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ABSTRACT 
Law controls our everyday.  It regulates our lives.  It tells us what is and is not 
acceptable behaviour, it confers and protects our rights, and it punishes us for our 
indiscretions.  But law does much more than this.  It creates normative standards 
which shape the way people are treated and the way that we relate to each other 
and to society generally.  The law defines people.  It constructs identity.  And it 
creates the ‘other’.  This is a legacy of positivism’s insistence on identifying that 
which is ‘inside’ law, and so accorded legitimacy, and that which is not.  That 
which does not conform to law’s constructed standards and values is identified as 
‘other’ and marginalised and silenced.  In this thesis, I demonstrate the way that 
the law constructs ‘other’, in particular, the Aboriginal ‘other’.  I consider the way 
that Aborigines have been defined by the law to show the consequences that this 
has had for Aboriginal people beyond the purely legal.  I argue that law’s 
construction of Aboriginality has contributed to the marginalisation of Aboriginal 
people and their exclusion from many aspects of the legal and the social, and that it 
has silenced them within the dominant domain, denying them the ability to 
challenge the wrongs perpetrated against them.  I examine these issues through the 
medium of literature.  I argue that literature’s contribution to exposing, critiquing 
and challenging law’s construction of ‘other’ is invaluable.  It informs the reader 
about the way that the law has treated Aboriginal people and, more generally, 
about the structures and limitations of our positivist legal system.  It thereby 
contributes to the community’s perception and understanding of the way the law 
works, and the impact that it has on the lives of its subjects.  Perhaps most 
importantly, it also educates towards social change and reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
… it might help if we non-Aboriginal Australians imagined ourselves 
dispossessed of land we have lived on for 50,000 years – and then imagined 
ourselves told that it had never been ours.  Imagine if ours was the oldest 
culture in the world and we were told that it was worthless.  Imagine if we 
had resisted this settlement, suffered and died in the defence of our land, 
and then were told in history books that we had given up without a fight.  
Imagine if non-Aboriginal Australians had served their country in peace 
and war and were then ignored in history books.  Imagine if our feats on 
sporting fields had inspired admiration and patriotism and yet did nothing 
to diminish prejudice.  Imagine if our spiritual life was denied and ridiculed.  
Imagine if we had suffered the injustice and then were blamed for it. 
  It seems to me that if we can imagine the injustice we can imagine its 
opposite.  And we can have justice.1 
In his 1992 Redfern Park speech, former Prime Minister Paul Keating eloquently 
brings together two important forms of discourse: law and literature.  He highlights 
the many injustices that have been wrought upon Australia’s Indigenous peoples by 
the law, from their dispossession and the denial of their culture, to the forced 
removal of their children.2  And then he calls on all non-Aboriginal Australians to 
imagine what this would have felt like, what impact such injustices would have 
had on our lives.  Literature is a powerful medium for the expression of the 
imagination.  It can bring to life the kinds of social, political, cultural and legal 
realities that were (and are) encountered everyday by Aboriginal people in our 
society.  Importantly, it can also imagine a different reality, a different future, one 
in which the injustices foregrounded by Paul Keating are remedied.  It is this 
linkage between law and literature that I examine in this thesis.  More specifically, 
                                                 
1 Keating, P. “The Redfern Park Speech” in Gratten, M. ed. Essays on Australian Reconciliation 
(Melbourne: Black Inc.) 2000 at 63. 
2 Keating states: “… it was we who did the dispossessing.  We took traditional lands and smashed 
the traditional way of life.  We brought the disasters.  The alcohol.  We committed the murders. We 
took the children from their mothers.  We practiced discrimination and exclusion.  It was our 
ignorance and our prejudice.  And our failure to imagine these things being done to us.”  Ibid at 61.   2
I examine what literature can tell us about the structure, the operation and the 
limitations of our legal system. 
 
Law is part of our everyday.  It controls many aspects of our lives.  It regulates our 
behaviour and sets rules with which we are required to comply.  It categorises our 
actions as legal or illegal, it protects our rights and it punishes us for failure to 
comply with its prescriptions.  But law is about much more than this.  It does not 
only regulate the legal.  It also orders the social.  It extends past the specific 
prescriptive rules of a legal system into “the structure of truth and the 
interpretations we have of the world.”3  It creates normative standards that impact 
on our social and cultural interactions, and shape our perceptions of, and the way 
we are perceived by, others.  It impacts on the way that we relate to each other and 
to society generally.  Laws tell us where we can go, who we can marry, that we 
should not discriminate against people with a disability, what constitutes 
acceptable behaviour in a public place, when we can consume alcohol, what speed 
we can drive at, and so on.  Law matters.  It is not separate from society, but is part 
of the “machine of society.”4  Our entire world, as Margaret Davies has stated, “is 
structured by laws of one sort or another.  The law is a form we cannot avoid, 
whatever its substance.  We think and act in relation to laws.”5 
 
One of the concepts I discuss in this thesis is the way in which the law constructs 
identity.  That is, the way it defines and represents people in particular ways and 
creates categories of ‘otherness’.  It has, for example, represented Aborigines as 
                                                 
3 Davies, M. Asking the Law Question 2nd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002 at 8. 
4 Hunt, A. and Wickham, G. Foucault and the Law (London: Pluto Press) 1994 at 104. 
5 Above n.3 at 4.   3
‘uncivilised’ or ‘inferior’, and used such constructions to legitimate and justify its 
treatment of them.  Representations of Aboriginal people as ‘uncivilised’, for 
example, justified the law’s dispossession of them.  Similarly, its representation of 
them as ‘inferior’ or ‘primitive’ legitimated the legally sanctioned discrimination 
that has been exercised against them.  The consequences of being constructed as 
‘other’ by the law are far reaching, long-term and often negative.  Aboriginal 
people continue to feel the impact, at the level of the legal and the social, of the 
way that they have been constructed and treated by the law.  They continue to 
experience higher rates of infant mortality and have a lower life expectancy than 
non-Aboriginal Australians.  They do not enjoy the same employment and 
educational opportunities and they are disproportionately represented in our 
criminal justice system.6  They “remain at a disadvantage compared to the rest of 
the population.”7 
 
It is for these reasons that we should not unquestioningly accept the laws by which 
we are governed, or, more accurately, the underlying assumptions or reasons for 
those laws.  This is not to say that laws are not necessary, or that we can ignore 
them or refuse to comply with them.  Rather, it is to suggest that as members of 
society we have a responsibility to think about our laws.  We should think about 
why the law tells us that we must vote in state and federal elections, for example, 
or why the law determines that certain days are public holidays while others are 
not, or why the law confines marriage to heterosexual partners.8  We should ask 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of some of these issues see Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/ 
rciadic/national/>  Retrieved on 30 June 2008. 
7 Scott, K. “Covered up with Sand” (2007) 66(2) Meanjin 120 at 121. 
8 The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s.5(1) defines marriage as “the union of a man and a woman” and so 
excludes same sex relationships.   4
what kinds of values and knowledges, or norms, do these kinds of laws enshrine 
and impose on us, not just in the legal arena, but at the level of the social, in the 
way that they regulate our experiences and perceptions of society.  If we do not 
think about these issues, or question them, then our assumptions, beliefs, reality, 
truth and knowledge become those determined by someone else.9  We should not 
“abdicate the responsibility of wondering about why we think the way we do, 
[and] why we act the way we do.”10 
 
In this thesis, I argue that literature brings important insight into our 
understanding of these issues.  As Melanie Williams has written: “literature … both 
reflect[s] prevailing values and problematise[s] those values. … [It is] a mirror to 
ourselves.”11  As an instrument of education, socio-political commentary and 
reform, literature is invaluable.  Literature that is concerned with law, such as The 
Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith, Journey to the Stone Country, Benang and the other 
texts referred to in this thesis, informs us about the way in which our law promotes 
particular values and norms, and the impact that this can have on society at large.12  
In particular, it exposes how the law constructs identity and marginalises and 
silences, within its domain, those who are different.  It exposes that the law does 
not treat everyone equally.  And, importantly, it encourages readers to question 
and to challenge the assumptions which underpin our legal system and our laws. 
 
                                                 
9 Davies, above n.3 at 4 – 11. 
10 Ibid at 5. 
11 Williams, M. Empty Justice: One Hundred Years of Law, Literature and Philosophy (London: 
Cavendish Publishing) 2002 at xxiv.  Emphasis in original. 
12 Keneally, T. The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith (Australia: Harper Collins) 2001; Miller, A. Journey 
to the Stone Country (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2003; Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: 
Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000.   5
Asking such questions is important.  They are a necessary precursor to law reform.  
Without questions Aboriginal people would not, for example, enjoy the (limited) 
legal recognition of their rights to land, and women would still not enjoy the right 
to vote.  Questions being asked today concern the inhumanity of imprisoning 
asylum seekers, the right of our political leaders to take us to unprovoked wars and 
(still) the rights of Australia’s Indigenous peoples.  If people wish to bring about a 
change in the laws by which they are governed they need to question them.  If 
they are to question they need to be informed.  One of the main ways in which 
people are informed about the law is through the media; television, movies, 
newspapers and books.13  The way the law is portrayed in literature is an important 
tool by which people can acquire knowledge and through which they can express 
their dissatisfaction (and satisfaction) with the status quo.  The power of literature 
should not be underestimated.  One need only look, for example, to the sales of 
John Grisham’s novels or to the hold that Harry Potter enjoys, to see that there is a 
powerful role for literature in popular consciousness.14 
 
The literature that I focus on in this thesis is Australian literature.  There is an 
absolute wealth of Australian writing that comments on the way in which our legal 
system and our laws operate.  Consider, for example, Peter Carey’s depiction of the 
law’s treatment of free settlers in True History of the Kelly Gang,15 or the law’s 
discrimination of Indigenous peoples that has been the subject of many literary 
                                                 
13 Although it should be noted that sometimes this information may be biased, or, for some other 
reason, questionable. 
14  Publisher’s Weekly, for example, lists John Grisham as the top selling author of the 1990’s. 
<http://archives.cnn.com/1999/books/news/12/31/1990.sellers/index.html> Retrieved on 24 August 
2008. 
15 Carey, P. True History of the Kelly Gang (Queensland: University of Queensland Press) 2002.   6
works, including The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith, My Place and Benang.16  The 
plight of the convict and the settlement of Australia have also been the topic of 
many novels, from Marcus Clarke’s For the Term of His Natural Life to more recent 
works such as Gould’s Book of Fish and The Secret River.17  There is also much 
contemporary literature ranging from the works of Nicholas Hasluck and Andrew 
McGahan to those of Robert Drewe and Kerry Greenwood that deals with an array 
of legal issues from criminal law to the corruption of government.18 
 
This thesis does not profess to provide an exhaustive discussion of Australian 
literature that deals with law.  Such a task is clearly beyond the scope of this work.  
Rather, I have chosen literary representations of the law’s treatment of Australia’s 
Indigenous peoples as my specific site of analysis.  Since the beginning of 
colonisation Aboriginal people have been mistreated by the western colonial law.  
They suffered the violence of terra nullius in the law’s representation of them as 
insufficiently ‘civilised’ to own their land, and in its dispossession of them.  They 
were then subjected to the injustice of protection and assimilation policies as 
contained in the repressive and inhumane legislative regimes which governed 
every aspect of their lives throughout much of the twentieth century and inflicted 
such wrongs on them as the forced removal of their children.  They were 
completely subjugated by our colonial law.  They were constructed, by this law, as 
                                                 
16 Keneally, above n.12; Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1988;  Scott, 
above n.12. 
17 Clarke, M. For the Term of His Natural Life (Victoria: Currey O’Neil) 1984; Flannagan, R. Gould’s 
Book of Fish (Sydney: Picador) 2001; Grenville, K. The Secret River (Melbourne: Text Publishing) 
2006. 
18 See, for example, Hasluck, N. A Grain of Truth (Victoria: Penguin) 1994; McGahan, A. Last 
Drinks (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2001; the Phryne Fisher series by Kerry Greenwood; 
Drewe, R. The Shark Net (Victoria: Penguin) 2001.   7
‘other’: ‘primitive’, ‘inferior’ and ‘uncivilised’, and were marginalised and silenced.19  
The law refused to recognise Aboriginal perspectives and experiences and denied 
Aboriginal people a voice, within the dominant discourse, with which to testify to 
the wrongs perpetrated against them. 
 
I argue in this thesis that by reading literature about the law’s treatment of 
Aboriginal people from a postcolonial perspective, the reader is clearly informed 
about the way in which the discourse of law constructs identity and marginalises 
difference, and about the way in which the law fails to treat people equally.   
Postcolonialism emphasises plurality, diversity and the local, and creates a space for 
alternative (minority) stories to be told that question and challenge dominant 
discourses such as the law.  It allows for the voice of the ‘other’ to be heard.  I use 
postcolonialism as a framework for reading the literary texts discussed here.  That 
is, I find postcolonialism useful as a reading and interpretation strategy rather than 
as a basis upon which to select specific (postcolonial) literature.  I argue that many 
texts can be read from a postcolonial perspective and so offer important insight into 
the way in which our law is structured and the way in which it treats its subjects. 
 
Within this framework, I focus specifically on two substantive areas of law; 
namely, terra nullius and the rule of law.  These two principles combine to provide 
the basis of Australia’s modern legal system.  Terra nullius, which determined, 
                                                 
19 It should be noted here that the very notion of ‘primitive’ is problematic and depends on the 
criteria by which it is judged.  By western colonial criteria which prioritized the cultivation of the 
land, dress and the ‘sophistication’ of technology, Aboriginal people were deemed to be ‘primitive’.  
If different criteria were applied, such as the sophistication of kinship groups and social 
organization, or the percentage of time applied to cultural pursuits, Aboriginal people would not be 
assessed as such.  In this thesis I am examining the way that the western colonial law has treated 
Aboriginal people.  This law determined that Aboriginal people were, by its standards and criteria, 
‘primitive’.  It is in this sense that I use the term ‘primitive’ throughout this thesis.   8
literally, that this land was empty, with no ‘civilised’ inhabitants, provided the 
colonisers with justification for claiming sovereignty over, occupying and settling 
Australia.  It also authorised them to transplant their own legal system and their 
own laws, to the exclusion of any other pre-existing laws, into their new 
acquisition.  The rule of law, as a fundamental principle of English law, was one of 
those principles duly implanted into the new colony.  It specifies that the law is an 
impartial and objective arbiter and that all of its subjects should be treated equally 
by it.  I argue that terra nullius and the rule of law are both colonial, positivist 
constructs that, when applied to Australia, resulted in the dispossession and 
discrimination of Aboriginal people.  Importantly, these two sites of analysis also 
expose clearly that the law is not separate from society, and that the way that it 
deals with people can have considerable (often negative) long-term consequences.  
Aboriginal people today continue to feel the impact of being dispossessed and of 
the discrimination exercised against them under the guise of equality. 
 
I begin in Part One of this thesis with an examination of questions that are relevant 
to law and to literature.  My aim here is twofold.  Firstly, to explicate the 
importance of law as a mechanism of regulating both the legal and the social, and 
secondly, to explain why literature is a useful medium by which to examine these 
issues.  In Parts Two and Three, I analyse specific literary texts that examine the 
issues I raise in Part One.  My argument, throughout, is that postcolonial readings 
of literature expose the way that the law constructs identity and creates the ‘other’, 
and that this has enormous long-term consequences beyond the purely legal. 
   9
In Chapter One, I begin with an examination of the reach that the law has into our 
everyday lives.  Drawing on the work of Lyotard and Foucault, I argue that law is 
not separate from society but that its power extends into many aspects of the 
everyday, impacting on all forms of social, political and cultural interactions.  The 
law is a discourse that contributes to the production of knowledge.  It imposes on 
society a universal and totalising truth, one that denies alternative truths and 
alternative values.  I argue here that the discourse of law marginalises and silences, 
within the dominant domain, those who do not fit within or conform to these 
constructed values or truths.  That is, the law gives rise to a différend, in its 
inability (and unwillingness) to recognise alternative perspectives.  It denies the 
‘other’, those who do not conform, the ability or the right to speak and be heard 
within the dominant discourse. 
 
The way in which the law constructs and marginalises the ‘other’ is examined in 
further detail in Chapter Two.  In this chapter, I explain that the legal system that 
operates in Australia is a positivist one.  That is, it is a system which stipulates that 
only those laws which are validly posited by the state are considered to be law, and 
that validly enacted laws must be complied with.  More importantly, positivism 
attempts to provide a universal, totalising narrative of law, one which clearly and 
definitively identifies that which is law and that which is not.  One of the 
important consequences of this concern is that it has created a discourse of law that 
is binary.  Some things are law and some things are not.  Some things are included 
within its domain and some things are not.  That which is different or does not 
conform to law’s constructed standards and norms is excluded.  And so, the law 
creates categories of non-conformity or difference.  Those who fall within these   10
categories and definitions are constructed as ‘other’, are marginalised and are often 
excluded from the full protection of the law.  Importantly, the way in which the 
law constructs the ‘other’ and marginalises difference further reveals that the law, 
despite its claim that it is impartial and that everyone is equal before it, is not an 
objective institution and does not treat everyone equally.  In this chapter, I argue 
that if the law is to achieve this objective of equality, it must embrace pluralism.  
Pluralism emphasises diversity and respect.  I  a r g u e  t h a t  i t  t h e r e b y  o f f e r s  a n  
alternative approach to the monism of positivism, one in which ‘otherness’ or 
difference can be accommodated by the law, not absorbed or digested by it.  It 
allows for alternative voices to be heard, within the dominant domain, and 
challenge the conditions that give rise to Lyotard’s différend. 
 
In Chapters Three and Four I focus on questions about literature.  In Chapter 
Three, I argue that literature is an important form of representation that can either 
create and perpetuate, or critique and question authorised discourses, including the 
law.  It is an important medium by which people are informed about the law and 
by which existing structures, systems and values can be represented and critiqued. 
 
In Chapter Four, I suggest that postcolonialism provides a useful framework for the 
interpretation and analysis of literature about law.  I argue that postcolonialism is 
useful for two reasons: firstly, it creates a space for alternative stories to be told.  
That is, it allows for the ‘other’ to be heard.  Secondly, it offers a perspective or way 
of reading.  Within this framework, I find the work of Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra 
in  Dark Side of the Dream: Australian literature and the postcolonial mind   11
particularly useful.20  T h e y  m a k e  a  n u m b e r  o f  i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t s  i n  t h i s  w o r k .    
Firstly, they emphasise that heterogeneity is fundamental to an understanding of 
postcolonialism, and that we must be aware not to reduce the diversity of 
experiences of colonised peoples to an undifferentiated theory of the colonised 
‘other’.  Secondly, they highlight the difficulties of treating settler countries, such 
as Australia, where the colonial power remains intact, as postcolonial.  Finally, they 
introduce their theory of Aboriginalism, which, like Said’s Orientalism, explains 
that Aboriginal people have been (and are) represented by the colonisers in such a 
way that they are denied the right to represent, or speak for, themselves within the 
dominant domain.  I draw on Aboriginalism, in particular, in analysing the texts 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
In Part Two, I focus on the application of the principle of terra nullius to Australia.  
I argue that the discourse of terra nullius legitimated, and was legitimated by, the 
representation of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’.  It was this 
construction of them that enabled the English to occupy Australia and to dispossess 
Aboriginal people.  The law represented them as unable to cultivate or own the 
land, and that therefore the land could be considered empty, available to be legally 
and legitimately occupied.  This concept of terra nullius is further explored in 
Chapter Five.  I explain what is meant by terra nullius, the way in which it 
provided the legal basis for the settlement of Australia, and challenges to the 
application of the principle.  In particular, I explore the way in which the law has 
changed from the decision in Milirrpum v Nabalco, in which Aboriginal rights to 
land were denied, to that in Mabo v Queensland (No.2), which recognised the 
                                                 
20 Hodge, B. and Mishra, V. Dark Side of the Dream: Australian literature and the postcolonial mind 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin) 1990.   12
existence of common law native title rights in Australia.21  This chapter provides 
the legal background to the texts that are examined in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
In Chapter Six, I analyse Eleanor Dark’s The Timeless Land, Thomas Keneally’s The 
Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith and Mudrooroo’s Doctor Wooreddy’s Prescription for 
Enduring the Ending of the World.22  These texts tell of the settlement of Australia 
and of the impact that this settlement had on Aboriginal peoples.  I argue that these 
stories inform the reader about how the law constructed Aboriginality in a way 
which justified Australia’s designation as terra nullius and the dispossession of 
Aboriginal peoples.  I further argue here that these texts expose how the law’s 
representations of Aboriginality gave rise to a différend and silenced Aboriginal 
peoples’ voices within the dominant discourse. 
 
In Chapter Seven, I examine texts by Kate Grenville, Alex Miller and Andrew 
McGahan, all of which were written after the 1992 Mabo decision, and which 
retell stories of settlement and dispossession.23  I argue that these texts tell 
alternative stories to those examined in Chapter Six.  That is, they allow for 
Aboriginal stories, experiences and perspectives to be told.  They give a voice to the 
‘other’ and so begin to challenge the conditions that give rise t o the différend.  
Importantly, I argue that in telling these stories, these texts inform the reader about 
the law’s role in changing constructions of Aboriginality.  They engage with the 
change in the law that occurred in Mabo, represent Aboriginal people as 
                                                 
21 Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141; Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
22 Dark, E. The Timeless Land (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2002; Keneally, above n.12; Mudrooroo, 
Doctor Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World (Melbourne: Hyland House) 
2001. 
23 Grenville, above n.17; Miller, above, n.12; McGahan, A. The White Earth (Crow’s Nest NSW: 
Allen & Unwin) 2005.   13
empowered and having the right to claim their land, and reveal how there is now a 
way for Aboriginal people to speak and to be heard within the dominant 
discourse.24 
 
In Part Three, I move away from stories about dispossession, and focus on the rule 
of law.  In particular, I examine its assertion that everyone is equal before the law.  
I argue that, despite this assertion, the law does not treat everyone equally, and that 
it silences, within the dominant domain, the voices of those who are not treated 
equally by it.  In Chapter Eight, I explain the concept of the rule of law.  In 
particular, I examine Dicey’s formulation of the rule,25 its manifestation as equality 
before the law, and the distinction between standards of formal and substantive 
equality.  It is against this background that I examine the texts discussed in 
Chapters Nine and Ten. 
 
In Chapter Nine, I analyse stories about the 1905 Aborigines Act (WA).26  This 
legislation instituted a repressive and discriminatory regime that regulated the lives 
of Aboriginal people in Western Australia throughout much of the twentieth 
c e n t u r y .   I t  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h e cultural and physical absorption of 
Aboriginal Australia into mainstream (white) Australia through a raft of inhumane 
and barbaric restrictions and controls imposed on Aboriginal people, from the 
regulation of who they could marry, to the forced removal of their children.27  I 
argue that the texts discussed here expose the way that the law used the discourse 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that, of course, there are individual Aboriginal people, such as Michael Mansell 
and Mick Dodson, and organizations, such as the Aboriginal Legal Service, that do speak out in 
public. 
25 Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10th ed. (London: Macmillan) 
1960. 
26 Scott, above n.12; Morgan, above n.16. 
27 It was also about protection in the eyes of some.   14
of equality, in the form of assimilation as enshrined in the 1905 Act, to justify its 
deliberate discrimination of Aboriginal people.  It denied them equality, and it 
denied them a voice, within the dominant discourse, with which to challenge the 
injustices which they suffered. 
 
In February 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd apologised to Aboriginal people for 
the discrimination, injustice and pain deliberately inflicted on them by the “laws 
and policies of successive parliaments and governments.”28  In Chapter Ten, I 
discuss the importance of apologising.  I examine Gail Jones’s Sorry, Alex Miller’s 
Landscape of Farewell and Kim Scott’s Benang.29  Sorry and Landscape of Farewell, 
in particular, highlight the importance of apologising.  They illustrate that saying 
sorry allows for the unspoken to be put into words and forces the party that has 
committed the wrong to name that which they have done.  I argue that Kevin 
Rudd’s apology, in acknowledging, and speaking of, the wrongs committed against 
Aboriginal people by the law, is an essential precursor to the realisation of equality 
for Aboriginal Australians.  It also foregrounds the need to respect difference and 
Aboriginal peoples’ ‘otherness’.  I argue in this chapter that the law needs to respect 
and accommodate this diversity, without assimilating or absorbing it.  That is, it 
needs to be more pluralistic in its treatment of, and relationship with, Aboriginal 
people.  As demonstrated by the texts discussed here, this recognition and 
acceptance of difference is an essential precursor to achieving equality. 
 
                                                 
28 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 February 2008 at 167   
(Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister). 
29 Jones, G. Sorry (NSW: Vintage Books) 2007; Miller, A. Landscape of Farewell (Crow’s Nest NSW: 
Allen & Unwin) 2007; Scott, above n.12.   15
Finally, I offer some concluding comments about what the literature I have 
examined tells me about the way that our law has treated Aboriginal people, about 
the importance of the law beyond the impact that it has had on the lives of 
Aboriginal people, and about the ability of the law to change to accommodate, and 
to guide, changing community standards and values.   16
CHAPTER ONE 
REGULATING THE SOCIAL: THE ROLE AND FORCE OF LAW 
 
Introduction 
Law can be defined in many ways.  At a very basic (and functional) level one could 
say that law is the web of rules and regulations which order society.  That is, it 
prescribes and regulates behaviour.  Classical positivist conceptions would elaborate 
on this and describe law as a set of rules or commands validly enacted by a 
sovereign power, which demand compliance under threat of sanction.1  Natural law 
theorists would agree that law is a series of rules or commands.  For these theorists, 
however, what is essential is that these orders derive not from a sovereign (human) 
power but from some higher authority, such as God.  That is, law exists 
independently of human action and is reflective of higher or moral values.2  These 
are both narrow definitions of law, focusing predominantly on questions of 
authority and legitimacy.  For both, law is defined as a set of rules emanating from 
a legitimate (if variable) authority.3 
 
Law is not, however, simply a series of commands which demand compliance.  This 
is a conception of law that many critical theorists challenge.4  They highlight the 
                                                 
1 This version of positivism is most notably attributable to Austin, J. The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined 2 nd ed. (New York: Burt Franklin) 1970.  Other leading positivist thinkers of the 
twentieth century include Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1994 
and Kelsen, H. Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1967.  These theorists 
will be considered further in Chapter Two. 
2 Some leading natural law theorists include Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and John Finnis. 
3 It is, however, the positivist tradition with its emphasis on correctly created law that is the 
foundation of our modern (western) legal system. 
4 There are many critical theorists writing in a number of areas, such as postmodernism, feminism 
and a variety of law in context movements.  See, for example, Douzinas, C., Warrington, R. and 
McVeigh, S. Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in the Texts of Law (London: Routledge) 
1991; Cornell, D. Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (New 
York: Routledge) 1991.  For an overview of some of the various theories see Davies, M. Asking the   17
impact of law on society at large and critique the way that law operates in relation 
to issues such as gender, race or culture.  They argue that law is not a determinate 
body of knowledge which is objectively applied, but that it is indeterminate, its 
application entailing exercises of discretion and value choices, which enable it to 
favour dominant power bases in society, based on gender or race, for example.  
They assert, that is, that law is not a discrete science that can be studied or 
considered separately from its wider social and political context.5 
 
In this chapter, I examine the role of the law in regulating the social.  My argument 
is that the law demands compliance with its rules, but that these rules do not just 
regulate the legal.  Drawing on the work of Lyotard and Foucault, I argue that law’s 
power extends into many aspects of the everyday, impacting on all forms of social, 
political and cultural interactions.  That is, I argue that the law is a web of power 
relations that structures the way society operates.  I explain what I mean by my use 
of the term ‘law’, and examine the extent of the law’s reach into the everyday.  In 
the second part of this chapter, I introduce some of the consequences of law’s 
regulation of the social. 
 
Law’s Power 
Law is powerful for a number of reasons.  It sets rules, regulates behaviour and 
orders society.  It issues commands which must be obeyed.6  These commands or 
orders may relate to anything from the imposition of restrictions on speeding, or 
                                                                                                                                             
Law Question 2nd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002 at chapters 5 – 8 and Freeman, M.D.A. Lloyd’s 
Introduction to Jurisprudence, 6th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell) 1994 at chapters 11 – 14. 
5 This is obviously a generalisation and the different approaches have variant theoretical arguments 
and emphases.  Some of these will be addressed in Chapters Two and Four. 
6 These commands may be legislative, regulatory or judicial.  They may also be positive or negative.  
This is a point to which I return later.  That we suggest that the law has agency, and acts, rather 
than acknowledging that humans operate the law, is itself an example of law’s power.   18
the obligation to register your dog, to the proscription of murder or the 
requirement that, once eighteen, we all vote in state and federal elections.   
Compliance with these regulations is ensured, or at least encouraged, through the 
imposition of sanctions on those who fail to comply.  The power (and assumed 
right) of the law to enforce such sanctions is displayed when offenders are brought 
before a court and duly punished.  Generally, we are all aware of the existence and 
presence of the law.  Generally, we all have some kind of working knowledge or 
understanding of the law, and what we can and cannot (or should and should not) 
do.7  We are made aware, through the imposition of sanctions, as reported by a 
variety of media, that certain actions incur certain consequences.  Generally, as a 
community, we adhere to the law. 
 
But law is powerful not simply because it issues commands that demand obedience.  
It is powerful because of the power relations that it creates within society at large.  
It is part of our everyday, wielding control in some form over many aspects of our 
lives, defining and dictating the way in which we should live.  This is a point of 
absolute fundamental importance.  The law is not simply a mechanism for ensuring 
that we do not harm others, that we observe road regulations, or that we comply 
with our contractual agreements.  It is a mechanism for ordering the social.  It 
orders our experiences and the way that we relate to and perceive the world.8  As 
stated by Davies: 
                                                 
7 There are, of course, exceptions to this.  For example, newly arrived residents in Australia may 
have little knowledge of Australian law.  Also some Aboriginal people who live outside towns or 
who live in small enclaves within towns may have little knowledge of some law.  For example, prior 
to the Mabo case, the law of property may not have been an area in which many had knowledge.  
Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
8 Davies, above n.4 at 6.   19
Law – broadly understood – orders the way we view the world: it shapes 
our perception, and therefore cannot be identified merely as an “object” of 
our perception.  It enters into the process of cognition.9 
Importantly, the impact of this is not always positive.10  Authority to determine the 
content of law traditionally resides with those who occupy positions of dominance 
within society.  Consequently, the way in which we perceive, understand and 
experience the law is often dependent upon where we sit in relation to these 
dominant powers.  That is, it will depend on “our language, culture, gender, race, 
class, and so on.”11 
 
The way in which individuals experience the law is an issue emphasised by much 
critical legal theory.  Since the middle of the twentieth century there have been a 
variety of critical legal theories, ranging from postmodernism and feminist legal 
theory to postcolonialism and law and literature, which have focused on 
highlighting the links between law and society and critiquing the law’s role in the 
creation of power relations within society.12  One of the central concerns of these 
critical theories is demonstrating that law is not separate from society.  As 
expressed by Davies: 
We frequently assume that law is separate and distinct from other aspects of 
our social existences. … But how can law be even conceptually separate 
from its context?  How can it be conceptually separate from the human lives 
who have created it, who apply it, who criticise it, and who relate to it?13 
                                                 
9 Ibid at 7. 
10 This is something that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
11 Davies, above n.4 at 9.  This is something that is explored further in Chapter Two. 
12 These theories also include the Critical Legal Studies movement, Marxism, deconstruction, 
poststructuralism and critical race theory.  While I do not give a detailed account of these theories 
here, some, particularly postmodernism and postcolonialism, will be discussed further throughout 
this work.   
13 Above n.4 at 4.   20
Hunt and Wickham make a similar point.  They explain that law is part of the 
“machine of society.”14  They go on: 
Law is part of power; it helps drive society … Law is a part of mundanely 
productive power, helping power produce all aspects of social life.  Law is 
neatly tied into the equation whereby ‘power’ is simply another term for the 
process of governance. … we make this point … in an attempt to ensure the 
reader cannot understand law as separate from and in the service of some 
mysterious removed power.15 
 
One of the issues of importance raised by critical theorists in emphasising this 
interrelation of law and society is the creation of ‘norms’.  Norms can broadly be 
identified as standards or principles.  They may refer to a legal standard, such as 
when the law states that we must not speed.  However, when the law proscribes or 
prescribes certain actions or behaviour it is not simply defining whether a 
particular act is legal or illegal.  It is also creating and perpetuating general 
standards, or norms, of behaviour that have important social consequences.  For 
example, recently enacted Commonwealth legislation requires that Aboriginal 
people living in the Northern Territory comply with a raft of restrictions and 
obligations (financial and social) in order to receive certain government benefits 
and assistance.16  This follows a long line of similar measures aimed at regulating 
the lives of Aborigines.17  The consequences of such laws have been to influence 
the way that Aboriginal people are viewed and treated by the community 
generally, and to affect the level of access that they have to various aspects of 
                                                 
14 Hunt, A. and Wickham, G. Foucault and the Law (London: Pluto Press) 1994 at 104. 
15 Ibid at 104.  Yet, as discussed later, it can seem like law is separate from society, that it is removed 
from the everyday.  See, for example, Keneally, T. The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith (Sydney: Harper 
C o l l i n s )  2 0 0 1 .   F o r  J i m m i e  B l a c k s m i t h  t h e  l a w  w o u l d  h a v e  s e e m e d  l i k e  i t  w a s  p a r t  o f  “ s o m e  
mysterious removed power”.  This work is discussed in Chapter Six. 
16 Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth). 
17 Some of these measures will be discussed in Chapter Nine.   21
society.18  The point is that the law demands compliance with its rules, and 
compliance means that we are required to submit, whether willingly or because we 
feel we have no choice, to the normative values and ideologies that are embedded 
within the content of its prescriptions.19 
 
This interest in the power of the law in setting normative standards is something of 
concern to postmodernist, poststructuralist and postcolonial theorists and writers.20  
Generally, these theorists argue that the law operates by enshrining certain 
dominant values, such as those aligned with the white dominant monoculture, and 
presenting them as truth.21  The effect of this is to disempower those who do not fit 
within or conform to these values or truths, such as minority groups based on race, 
gender or culture, positioning them to resist if they do not wish to accept the status 
quo.  One result of this is that they may then be silenced within the dominant 
discourse.22  As Alex Reilly writes of Indigenous peoples’ experiences within this 
discourse: 
It is only recently that the voices of Indigenous peoples have been heard 
publicly at all by non-Indigenous peoples.  Generally, Indigenous peoples 
have been compelled to listen and pay heed to non-Indigenous peoples, and 
even to speak in non-Indigenous languages.  Histories of Australia have 
excluded the rich and diverse cultural experience of Indigenous peoples and 
played down the degree of injustice under which they have suffered since 
first European settlement.  Indigenous peoples still labour under the myth 
                                                 
18 This is something discussed in more detail in Parts Two and Three. 
19 Of course sometimes we choose not to submit to these values and may voice our disagreement by, 
for example, participating in protests against them.  Recently, for example, Australians have voiced 
their disagreement with detaining asylum seekers, particularly children, in detention centres, and 
with government refusal to protect the environment (and principles of democracy) through the 
approval process employed for the Bell Bay pulp mill in Tasmania. 
20 See Chapters Two and Four. 
21 See, for example, Cornell, above n.4; Berns, S. Concise Jurisprudence (New South Wales: 
Federation Press) 1993; Graycar, R. and Morgan, J. The Hidden Gender of Law (Sydney: Federation 
Press) 1990. 
22 See further the discussion below at 24 – 26.   22
of their physical extinction and the extinction of their traditional laws and 
customs.  In issues of rights to land, sovereignty, reconciliation, and 
identity, Indigenous voices have too often been silenced, or when spoken, 
dismissed or trivialised.23 
 
This silencing is something particularly emphasised by postmodernism, which: 
defies the system, suspects all totalizing thought and homogeneity and 
opens space for the marginal, the different and the ‘other’.  Postmodernism 
is … a celebration of flux, dispersal, plurality and localism.24 
Postmodernism has as its concern a critiquing of totalising narratives, including 
that of law.  It denies that it is possible (or even desirable) to construct a narrative 
that provides an overarching sense of order and reason to the world.25  It opposes 
the totality and unity sought to be created by grand narratives and seeks to critique 
them with smaller local narratives.  Postmodernist legal theory foregrounds the 
role of the law in perpetuating dominant power structures and relations in society.  
Law has, for example, traditionally favoured men at many levels of society so that 
women have been denied a public voice and a range of rights.26  White colonial law 
has promulgated an image of the western legal system as superior, and other, non-
western, systems of law as inferior, and thereby provided colonial powers with 
justification for colonial expansion.  Similarly, it has perpetuated an image of 
Aboriginal people as ‘primitive’ and ‘inferior’ so that they too have been denied a 
public voice and access to many aspects of society.27  In defying this discourse, 
                                                 
23 Reilly, A. “Introduction” (2000) 1(1) Balayi: Culture, Law and Colonialism 1 at 1. 
24 Douzinas et al, above n.4 at 15. 
25 Rice, P. and Waugh, P. Modern Literary Theory, A Reader 3rd ed. (London: Arnold) 1991 at 290. 
26 They have, for example, been denied equal pay, the right to vote, and the right to own property. 
27 The way that the law has constructed Aboriginality and restricted Aboriginal rights is discussed in 
Parts Two and Three.   23
postmodernism seeks to legitimate and give a voice to the ‘other’ that has for so 
long been suppressed by law’s totalising power.28 
 
The work of Jean-François Lyotard provides insight here.  According to him, 
attempts to put forth a totalising discourse of law result in what he labels a 
différend.  It is with this creation of a différend that I am mostly concerned here.  
Lyotard explains it as: 
the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must 
be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be.  This state includes silence, 
which is a negative phrase, but it also calls upon phrases which are in 
principle possible.  This state is signalled by what one ordinarily calls a 
feeling: “One cannot find the words,” etc.  A lot of searching must be done 
to find new rules for forming and linking phrases that are able to express the 
differend disclosed by the feeling, unless one wants this differend to be 
smothered right away in a litigation and for the alarm sounded by the 
feeling to have been useless.  What is at stake in a literature, in a 
philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to differends by finding 
idioms for them.29 
A différend arises because of a feeling.  It arises because of “phrases that have been 
neither spoken nor heard: phrases that are at the level of sense feeling, and/or 
phrases that have been marginalised or silenced even before they are spoken.”30  It 
can derive from an injustice and is signalled by an inability to speak of it, as where 
a “plaintiff is divested of the means to argue”,31 or where the resolution of a dispute 
                                                 
28 There are many examples of the law’s inability to cater to the ‘other’.  See, for example, The 
Queen v Carlton James Winmar decided in the District Court of Western Australia by Keall J. in 
which an Aboriginal man was sentenced for lighting a fire in contravention of the Bushfires Act 
1954 (WA).  This was despite the Court’s acceptance that Winmar’s actions were prompted by his 
belief that Pulyarts, evil spirits, were hiding in the bushes.  As Winmar had his child with him and 
as Pulyarts, which are afraid of light and fire, sometimes take children, he lit the fire to ward the 
Pulyarts away.  This case is discussed in Moore, L. “The Queen v Carlton James Winmar (Repelling 
the Pulyarts – cultural clash and criminal responsibility)” (1990) 2(46) Aboriginal Law Bulletin 17. 
29 Lyotard, J-F. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abeele (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press) 1988 at 13. 
30 Rodan, D. Identity and Justice: Conflicts, Contradictions and Contingencies (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter 
Lang) 2004 at 88. 
31 Lyotard, J-F. “The Différend, the Referent, and the Proper Name” (1984) 14(3) Diacritics 3 at 5.   24
“is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the injustice suffered by the other 
is not signified in that idiom.”32  As Lyotard explains: 
As distinguished from a litigation, a differend would be a case of conflict, 
between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a 
rule of judgment applicable to both arguments.  One side’s legitimacy does 
not imply the other side’s lack of legitimacy.  However, applying a single 
rule of judgment to both in order to settle their differend as though it were 
merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of them if 
neither side admits this rule.)33 
Rodan summarises it as follows: 
The differend arises where there are conflicts, disputes, differences, 
incommensurabilities that are not spoken, or if they are, they are not heard.  
A differend occurs because other versions of reality are either silenced or 
already judged.  It marks the impossibility of consensus between 
heterogeneous language games.34 
 
Silence is a key indicator of a différend: 
The différend is signaled by this impossibility to prove.  He who lodges a 
complaint is heard, but he who is a victim, and who is perhaps the same, is 
reduced to silence.35 
It is because of this silencing that, according to Lyotard, disputes, conflicts or 
differences do not get spoken or, perhaps more importantly, if they are spoken, are 
not heard.36  He writes: 
It would be absurd to suppose that human beings “endowed with language” 
cannot speak in the strict sense, as is the case for stones.  Necessity would 
signify here: they do not speak because they are threatened with the worst 
in the case that they would speak, or when in general a direct or indirect 
attempt is made against their ability to speak.  Let’s suppose that they keep 
                                                 
32 Ibid at 5. 
33 Above n.29 at xi. 
34 Above n.30 at 86. 
35 Lyotard, above n.31 at 6. 
36 Rodan, D. ‘Identity’ and ‘Experience’: Theories of Representation and Justice in Selected Narrative 
Forms (Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch University) 2000 at 150.   25
quiet under threat.  A contrary ability needs to be presupposed if the threat 
is to have an effect.37 
It is this silencing that is of interest to me here.  The différend, in this sense, results 
from the power of discourse to perpetuate dominant ideology and silence those 
who do not fit within its ideal.  It denies those who do not conform, the right, and 
the ability, to speak and to be heard within the dominant discourse.  It is those who 
are part of the dominant discourse who are able to determine, and deny, the rights 
and voices of those who are not; that is, the ‘other’.38 
 
Lyotard’s theory of the différend is useful in highlighting the difficulties and 
inadequacies of law’s discourse.  For example, one of the founding principles of 
Australia’s legal system is equality before the law.  This is supported by everyone 
(formally) having access to the law.  This is not, however, the (substantive) 
reality.39  If those seeking access do not speak the language of legal discourse they 
cannot be heard, and the injustices which they cannot voice are thereby 
legitimated.40  As Rodan explains: 
Within the discourse of law, citizens who are visibly different and are from 
a minority race, ethnicity, and/or gender can also be ‘already judged’ as not 
credible before they speak.  The structure of logic, within the law, already 
judges what realities are credible and what realities are illegitimate, because 
a plaintiff’s reality is already judged as not credible, so what is unjust can be 
legitimated.  Lyotard questions, then, why there is a testimony given at all 
                                                 
37 Lyotard, above n.29 at 10 – 11.  This is evidenced, for example, in the way that the characters in 
Benang are unable to speak within the dominant discourse.  Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: Fremantle 
Arts Centre Press) 2000.  Benang is discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
38 For example, in Keneally, above n.15 Jimmie Blacksmith does not have the language to get his 
needs met, as when he wants to be paid correctly for the fencing work he has done.  Also in Dark, 
E.  The Timeless Land (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2002 and Mudrooroo, Doctor Wooreddy’s 
Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World (Melbourne: Hyland House) 2001, the 
Aboriginal characters are unable to defend their land within the new dominant discourse.  These 
works are discussed in Chapter Six. 
39 The idea of equality before the law is enshrined in the rule of law.  This is explained in Chapter 
Eight and examined in further detail in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
40 Rodan, above n.30 at 89.   26
when the victim has not even entered into the phrase “universe” of the 
tribunal.  It is only when a person enters into a phrase universe legitimated 
by the tribunal, within the discourse of law, that their testimony exists for 
the tribunal.  A person who is outside the legitimated phrase universe, does 
not exist for the tribunal.41 
In the context of this work the existence of a différend is clear.  The expansion of 
colonialism meant that those who were colonised were denied, by the colonisers, 
their language, their social system, their legal system and their rights.  They were 
denied a voice and silenced, within the dominant domain.42  A  différend was 
created by the inability of Aboriginal people to use the colonisers’ discourse to 
assert the injustice of the colonisation of Australia and the taking of their land.  The 
relationship that Aborigines had with their land was “judged as not credible”, and 
their dispossession thereby legitimated.  Until the Mabo decision, Aboriginal 
plaintiffs were not heard.43  They had not “entered the phrase “universe” of the 
tribunal.”44  As explained in Chapters Five and Seven, it was only once they had 
entered this “universe” and made their claim in a way western law could 
understand that this law was able to recognise the existence of common law native 
title rights.  As Rodan explains it, Eddie Mabo’s feelings of injustice about the 
dispossession of his people “gave rise to a differend opening up the possibility of 
justice to come for indigenous people.”45 
 
                                                 
41 Ibid at 90. 
42 It is important to appreciate that this silencing was (and is) within the dominant domain and not 
always within the private domain.  For example, in Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts 
Centre Press) 1988, Gladys says to her children to tell people in the public domain that they’re 
Indian.  My Place is discussed in Chapter Nine. 
43 Although it should be noted here that there was some limited statutory recognition of Aboriginal 
rights to land.  For example, the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966 (SA); the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth); the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA); the Maralinga 
Land Rights Act 1984 (SA). 
44 Rodan, above n.30 at 90. 
45 Ibid at 87.   27
One of the issues that emerges through a consideration of Lyotard’s work and 
which is of importance in the current context is the power and importance of 
discourse.  Discourses, as stated by Hunt and Wickham: 
have real effect; they are not just the way that social issues get thought and 
talked about.  They structure the pos s i b i l i t y  o f  w h a t  g e t s  i n c l u d e d  a n d  
excluded and of what gets done or remains undone. … In the most obvious 
sense discourse authorises some to speak, some views to be taken seriously, 
while others are marginalised, derided, excluded and even prohibited.   
Discourses impose themselves upon social life, indeed they produce what it 
is possible to think, speak and do.46 
For Lyotard, discourses are important because they create, legitimate and so 
authorise a particular version of reality and, in so doing, exclude other ways of 
constructing reality.47  As Rodan puts it: 
One of the key points Lyotard makes is that it is legitimation which enables 
a genre of discourse to generate hegemony over other discourses.  Thus one 
genre of discourse becomes the authorised version of the ‘event’.  It is this 
authorised version which constructs a hegemony that causes a differend.  
The differend occurs because the other versions are silenced, or already 
judged.48 
In Parts Two and Three of this thesis I examine the impact of the colonisation of 
Australia on Indigenous peoples.  Discourses including social Darwinism and 
anthropology promulgated ideas and images about Aboriginal people as ‘primitive’ 
and destined to ‘die out’.49  Governments and the law drew on these ideas to 
legitimate policies of protection and assimilation.  These discourses created an 
authorised reality about Aboriginal people, based on race, judging them, silencing 
them and so creating a différend.50  Said makes a similar point in his discussion of 
the ways western discourses constructed the Orient by: 
                                                 
46 Above n.14 at 8. 
47 Rodan, above n.30 at 94. 
48 Above n.36 at 155. 
49 Some of these theories are discussed in more detail in Parts Two and Three. 
50 Rodan, above n.30 at 94.  These policies are discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine.   28
dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short Orientalism 
[is] a western style for dominating, restricting, and having authority over 
the Orient.51 
 
What is important here is the relationship between discourse, power and 
knowledge.  This is an issue that is also of interest to Foucault.  In Discipline and 
Punish he wrote: 
We should admit … that power produces knowledge … that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations.52 
Discourse contributes to the production of knowledge and truth and for Foucault it 
is the creation of knowledge that is necessary for the basis and continuance of 
power.  Legal discourse is one of the mechanisms that play a role in generating 
knowledge and normative standards, and so in creating and controlling the subject.  
It creates knowledge or truths by normalising certain values; legal, political, and 
social.53  The imposition of sanctions, such as fines, community service or a period 
of imprisonment, for failure to comply with legal regulations further serves to 
reinforce these values and beliefs.  In this, the discourse of law is enormously 
powerful.  And so, for me, in the context of this thesis, the importance of Foucault’s 
work lies in its suggestion of law as a mechanism of power and one of the means by 
which knowledge is produced and subjects created.  It controls (regulates and 
                                                 
51 Said, E. Orientalism (London: Penguin) 2003 at 3. 
52 Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Pantheon) 1977 at 27 – 28.. 
53 This can be seen in the variety of policies and legislation directed at controlling the lives of 
Aboriginal people.  These normalised, for example, views that Aboriginal people could not properly 
care for themselves and their families, that they were ‘lazy’ or ‘alcoholics’, or that they could only 
be educated to a certain (low) standard.  Some of these policies and legislative enactments are 
discussed in Chapter Nine.   29
disciplines) these subjects and so creates norms that are effective in the everyday.  
This, in turn, perpetuates the power relations created by the very discourse of law 
and thus contributes to the marginalisation of certain groups within society. 
 
It is important here to clarify Foucault’s use of the word ‘power’.  He does not use 
the term in the way it is described above to refer to something that is specifically 
exercised by one individual over another or something that any one person holds.  
Rather, he sees it as part of the system of relations within society, something that 
exists within a social context.  As Foucault expresses it: 
power is not to be taken to be a phenomenon of one individual’s 
consolidated and homogeneous domination over others, or that of one 
group or class over others. … Power must be analysed as something which 
circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a 
chain.  It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth.  Power is employed and 
exercised through a net-like organisation.54 
This is an important point in the context of this work.  I agree that power is 
something that exists within a system of meaning, within a social context.   
Foucault’s work is therefore important for two main reasons.  Firstly, because it 
highlights the impact that law has on the everyday through the creation of norms.  
Secondly, because it exposes the way that discourse produces truth and knowledge 
and so perpetuates current dominant power relations within society. 
 
These understandings of law are enormously important and are ones with which I 
voice general agreement.  They emphasise that law is not separate.  It is not an 
objective body of knowledge that is somehow ‘out there’.  It is made by people.  It 
is integral to our everyday lives and our very existence.  It regulates and controls.  
                                                 
54 Foucault, M. Power / Knowledge trans. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press) 1980 at 98.   30
But it doesn’t just prescribe that we drive at forty kilometres an hour in a school 
zone.  It is not just used in court to resolve disputes between competing parties.  It 
defines who we are and how we should lead our lives.  It delegitimises certain 
social relationships or certain cultural practices and beliefs and so defines what 
appropriate or ‘normal’ behaviour is and what is not.  Those who do not comply 
with these norms are marginalised and castigated as ‘other’.55  A n d  s o  w h a t  
becomes apparent is that law matters.  It is not just some mysterious entity that 
springs into action as disputes arise.  Law is always present, creating and enforcing 
power relations and ordering the social.56  For me, when I talk about law 
throughout this work, I mean law as it extends beyond the legal into the everyday, 
and structures knowledge and truth and impacts on the way we perceive and 
experience the world.57  Law, in this context, is not just the institutions of law in 
the sense of courts and legislatures, but includes legal discourse.  That is, law’s: 
surrounding context, including language and cultural norms, which interact 
to give certain acts a legal significance. … legal discourse is not just the 
formal rules of the game of law, but includes all of the contextual systems 
which contribute to the significances established by law.58 
And, importantly, it includes the silencing and judging, that is, the différend, 




                                                 
55 This is a point which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
56 This ordering of the social may be positive or negative.  For example, in Keneally, above n.15 for 
Jimmie Blacksmith the law was negative, but for the squatters it worked in a positive way.  So while 
the law may be negative for Aboriginal Australians, it may be positive for white Australians.  This is 
discussed further in Parts Two and Three. 
57 Davies, above n.4 at 8. 
58 Davies, M. Delimiting the Law: ‘Postmodernism’ and the Politics of Law (London: Pluto Press) 
1996 at 43.   31
Law’s Impact 
The issues discussed above are not of purely theoretical concern; law matters.  Its 
decisions about how, or even whether, to deal with particular issues have very real 
and long-term consequences.  Often these consequences may be negative.59  The 
content of our laws creates ideologies to which we, willingly or otherwise, 
generally submit, and this influences the way we perceive and experience the 
everyday. 
 
The extent of law’s hegemony is demonstrated in the way it defines and categorises 
certain groups of people.  Traditionally, for example, the law has defined and 
treated women differently from men, classifying them as the property of men, 
denying them the right to vote and denying them the right to own property, 
amongst other things.  While many of these restrictions may no longer exist the 
social impact of them is still being felt.  Men continue to dominate many areas of 
society from politics to the boardroom to the judiciary, and so on.  Women 
continue to struggle for equality in areas such as wage parity and for recognition of, 
for example, maternity leave entitlements and the provision of child care.  While 
such issues may well be about legal rights, they are not just questions of law.  They 
demonstrate the real, long-term social consequences of law’s discourse, for it is the 
                                                 
59 Despite this the law continues to enjoy general obedience and its power to regulate the social is 
reinforced by the community’s general adherence to it.  There are many suggested theories as to 
why the law enjoys such a level of compliance.  It may, for example, be because of a fear of 
retribution.  That is, a fear of the consequences of failure to comply.  I would agree with this to an 
extent.  This certainly may account for why, generally, we do not steal or commit murder, for 
example.  Sometimes, however, the penalties may not be sufficient to discourage us from breaking 
the law, as in the case of parking regulations, for example.  Maybe we obey the law because of a 
general sense of obligation to do so.  Maybe we don’t necessarily choose to obey, but the law is 
something that is so ingrained as part of the everyday that we unthinkingly follow its commands.  
This is an issue of some importance, but not one that I will address in this work.   32
law’s definition and treatment of people based on gender that has contributed to 
the marginalisation of women.60 
 
The law can be seen to be deliberately exclusive of certain groups of people in 
many areas of the law.  Consider, for example, the way it defines terms such as 
‘marriage’ and ‘family’.  The former is defined in the Marriage Act to mean “the 
union of a man and a woman” and so excludes same sex relationships.61  T h i s  
conception of heteronormative families is further reinforced in the Family Law 
Act.62  In this way the law tells society that some relationships constitute a 
marriage or a family while others do not.  As a result, alternative families that do 
not fit within this legally endorsed and enshrined norm are stigmatised for their 
difference.  They are not considered to constitute a ‘proper’ family.  They suffer at a 
social level and are excluded from a range of services and remedies.63 
 
The area I have chosen for analysing law’s regulation of the social, in this work, is 
the consequences of England’s colonial expansion into Australia.  When England 
claimed ownership of Australia it determined that it was empty, unoccupied by 
civilised inhabitants, and so it asserted absolute ownership of all the land and 
                                                 
60 This has been the subject of much analysis by feminist legal theory.  See, for example, Cornell, 
above n.4 and Graycar and Morgan, above, n.21. 
61 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s.5(1). 
62 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
63 These issues are analysed in Summerfield, T. Families of Meaning: Dismantling the Boundaries 
Between Law and Society (Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch University) 2004.  There are numerous 
examples of the ways in which law’s regulations influence the social.  For example, the law 
prohibits the taking of certain ‘illicit’ substances such as heroin, yet permits the use of other ‘non-
illicit’ drugs such as alcohol.  One of the effects of this is to stigmatise those who are consequently 
identified as ‘drug-addicts’ but not those who ‘enjoy a few drinks’.  Conversely, law’s regulations can 
have positive social effects.  For example, various state and commonwealth laws prohibit 
discrimination against people who have a disability.  Measures such as these encourage the 
community to treat people with disabilities equally to able bodied people and so operate to counter 
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introduced its own laws and customs into this country.  It denied the existing 
inhabitants the right to their own laws, culture and land as their overriding way of 
living.64  Their entire legal and cultural existence “was foreclosed from the very 
being of law.”65  The new sovereign introduced new laws that regulated all aspects 
of Aboriginal people’s lives; legal, political, economic, moral and social.66  T h e  
consequences of this are still being felt by Aboriginal people today in a number of 
ways from the ongoing struggle for rights to land, to lower life expectancy, higher 
infant mortality rates, lower employment levels, lower standard of education, 
higher representation in our criminal law system, and so on. 
 
What becomes clear from this brief consideration of these examples is that law is 
not separate from society.  The way in which law creates and perpetuates 
normative standards and knowledge impacts on the social and has real and long 
lasting consequences.  This is a theme to which I will return throughout this work. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented some of the arguments which underlie this work.  
In particular, I have discussed the extent of law’s reach beyond the legal to its 
regulation of the everyday, the social.  I have argued that law and legal discourse 
are important and powerful mechanisms by which law is able to extend and exert 
its sphere of influence.  That is, I have argued that law is important not just because 
                                                 
64 Although people still had their own laws, customs and traditions.  The continuance of these was 
central to the recognition of their rights to land in Mabo.  They were, however, relegated to the 
private sphere. 
65 Davies, M. “Exclusion and the Identity of Law” (2005) 5 Macquarie Law Journal 5 at 21.   
Although, it was not this simple.  As explained in Chapter Five, Governor Phillip had instructions 
not to disturb Aboriginal culture and to get to know Aboriginal people.  However, the reality was 
quite separate from this, even though Phillip did try to carry out his instructions. 
66 Although, of course, some Aboriginal people lived in isolated areas beyond the practical reach of 
the law and, in some cases, remained unknown by the law.   34
it prescribes behaviour but because, in so doing, it imposes normative standards 
with which it demands compliance.  It creates knowledge by which it is able to 
regulate and control its subjects.  It is thereby able to regulate virtually every aspect 
of the social.  The ramifications of this are material and far reaching.  The law has a 
large social impact and often this can be negative.  These are points which I take up 
in my discussion of the novels analysed in Parts Two and Three. 
 
In the next chapter, I examine further how the law operates, and the techniques it 
adopts, to maintain this position of dominance.  In particular, I argue that the 
discourse of law that underscores the modern Australian legal system is largely 
concerned with determining that which lies within law’s domain and that which 
does not.  I argue that this discourse has contributed to one of the major 
consequences of the reach of law’s power; namely, the exclusion of those who do 
not conform to law’s conception of itself and to law’s enforced normative 
standards.  That is, it has led to the creation of the ‘other’ and to the silencing and 
exclusion of the voices of those so identified.67 
                                                 
67 Note that by exclusion I mean that these ‘other’ are excluded from the positive aspects of the law, 
such as its protection, but that they are not excluded from its negative aspects, such as criminal 
sanctions and procedures.  That is, they are included in a way that positions them negatively.  This 
is a point that will become clearer through my discussion of the literary texts.  See, for example, 
Keneally, above n.15, discussed in Chapter Six, and Morgan, above n.42 and Scott, above n.37, 
discussed in Chapter Nine.   35
CHAPTER TWO 
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION: THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 
 
Introduction 
One of the issues that I raised in the previous chapter is that the law exercises its 
power to marginalise those who do not conform to its standards of appropriate or 
acceptable behaviour.  In this chapter, I explore this issue further.  In particular, I 
argue that the discourse of law operates a n d  i s  s t r u c t u r e d  s o  t h a t  i t  c r e a t e s  
categories of non-conformity or difference.  Those who fall within these categories 
are then treated as ‘other’ and often excluded from the full protection of the law.  
In this way, law’s discourse serves to reinforce dominant power relations within 
society and to impact on the lives of those designated as ‘other’ in many ways 
beyond the purely legal.  At the same time, it also presents law as a body of rules 
applied equally to all members of society, regardless of individual differences, thus 
perpetuating an image of the law as objective and impartial.  However, the law is 
not an objective institution.  It does not treat everyone equally.  Law tells only one 
story and confers legitimacy according to this story.1  Those who do not conform 
are categorised as ‘other’ and treated differently.2 
 
                                                 
1 It should be noted at the outset, that I am not suggesting that the law, although conservative, is not 
an inflexible or immutable institution.  This is evidenced, for example, in the decision in Mabo v 
Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, as discussed in Chapters Five and Seven.  It is also evidenced 
in the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd’s recent apology to Aboriginal people.  Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 February 2008 at 167 (Kevin Rudd, Prime 
Minister). 
2 Or they are treated the same, which is in effect different because, as introduced in Chapter One, 
while everyone is (formally) equal before the law, our access to the law (through language, 
education, and so on) is not equal, and therefore the same treatment can have quite unequal results.  
The issue of equality before the law is discussed in Part Three.   36
In the first part of this chapter, I explore one of the central concerns of much 
western legal theory; namely, identifying what is and is not law.  That is, defining 
what is inside and what is outside law’s domain.  This creation of a binary 
opposition between the inside and the outside of law is something fundamental to 
western jurisprudence.  My concern here is more specifically with the 
consequences of law’s endeavour to define its inside and its outside.  That is, in 
seeking to identify that which is inside and outside it also stipulates what or who is 
included and excluded.  This question of exclusion, and the creation of ‘other’, is 
the focus of the second part of this chapter. 
 
In the final part of this chapter, I introduce the concept of pluralism.  I suggest that 
if the law is to accommodate ‘otherness’ and difference without incorporating them 
into itself, and making them the same, pluralism is one way in which this may 
potentially be achieved. 
 
Inside and Outside: Defining Law 
One of the main concerns of western jurisprudence has traditionally been 
determining what law is about.  Jurisprudence is the study of law and not ‘other’ 
(non-law) things.  It has, therefore, as its focus defining what constitutes this ‘law’ 
as opposed to the ‘other’.  As stated by Douzinas et al: 
Jurisprudence sets itself the task of determining what is proper to law and 
of keeping outside law’s empire the non-legal, the extraneous, law’s other.  
It has spent unlimited effort and energy demarcating the boundaries that 
enclose law within its sovereign terrain, giving it its internal purity, and its 
external power and right to hold court over the other realms.  For 
jurisprudence the corpus of law is literally a body: it must either digest and 
transform the non-legal into legality, or it must reject it, keep it out as 
excess and contamination.  Jurisprudence’s task is to impose upon law the   37
law of purity and of order, of clear boundaries and of well-policed 
checkpoints.3 
The creation of this binary opposition between that which is inside law and that 
which is outside, that is, defining what law is, is one of the legacies of positivist 
legal theory which has dominated much western legal thought since the 
nineteenth century.  For positivists the distinction between what is internal and 
what is external to law is relatively straightforward.  Simply stated, it is only the 
posited law of the state that can be considered to be law.4  It is human law, as 
opposed to non-human law, and its validity is dependent upon its correct creation, 
not its content.  This conception of law owes much to John Austin, one of the 
founders of modern positivism.  He contended that laws “properly so called are a 
species of commands”5 that are “set by political superiors to political inferiors.”6  
That is, a law is a command issued by a sovereign that confers an obligation to obey 
and is enforced by a threat of sanction.7  It was these laws “properly so called” that 
were the “appropriate matter of jurisprudence.”8  Other concerns, such as the laws 
of God, morality and social norms, did not fall within the ambit of Austin’s 
jurisprudence.  His project was to identify a clear and determinate boundary of law.  
It was to define and describe law as it is, not to prescribe its content.9 
 
                                                 
3 Douzinas, C., Warrington, R. and McVeigh, S. Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in the 
Texts of Law (London: Routledge) 1991 at 25. 
4 This is obviously a very simplistic definition and there are many different theories of positivism.  
Some of these will be discussed below. 
5 Austin, J. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 2nd ed. (New York: Burt Franklin) 1970 at 5. 
6 Ibid at 1. 
7 Ibid at 5 – 6. 
8 Ibid at 4. 
9 For a critique of Austin’s work see Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press) 1994 chapters 1 – 4; Freeman, M.D.A. Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 6th ed. (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell) 1994 at 213 – 229.   38
This emphasis on description rather than prescription is also evident in the theories 
of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart, two of the dominant positivist thinkers of the 
twentieth century.  Kelsen, like Austin, also sought to identify a clearly defined 
realm of legal study.  This took the form of his science or ‘pure theory’ of law, 
which he described as clearly distinct from other sciences dealing with matters 
such as sociology, ethics or psychology.  As he put it: 
That all this is described as a “pure” theory of law means that it is concerned 
solely with that part of knowledge which deals with law, excluding from 
such knowledge everything which does not strictly belong to the subject-
matter law.  That is, it endeavours to free the science of law from all foreign 
elements.10 
He also stated that “[a]s a theory it is exclusively concerned with the accurate 
definition of its subject-matter.  It endeavours to answer the question, What is the 
law?”11  Kelsen, therefore, was not just concerned with delineating the ambit of his 
theory.  He also focused on the substantive issue of defining law.  This he does by 
explaining that law is a complex hierarchy of norms, which “may have any kind of 
content”12 and deal with any kind of human behaviour.13  These norms are valid 
only when legally created in accordance with superior norms, which ultimately 
gain their validity from the highest norm, the grundnorm.  The validity of the 
grundnorm is simply presupposed.  It does not depend, for its validity, upon the 
existence of a further norm.  That is, it is not a positive law per se.  Its authority is 
derived from its efficacy and general acceptance by the community at large.  So, 
                                                 
10 Kelsen, H. The Pure Theory of Law extracted in Freeman, ibid at 291. 
11 Ibid at 291. 
12 Kelsen, H. General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell) 1961 at 113. 
13 Ibid at 113.   39
whereas for Austin law is a command issued by a sovereign, for Kelsen it is a norm 
justified by another higher norm.14 
 
For Hart law is neither a command issued by a sovereign nor a hierarchy of 
norms.15  He rather defined law as a formal and coherent system of rules.16  A valid 
legal system, according to Hart’s theory, consists of two components, “primary 
rules” and “secondary rules”.  The former are largely substantive laws that control 
or regulate behaviour.  The latter contain the procedural rules that specify how the 
primary rules may be enacted, varied and enforced.17  These rules combine to form 
a legal system due to the presence of an overarching “rule of recognition”.  It is this 
rule that gives a legal system its authority and legitimacy, and which, in a similar 
vein to Kelsen’s grundnorm, separates legal rules from non-legal rules.  Also like 
the grundnorm, the rule of recognition is not dependent upon another rule for its 
validity.  Its authority derives from its acceptance by legal officials.  According to 
Hart: 
For the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is 
shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, either by courts 
or other officials or private persons or their advisors.18 
For Hart, law is a system of positive rules which derive their legitimacy from an 
ultimate non-positive rule. 
 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of Kelsen’s theories see, for example, Stewart, I. “The Critical Legal Science of 
Hans Kelsen” (1990) 17 Journal of Law and Society 273. 
15 For a general discussion of Hart see Freeman, above n.9 at 344 – 356. 
16 Hart, above n.9. 
17 Ibid at chapter Five. 
18 Ibid at 101.  Emphasis in original.   40
Like Austin and Kelsen, for Hart morality, sociology, politics and the like were not 
properly included within the realm of law.  This is not to say that he thought that 
these issues were unimportant or irrelev a n t  t o  l a w .   H e  even prescribed a 
“minimum content of natural law” necessary for the survival of human beings, thus 
allowing for some overlap between law and morality.19  Importantly, however, 
while there may be overlap, he emphasised that law is not dependent on morality 
for its validity or identity.  There is no necessary connection between law and 
morality.  “As Hart has explained, morality is  n ot c on sid ered  to be  p art o f th e  
definition of law as the positivists see it.”20  For positivism the question of law’s 
validity is separate from questions of content.21  What Austin, Kelsen and Hart 
share, therefore, is their concern for describing what the law is.  Their objective, to 
use the language of Raz, is to identify “a test which distinguishes law from what it 
is not.”22  The identifying criterion may be a command issued by a sovereign, or the 
existence of a grundnorm or a rule of recognition.  All, however, seek to limit the 
boundaries of law and in so doing create an outside, that which does not fall within 
the realm of law so defined. 
 
It is apparent from a consideration of these theorists that in determining what 
constitutes law they are concerned with two separate yet related issues.  The first is 
delineating the boundaries of their field of study.  That is, identifying a determinate 
ambit of jurisprudence or legal science.  The second is defining that which they 
                                                 
19 Ibid at 193 – 200.  This “minimum content” includes such things as restrictions on killing or 
inflicting bodily harm and “some minimal form of the institution of property.” 
20 Davies, M. Asking the Law Question 2 nd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002 at 91.  Emphasis in 
original. 
21 Arguably, this goes some way to explaining the law’s refusal to appreciate Aboriginal peoples’ 
emotional and spiritual connection to the land and their rights to their own systems of law. 
22 Raz, J. “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 823 at 842.  Emphasis 
in original.   41
consider to constitute the object of that study, namely, law.  The distinction 
between the two is not always easily drawn.  As stated by Davies: 
Austin and Kelsen, despite a common emphasis on legal theory as a 
descriptive activity, arguably both cross over into the realm of the 
prescriptive.  They prescribe a separation between legal science and law, but 
the prescription, definition or determination of legal theory excludes certain 
entities as non-legal or methodologically impure, thus also prescribing what 
can be seen as law.23 
Delineating the limits of the theory shapes the identity and limits of the object 
itself.  Both are defined by exclusion.  That is, the exclusion of that which is not 
considered to be law, and the exclusion of that which is not deemed to fall within 
the domain of legal theory.  It is with this issue of exclusion that I am 
predominantly concerned here.  In particular, I am concerned with how the 
object, law, is defined, how attempts to define it have created a distinction 
between that which is inside law and that which is outside, and the way that this 
translates into a discourse of inclusion and exclusion and the creation of ‘other’. 
 
Positivism is not the only theoretical approach which foregrounds identifying that 
which is inside law.  Nor has positivism been accepted without criticism.  Ronald 
Dworkin, in particular, has been a major critic of much positivist theory, 
particularly that of Hart.24  He is, for instance, critical of positivism’s concentration 
on rules, arguing that there also exist background policies, standards and principles 
which inform lawyers and judges and so are a legitimate part of legal argument and 
judicial decision making.  These non-rule standards which allow for the 
                                                 
23 Davies, M. “Exclusion and the Identity of Law” (2005) 5 Macquarie Law Journal 5 at 12 – 13. 
24 For an example of Dworkin’s theory see Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth) 1977.  His 
theories have been subject to much criticism and debate about whether they are positivist 
themselves.  See, for example, Freeman, above n.9 at 1270 – 1283.   42
consideration of questions such as fairness and justice are, for Dworkin, part of the 
law.25 
 
Likewise, natural law theory does not agree with all positivist precepts.  In contrast 
to positivism’s emphasis on human made law, natural law theory argues that law 
exists independently of human intervention or action.  While the specific 
principles of natural law are diverse they include “objective moral principles which 
depend upon the nature of the universe and which can be discovered by reason.”26  
These principles may derive from God, as argued by Aquinas, or reason, as 
suggested by Finnis.27  They clearly derive from a source that is external and 
superior to the positive law of the state.  A natural lawyer would argue that these 
external principles should be incorporated into the law.  As summarised by 
Douzinas et al: 
Natural law in its various guises claims that there is a small number of 
fundamental principles, universals, ideals or standards that every posited 
legal system ought to and does include.  These norms, although not 
legislated, are legal rules that belong to an order superior to positive law; 
their violation weakens or suspends the obligation to obey the legal order.  
The content of these principles differs in each school of natural law, as a 
result of changes in their perceived source and origins, site of operation or 
method of identification.28 
The issue of importance here is that natural law theorists and Dworkin alike are 
engaged in a task of defining law’s boundaries.  Natural lawyers extend the 
boundary of what is included within law to incorporate principles which dictate 
                                                 
25 They are not, however, principles that give judges scope to reshape the law.  Rather, they are 
simply background principles that state the pre-existing rights and obligations of the parties to a 
dispute.  Thus, the judge is simply declaring the law as contained within these principles. 
26 Freeman, above n.9 at 81. 
27 Finnis is perhaps the most prominent modern natural law theorist.  See, for example, Finnis, J. 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1980.  His theories are also discussed and 
critiqued in Davies, above n.20 at 80 – 86. 
28 Above n.3 at 19.   43
what the law ought to be.  Dworkin defines law as inclusive of non-rule based 
standards.  The divide between that which is internal to law and that which is 
external nevertheless remains, and, as explained below, it is this divide, this 
concern with excluding the non-law, which has fundamentally influenced the way 
that the law has perceived, constructed and (mis)treated difference. 
 
Of these theories, it is positivism that remains the most prominent.  It is positivism 
that provides the foundation of our modern legal system and underpins our 
understanding of law.  It is positivism that specifies that law must be validly 
enacted and that a validly enacted law must be complied with.  It is also positivism 
that has left us with a number of important legacies.  Firstly, it leaves us with an 
essentially modernist theory of law.  As explained by Davies: 
Positivist legal thought is “modernist” because it is an attempt to provide 
law with a “metanarrative”, that is a universal explanatory framework of 
theory which is located outside the history or context of the discipline.29 
Modernism will be examined in more detail in Chapter Four in the context of 
postmodernism.  What is immediately important is that positivist legal theory 
remains committed to the modernist task of providing an overarching, universal, 
truth of law.  One of the consequences of this, and the focus of the next section of 
this chapter, is that in so doing it silences those who do not fall within its 
metanarrative.  It ignores local voices and perspectives.30  In seeking to present a 
universal theory of law, positivism promotes homogeneity and marginalises and 
silences, difference. 
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The second (and arguably more important) of positivism’s legacies is that it has 
created a discourse of law that is binary.  Some things are law and some are not.  
They are either law or non-law.  This definition of law by reference to what it is 
not arguably draws on the linguistic structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure, who 
argued that exclusion is central to defining identity.31  That is, identifying what 
something is requires the identification of w h a t  i t  i s  n o t .   A s  e n c a p s u l a t e d  b y  
Douzinas et al: 
An entity, work or field can claim unity only if it can be clearly delineated 
from its outside. … this is the first law of jurisprudence. … In other words 
what is non-legal is always necessary to make law properly legal.  The frame 
between the two, rather than being a wall, is a point of passage.  Law’s 
empire, as proper, united and coherent, depends on what is legally improper 
and denies law’s imperialism.32 
There are a number of important consequences that flow from this discourse of law 
as binary.  Firstly, it has resulted in the law’s failure to recognise the validity, or 
even the existence, of systems of law that are different from it.  Hart, as explained 
above, considered that a valid legal system was founded on two components, 
‘primary rules’ and ‘secondary rules’.  The absence of ‘secondary rules’ and the 
overarching ‘rule of recognition’ meant that only a ‘primitive’ legal system could 
exist.  For him, ‘primitive’ systems simply set standards for living.  There was no 
process for changing these rules.  Nor could they be authoritatively enforced.  Such 
systems could not be considered to be real, or ‘developed’ systems of law.33  In the 
context of this work, when the English occupied Australia they considered the land 
to be empty, unoccupied by civilised inhabitants with a ‘developed’ system of law.  
The positivist English law did not recognise Aboriginal customary law as law.   
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From the outset, it excluded Aboriginal social systems and Aboriginal law as 
‘primitive’, as failing to meet the standards of a ‘proper’ positivist legal system.  
Traditional law was ignored, and legislation was enacted that controlled the lives of 
Aborigines as if it was the only law that governed how they should live, denying 
the existence of a continuing underlying Aboriginal law.34 
 
Secondly, it is inherent in this conception of a divide between law and non-law 
that law is separate from society and its subjects.  It exists “out there” as something 
“separate and distinct from other aspects of our social existences.”35  I raised and 
questioned this issue in Chapter One.  I explained that law is not separate from 
society, but that it is an integral part of our everyday existence.  Positivism’s desire 
to maintain the divide between law and society is important.  As stated by Davies: 
one of the foundations for legally-sanctioned oppression – which I see as the 
inability of law to appreciate (as opposed to appropriate) difference – is the 
positivist myth of the separation of law from its subjects.36 
This is something discussed further in the next section of this chapter.37 
 
The separation of law from society, and positivism’s emphasis on the descriptive 
rather than the prescriptive, further gives rise to a conception of law as a neutral 
and impartial arbiter.  Positivism does not concern itself with what the law ought 
to be, but simply with what the law is.  This translates into an image of an objective 
and validly created law being impartially and equally applied to all people.  This 
                                                 
34 See, for example, the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA).  The impact of this legislation is depicted in 
Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1988 and Scott, K. Benang 
(Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000.  These works are discussed in Chapter Nine. 
35 Davies, above n.20 at 4. 
36 Davies, M. Delimiting the Law: ‘Postmodernism’ and the Politics of Law (London: Pluto Press) 
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positivist view of the law as objective, determinate and impartial continues to 
provide one of the fundamental foundations of our western legal system.38  As 
stated by Davies “the naïve thought that judges simply apply the law has enormous 
popular hold.”39  Yet it has also been subject to some criticism, and one of the issues 
that will be examined further in this work is that the law is not a neutral, objective 
or impartial arbiter, but that it is inherently ideological, often favouring particular 
privileges based on gender, race and culture, for example.40 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the context of this work, in phrasing law 
in terms of the inside and the outside, and in seeking to create a single, unified 
metanarrative of law, law perpetuates, and is about, inclusion and exclusion.  This 
conception of law is challenged by recent jurisprudential theorists such as 
feminists, race theorists, postmodernists and the various law in context movements.  
These theorists question existing discourses, structures and definitions of law in 
order to expand and challenge its boundaries of the internal and the external, and 
also to show that the very dichotomy is itself problematic and so should be 
rethought.41  This is an important point, for it is law’s persistence in seeking to 
define an inside and an outside that leads to the creation of ‘other’. 
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The Creation of ‘Other’ 
The impact of law’s concern with defining the ambit of its boundaries is significant.  
It has, as explained above, created a dichotomy between that which is inside law 
and that which is not.  The practical ramifications of this dominant discourse are 
considerable.  It has entrenched a distinction between ‘law’, as defined by those 
inside it, and ‘other’, those outside it who have no particular right, legitimacy or 
authority to be heard.42  In so defining ‘law’ and ‘other’, law, as the instrument of 
definition, is “intrinsically exclusionary”.43  It gives legitimacy and authority to that 
which it recognises as inside the law and devalues and dismisses that which is 
external to it. 
 
In this way, the distinction between the inside and the outside operates to control 
and repress difference.  The law seeks either to appropriate and homogenise 
difference or to exclude it altogether.44  It operates, that is, as a mechanism of 
oppression.  As Davies explains it: 
The norm is a homogenising limit circumscribing a category of the same, 
determining what is identical and what is different, demarcating a present 
interior of like cases opposed to an exterior of cases which fail to fit the 
norm’s paradigm and which possibly will not be measurable by any legal 
standard.  At the borders, human finitude, perversity or fallibility present 
some difficult, or deviant, or not-quite normal, cases.  But when such 
unpredictable cases arise, the law, in all of its omnipotent self-sufficiency, 
                                                 
42 In using the term ‘other’ there are some cautionary points that should be noted.  First, it is a term 
that has the potential to be too general and too homogenising.  My use of the term here is not meant 
to indicate that all those who are somehow ‘different’ share the same differences or the same 
exclusions or concerns.  It is also not meant to reduce the issues raised here to a simple binary of 
difference and sameness.  This is a problem considered by Rodan, D. Identity and Justice: Conflicts, 
Contradictions and Contingencies (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang) 2004.  In this section, however, my 
discussion does remain at a general level.  More specific analysis occurs in Chapter Four, in 
particular, in relation to the use of the term ‘other’ in reducing and homogenising the experiences of 
colonised peoples. 
43 Davies, above n.20 at 13. 
44 This is seen, for example, in the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA) as discussed in Scott, above n.34 and 
Morgan, above n.34..  See also the discussion on Chapter Nine.   48
adopts the delinquent case into its fold, homogenising its peculiarities, 
reducing its differences and its idiosyncrasies, and reconsolidating the total 
control of the law.45 
There are numerous examples of the way in which law operates to control that 
which it considers different or to exclude that which falls outside its self defined 
boundaries.  Feminist legal theory, for example, emphasises the role of gender in 
the law and the way in which the law has controlled, oppressed and marginalised 
women, both through directly discriminatory laws and the law’s entrenched 
favouring of patriarchy.  Postcolonial and race theory challenge law’s exclusion of 
the racial or ‘ethnic’ other, again through the application of specifically 
discriminatory laws and through a general favouring of white, colonial institutions 
and structures.46  One of the issues discussed in this work is the way in which 
colonial law excludes Aboriginal law from mainstream (colonial, positivist) law and 
Aboriginal people from full protection of this law.  Categories of difference based 
on gender, race or culture have traditionally been treated with suspicion and fear 
and in categorising them as different and excluding them from the discourse of law, 
law is able to control this difference and re-assert its own superiority.  As Douzinas 
and Gearey state: 
Orders establish and perpetuate themselves by rejecting, silencing and 
banning certain ‘others’ as mad, ‘deviant’ or criminal, but in all instances she 
is both inside and foreign to dominant culture.  The other is excluded either 
because she is cognitively unthinkable, beyond the ability of current 
knowledge to comprehend her difference, or because her existence is 
inimical to the systematic nature and political claims of dominant power 
relations.  But this position of the ‘enemy within’ turns her into the great 
threat that must be incarcerated and silenced, or subjected to the 
objectifying gaze of science in order to yield her secrets and allay the danger 
she poses to order.  In jurisprudence, the other becomes the unthought, that 
                                                 
45 Above n.36 at 39. 
46 There are many versions of postcolonialism.  Postcolonial theory will be considered in more detail 
in Chapter Four.   49
which must be forgotten or translated into the – alien and hostile – terms of 
the legal system in order to protect law’s coherence and systematicity.47 
 
There are two issues of importance that emerge from this discussion.  First, 
determining where the boundary between the inside and the outside lies is not a 
politically neutral or value free exercise.  One of the foundations of our modern 
legal system is that the law is an impartial and objective arbiter and that it treats 
everyone equally.48  As pointed out by much critical legal theory, however, this is 
not always the case.  The law is not always objective and impartial.  This theory 
emphasises that issues of gender, race or culture, for example, often form the basis 
for deliberate exclusion and discrimination, and the marginalisation of particular 
groups by the law and by society generally.  It highlights the contingent 
relationship of the legal and the social, demonstrating that, under the guise of 
objectivity, law’s exclusions reinforce social exclusions.  Consider, for example, the 
numerous laws that have been enacted controlling the movement and rights of 
Aboriginal people.  The effect of such laws has been to perpetuate the exclusion of 
Aboriginal people from many benefits of society such as health care, education, and 
access to the law.49  Law’s discrimination of Aboriginal people in these and many 
other ways has resulted in, and reinforced, their social exclusion and 
stigmatisation.50 
 
                                                 
47 Douzinas, C. and Gearey, A. Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing) 2005 at 60. 
48 The rule of law, which embodies conceptions of objectivity and impartiality and the ideal that 
everyone is equal before the law, is discussed in Chapter Eight. 
49 It should be noted here that while Aboriginal people can now access mainstream services this has 
not always been the case.  See, for example, the discussion of the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA) in 
Chapter Nine. 
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The second important issue is that the law operates to exclude in many different 
ways.51  Some of these exclusions may not necessarily be negative.  For example, 
the imposition of minimum age requirements that exclude young people from 
driving, drinking and other such rights are intended to protect them until they are 
deemed sufficiently responsible to undertake such activities safely.  The kinds of 
exclusions that I am concerned with, however, are negative.  These include, for 
example, the exclusion of specific groups based on gender, race, class, sexuality or 
religion, from the benefits and protection of the law.  Often such groups are 
included by the law for some purposes and excluded for others.52  For example, as 
discussed in Chapter Five of this work, when England claimed ownership of 
Australia the legal, social and cultural systems of Australia’s already existing 
inhabitants were dismissed and excluded from the law (and society) of the new 
occupants.  That is, entire Indigenous legal and cultural systems were excluded 
from the formation of a new dominant law and society.  This is not to suggest that 
Aboriginal people were themselves entirely excluded from the law.  As stated 
above, the law can be both inclusive and exclusive, and Aboriginal people were 
extensively legislated about by the new law .   T h e y  w e r e  s u b j e c t e d  t o  s p e c i f i c  
discriminatory laws that variously sought to ‘deal with’, ‘protect’ or ‘assimilate’ 
Aborigines.53  These enactments governed virtually all aspects of the lives of 
Aborigines and, in so doing, excluded them from many of the rights and 
protections that non-indigenous Australians enjoyed, such as the right to live 
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wherever they chose, the right to marry or to work without permission, the right 
to drink and so on.  Larissa Behrendt explains: 
Indigenous Australians intuitively know the power of the law.  It is a 
system, concept and language imposed upon Indigenous communities.  It is 
a tool of dispossession: it is a regulator of peoples’ lives: it delivers the biased 
hand of justice.  Whether land rights, or deaths in custody, stolen 
generations or sovereignty, Indigenous peoples have an intimate 
understanding of the pervasive force of law without opening a case book or 
reading a judgement.54 
As recently as 2007, Commonwealth legislation has singled out Aboriginal people 
as having to meet a number of requirements in order to receive government 
benefits and assistance.55  In these instances, Aboriginal people are included within 
the law.  But it is in a way which positions them negatively.  They have generally 
not been included within the law in a positive way.  As Davies argues: 
We should not forget that people (say, Indigenous Australians) who are 
often excluded from the benefits and protection of the law, are not 
ordinarily excluded from its criminal implications, and indeed, it may often 
be said that they are given special consideration in this area.56 
We should also not forget that it was not until 1967 that Aborigines were officially 
included within the Commonwealth Constitution.57 
 
As well as these more explicit forms of discrimination, the law can also exclude and 
discriminate against those lacking education, citizenship or knowledge about the 
law.58  For example, Aboriginal people, or refugees or new migrants, may not 
always have at their disposal the knowledge or resources to be able to establish 
                                                 
54 Quoted in Reilly, A. “Introduction” (2000) 1(1) Balayi: Culture, Law and Colonialism 1 at 3 – 4. 
55 Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth). 
56 Above n.20 at 15. 
57 The 1967 referendum gave the Commonwealth the power to legislate about Aboriginal people and 
allowed for Aboriginal people to be counted, for the first time, in the census. 
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their native title rights, or to challenge decisions effecting their status and well 
being.  Furthermore, the standards, language and perspectives that are reflected in 
law’s prescriptions can also be intrinsically exclusionary.  For example, in Chapter 
One, I cited the example of the definition of marriage in the Marriage Act as “the 
union of a man and a woman”.59  This reflects the assumed (and preferred) 
normative standard of heterosexual relationships, to the exclusion of same sex 
relationships, and seeks to uphold and protect this standard.60  Forms of exclusion 
such as these have contributed to the marginalisation of certain groups within 
society.61 
 
The consequences of being labelled and treated as ‘other’ are considerable.  It is a 
categorisation that operates to control and repress difference, or, more accurately, 
deny people’s humanity, regardless of difference, and deny the value and 
productiveness of that difference.  It also, and perhaps more importantly, silences.  
The law’s favouring of certain normative standards and privileging of particular 
groups within society reinforces dominant constructions of law and silences those 
who do not conform to these constructs.  In this way, exclusion: 
conceal[s] the person from law’s radar: it is an internal exclusion, which 
takes the form of silencing the subject who does not fit the predetermined 
legal stereotype.62 
 
Once again, Lyotard provides useful insight here.  In Chapter One, I introduced his 
concept of the différend.  As explained there, a différend arises where there is an 
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incommensurability of idioms.  One of the key indicators of a différend is a 
silencing of the ‘other’, the marginalised.  Lyotard highlights that the discourse of 
law silences those who do not speak its language.  It does not recognise that the 
‘other’ speak in their own idiom, which the law does not hear and therefore cannot 
engage with.  This inability to communicate results in the dominant discourse 
excluding the ‘other’.  It denies the ‘other’ the ability to testify to the injustices or 
wrongs to which they have been subjected, and is in itself an injustice.  In other 
words, Lyotard’s theories about discourse, legitimation and the différend 
foreground the way in which particular groups in society are constructed and 
represented as different and marginalised and silenced, and how the injustices they 
consequently suffer are legitimated through the authority of the discourse of law.  
As Rodan puts it: 
In contemporary societies, injustice occurs when groups of people are 
treated as invisible, and as ‘already judged’.  Injustice is perpetuated through 
the legitimation of norms, which ultimately become the authorised version 
of reality.63 
What is important here is that it is the legitimation of particular norms and 
particular versions of reality that perpetuate exclusions and injustice. 
 
In Australia, for example, the legitimated discourse operates to exclude Aboriginal 
peoples’ laws, cultures and perspectives.  This was the case from the very beginning 
of colonisation when the first settlers brought with them a colonialist discourse 
that legitimated their own superiority on the basis of being both colonisers and 
being white.64  Colonised and non-white, Aborigines were not part of this 
discourse.65  As explained by Rodan: 
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In each of these genres of discourse – … colonialism and whiteness – there 
is a suppression of other ways of being in the world.  The overriding 
problem is the representation of the ‘Other’ as being outside the … cultural 
norm, that is, as being different from the identity of ‘Sameness’.66 
This exclusion is evidenced by a consideration of Aboriginal claims to land.  The 
classification of Australia as terra nullius deemed that this land was empty.  It had 
no sovereign, no legal system, and Aboriginal people did not own it.67  They did not 
exist within the discourse of terra nullius and so had no particular right or 
legitimacy, within this discourse, to speak or to be heard.  In relation specifically to 
land, the law excluded (and excludes) relationships with land that are different 
from its own conceptions of ownership.68  Aboriginal relationships with land are 
different and cannot be expressed in a form understandable by the law.  That is, to 
use the language of Lyotard, there is a différend.  The only way the law can cater 
for Aboriginal rights to land is in the form of native title.69  Yet here the exclusions 
continue, because native title is, firstly, a recognition of rights to land within white, 
colonial law.  Aboriginal systems of ownership are invalid and excluded from this 
legal discourse.  Secondly, as Rodan explains: 
Currently in Australia, one of the practices of exclusion indigenous people 
experience is through litigation, specifically with claims on the Native Title 
Act.  Through their inability to prove particular land claims within the 
discourse of law in Australia, indigenous communities are often not heard in 
the terms that support their claim and relationship to the land.70 
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65 Rodan, D. ‘Identity’ and ‘Experience’: Theories of Representation and Justice in Selected Narrative 
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66 Ibid at 188. 
67 See the discussion in Chapter Five. 
68 Hence, in Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, the majority was able to accord the 
Meriam people native title rights because the relationship that they had with the land and the way 
that they managed the land was similar to the way that the English common law defined property 
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69 See discussion in Chapter Five. 
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It is not just in relation to land that such injustices and exclusions occur.  It is also 
evidenced in the government policies of protection and assimilation that were 
adopted throughout most of the twentieth century.  The legitimation of these 
policies silenced Aboriginal people.  They were unable to speak or to be heard 
within the colonial Anglo-discourse which legitimated and perpetuated the 
removal of Aboriginal children from their families and the belief that skin colour 
was an indicator of the potential for assimilation into white society.71 
 
Pluralism: A Challenge to Positivism? 
Wherever there is an Other which cannot simply be accommodated within 
a system of thought, monism is under challenge.  Faced with such an Other, 
we can try to assimilate it and make it fit within the unity (the attitude of 
singularity) or recognise its difference in its own right (the attitude of 
pluralism).72 
As introduced above, one of the issues central to postmodernist theory is an 
emphasis on multiplicity and the local.  That is, it emphasises that there is not 
simply one narrative that tells everyone’s story or that orders everyone’s world.  
Rather, it foregrounds that there are many stories, perspectives and experiences.  
There is, that is, an emphasis on plurality.73  Our legal system, however, does not 
embrace plurality.  It is a modernist, positivist system, with an emphasis on unity, 
order and coherence.  Positivism, as explained above, theorises a unitary system of 
law that promotes one singular, totalising and ordered legal system. 
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In terms of Australian law, the effect of this totalising (or what Uhlmann labels 
‘monologic’) approach is clear.74  From the beginning of colonisation the laws and 
legal systems of Aboriginal peoples were neither recognised nor allowed to co-exist 
with out positivist, colonial law.75  Colonial legal systems, as Uhlmann explains, 
favour a monologic, totalising discourse, and deny the possibility of an alternative, 
dialogic (or non-totalising) approach.76  As he goes on, “monologic translation, 
rather than opening the potential for justice, closes down such potential: … [it] 
excludes any possibility of recognition.”77  This is borne out by an examination of 
the Mabo decision, for example, in which the High Court recognised the existence 
of native title rights to land at common law.78  While according (limited) rights to 
Aboriginal people to their land, Mabo is a decision which in no way recognises or 
acknowledges Aboriginal law or Aboriginal rights to land within Aboriginal law.  It 
is a decision which promotes the supremacy and dominance of one legal system, 
that of the colonisers.  It promotes legal monism.  In allowing Aboriginal rights to 
land to be recognised within the colonisers’ law, it simply absorbs those rights into 
a common law conception of native title to the exclusion of Aboriginal law and 
Aboriginal rights to land within that law.79  There is no recognition of an 
independent Indigenous system of law that exists outside of the Australian colonial 
law.80  While the recognition of native title rights within the common law indicates 
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a shift towards recognition of Aboriginal rights to land, it does not constitute a 
move towards pluralist understandings of law.  As stated by Davies: 
in a weak sense, Australian law has recognised Indigenous law on this issue, 
but it is a recognition which does not subvert the basic centralist dogma of 
A u s t r a l i a n  l a w ,  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  f u l l y  e f f e c t e d  w i t h i n  t h a t  l a w .   N a t i v e  t i t l e  
illustrates a continuation of standard colonial practices (in Australia and 
elsewhere), whereby Indigenous laws can achieve some status, but strictly 
within the framework of colonial recognition.81 
Perhaps more importantly, she goes on: 
The recognition of such differences as … European law/ Indigenous law, to 
the extent that they are contained within dominant law, are no threat to the 
doctrine of centralism because they are structurally subsumed within state 
law.82 
Monism, and positivism, is not challenged by the recognition of native title rights.  
In refusing to acknowledge the existence of Indigenous legal systems and 
Indigenous peoples’ ‘otherness’, Australian law perpetuates an injustice.  Monism 
“prevent[s] equal dialogue between two systems”83 and does not allow the voice of 
the ‘other’ to be heard within the dominant domain.  In this way, it contributes to 
the creation of the différend discussed above. 
 
Pluralism suggests a possible alternative to this approach.  Pluralism can refer to the 
existence of two or more systems of law operating side by side,84 or it may simply 
be an acknowledgement that, within the dominant system, there is diversity and 
fragmentation.85  By pluralism, I mean a recognition and respect for difference, and 
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a recognition that there exist multiple and diverse perspectives, experiences and 
approaches to law.  Pluralism suggests that it is possible for recognition and respect 
to be accorded to “multiple types of law” and emphasises “the heterogeneity of 
narratives constituting the law.”86  As Davies explains it: 
In contrast to the monistic and centralist narrative about law, the ‘ethos of 
pluralism’ enshrines an attitude which celebrates multiplicity and difference 
in the law.  A pluralist approach rejects the view that law is one system, 
imposed on one society.  It sees law as diverse and fragmented, not 
systematic and cohesive.87 
As she goes on to explain, pluralism is normatively preferable to monism “because 
it presents opportunities for the legal recognition of social diversity.”88  It allows for 
the recognition, as opposed to the assimilation, of ‘otherness’.89  It allows for the 
creation of a space where alternative voices can speak and be heard.  In this way, 
pluralism can be seen as one way in which the incommensurable, or Lyotard’s 
différend, can be put into words. 
 
In Australia, the need for a more pluralistic understanding of law is imperative.  As 
explained above, the law’s failure to respect and accommodate ‘otherness’ has 
resulted in Aboriginal rights to land being recognised and given limited protection 
only within our common law understanding of property rights.  The law’s refusal 
to respect Aboriginal peoples’ ‘otherness’ has also led to the policies of assimilation 
and absorption which guided the regulation of Aboriginal people’s lives in 
Australia for much of the twentieth century.  Further, as argued by McRae et al, 
                                                                                                                                             
of this thesis I am suggesting it at a general level as something to be explored and thought about as a 
way of combating some of the more negative aspects and legacies of a modernist, positivist, colonial 
legal system. 
86 Davies, above n.72 at 88. 
87 Ibid at 93. 
88 Ibid at 94. 
89 This is discussed in Chapter Ten.   59
Australia is a country in which two (and given the differences in Aboriginal 
groups, multiple) systems of law continue to exist; colonial and Indigenous.90  As 
they state: 
For the colonists, the doctrine of terra nullius may have consigned 
indigenous legal issues to legal oblivion, but as far as indigenous 
communities were concerned their legal systems continued to regulate their 
lives as they had always done.  Although never officially recognised as such, 
a pluralistic legal system has operated in Australia since the British colonists 
introduced the Australian legal system.91 
They explain the impact that the introduction of colonial law had on Indigenous 
laws, and how Indigenous laws continue to operate in contemporary Australia.92  
Aboriginal customary law, for example, while recognised by many Aboriginal 
people, has generally not been recognised by, or accorded any status within, the 
dominant law.93  It is the colonial law which takes precedence, while Indigenous 
law is generally excluded as not part of the dominant law.94  In the interests of 
‘equality’, the same (that is, white, colonial) law is deemed to apply to everyone.  
As summarised by McRae et al, “to date, recognition has been very much on terms 
set by the dominant legal system, with problematic results in many areas.”95 
 
                                                 
90 Indigenous law itself varies within groups, although groups are connected by their spiritual 
relationship to land. 
91 McRae, H., Nettheim, G., Beacroft, L. and McNamara, L. Indigenous Legal Issues: Commentary 
and Materials 3rd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2003 at 75. 
92 Ibid at Chapter Two. 
93 Customary law is not just about punishments or ‘payback’, for example.  It is about the traditional 
rules that govern daily life, both legal and social.  For a discussion of customary law in the context of 
the legal see ibid at Chapter Two. 
94 As McRae et al. note, on the whole the Australian legal system has proved “incapable of 
accommodating indigenous laws.”  Ibid at 75. 
95 Ibid at 76.  Likewise, Davies states that, “Indigenous law is … assimilated and / or excluded by the 
institutions of law, but is not recognized as law in its own right.”  Davies, above n.72 at 101.   60
What is highlighted most clearly here is the need for an understanding and 
conception of difference that does not reduce it to the same.96  If the dominant legal 
system is to accommodate, as opposed to assimilate and absorb, the Aboriginal 
‘other’, pluralist understandings of both the legal and the social need to be 
embraced.  In the context of this work, therefore, I use the term pluralism to mean 
alternative ways of thinking about our laws, our legal system, and our society.  In 
particular, I view it as a means of allowing for the recognition and acceptance of 
difference and ‘otherness’ in a way which caters for its existence, without 
assimilating and absorbing it.97  I n  t h i s  I  a m  s u g g e s t i n g that, of necessity, our 
conception of law must become less singular. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have raised a number of important issues and arguments that will 
be examined throughout this work.  In the first section, I argued that law is 
theorised as a unitary and discrete object that can be conclusively and 
determinately identified and that, consequently, the discourse of law is structured 
by a delineation or distinction between that which is inside law and that which is 
outside.  In the second section, I proposed that this binary opposition between the 
inside and the outside translates into a discourse of inclusion and exclusion and that 
those who are excluded are treated differently, often denied full protection of the 
law and often discriminated against.  This, in turn, defies one of law’s foundation 
principles, that of equality and objectivity.  In the final section, I suggested that 
law’s ‘other’ needs to be acknowledged and accommodated, not assimilated or made 
                                                 
96 The effects of the failure to appreciate difference are demonstrated, for example, in the protection 
and assimilation policies that are discussed in Chapter Nine. 
97 This is highlighted in Jones, above n.41 and Miller, above n.41.  These texts are discussed in 
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the same.  One of the ways in which this may be possible is to adopt a position of 
pluralism, which allows for the questioning of law as a unitary object and so 
challenges the positivist distinction between the inside and the outside and 
inclusion and exclusion. 
 
In this and the previous chapter, I have presented arguments about law that 
underlie the rest of this work.  It is on issues of law’s control of the social, law’s 
power to include and exclude and the lack of law’s objectivity and equality that I 
focus in my analysis of literature in the following chapters.  Before moving on to 
examine how particular literary texts deal with these issues, however, in the next 
two chapters I examine some more general questions that are relevant to literature; 
namely, the importance of literature as a form of representation and medium for 
critiquing the operation of law, and theories relevant to the reading of literature, 
specifically postmodernism and postcolonialism.   62
CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE: WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT USEFUL? 
 
Introduction 
In Chapters One and Two, I discussed some important issues in relation to law.  
Namely, that law regulates many aspects of our social and everyday existences 
beyond the purely legal, and that it creates boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
which construct, marginalise and silence the ‘other’.  In Chapters Three and Four, I 
move away from law and focus on literature.  In particular, in this chapter, I 
examine the importance of literature as a medium for informing about social, 
political and legal issues, and for critiquing and encouraging thought about existing 
structures, systems and values.  In Chapter Four, I argue that postmodernism and 
postcolonialism provide useful frameworks for the interpretation and reading of 
literature about these issues. 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I discuss how ‘literature’ can (or cannot) be 
defined, and clarify my use of the term.  I also identify the literature that I examine 
in this thesis.  In the second section, I argue that literature, through its 
representations and commentary, teaches about, and offers useful critical insights 
into, many aspects of society.  In particular, I take up Lyotard’s point here that 
“what is at stake in a literature … is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms 
for them.”1  Some of the literary texts that I examine in Parts Two and Three of this 
thesis “bear witness” and seek to give expression to the différend that is created by 
                                                 
1 Lyotard, J-F. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abeele (Minneapolis: 
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the law.2  In this way, as argued throughout this thesis, literature is a valuable 
resource in contributing to the community’s perception and understanding of the 
way the law works, the extent of its impact, and in educating towards reform. 
  
What is Literature? 
There are many diverse definitions, and approaches to the study, of literature.3  
Some of these identify literature by reference to its ‘literariness’, that is, whether it 
has a sufficient (if vaguely defined) inherent quality that renders it ‘literary’.  This 
quality is usually evident in the classic literature of Ancient Greece or Rome, the 
writings of Shakespeare, or romantic nineteenth century English literature, for 
example.  According to this conception, literature is privileged in form and content 
over lesser, inferior works, those that do not possess ‘literary’ qualities.  It can 
include, for example, writing produced by, and supportive of, dominant 
(colonising) cultures, but exclude that of colonised peoples.4  As Ashcroft et al. 
state: 
One of the most persistent prejudices underlying the production of the texts 
of the metropolitan canon is that only certain categories of experience are 
capable of being rendered as ‘literature’.  This privileging of certain types of 
experience … [denies] value to the post-colonial experience itself, as 
‘unworthy’ of literature.5 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Grenville, K. The Secret River (Melbourne: Text Publishing) 2006; McGahan, A. 
The White Earth (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2005; Miller, A. Journey to the Stone Country 
(Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2003.  These texts are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
3 See Eagleton, T. Literary Theory: An Introduction 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing) 1996 at 1 
– 14 for a discussion and criticism of some of the ways that literature has been defined. 
4 So while works such as Forster, E.M. A Passage to India (London: Penguin Classics) 2005 or Dark, 
E. The Timeless Land (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2002, for example, may be deemed literary, those 
written by Aboriginal and other minority writers have not always been considered worthy of the 
label ‘literary’.  As I show in Parts Two and Three, this is, however, starting to change. 
5 Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. The Empire Writes Back 2nd ed. (London: Routledge) 2002 
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Other definitions of, or approaches to, literature emphasise its structure and the 
way that it uses language.  Russian formalism and structuralism, for example, focus 
on defining “in linguistic terms what makes a verbal message a work of art.”6  
Literature, in this sense, is about language, structure and form, not content.  As 
Terry Eagleton explains, these theories emphasise that “literature is a ‘special’ kind 
of language.”7  Poststructuralists and postmodernists, in contrast, deny that 
literature is a unified whole with its own set of immutable rules.  Rather, they 
highlight its multiplicity of voices, forms, languages and meanings, and emphasise 
that literature is dependent on interpretation and ways of reading.8  O t h e r  
definitions focus purely on the content of literature, confining it to fictional or 
creative writing,9 
 
As Eagleton points out, none of these definitions are conclusive, or entirely 
satisfactory.  Clearly, defining literature is dependent on value judgements.10  As he 
states: 
It would not be easy to isolate, from all that has variously been called 
‘literature’, some constant set of inherent features.  In fact it would be as 
impossible as trying to identify the single distinguishing feature which all 
games have in common.  There is no ‘essence’ of literature whatsoever.11 
How literature is defined will vary according to numerous variable factors such as 
time, culture and the perspective or ideology of the reader.  It is not an object 
                                                 
6 Lodge, D. Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader (London: Longman) 1988 at 31. 
7 Above n.3 at 4.  See, for example, Shklovsky, V. “Art as Technique” in Lodge, ibid at 16; Jakobson, 
R. “Linguistics and Poetics” in Lodge, ibid at 32. 
8 See, for example, Barthes, R. “The Death of the Author” in Lodge, ibid at 167; Foucault, M. “What 
is an Author?” in Lodge, ibid at 197. 
9 Williams, whose focus is law and literature, would seem to limit literature’s ambit to fictional or 
imaginative works, stating that “literature must be … the progeny of art, imagination, fantasy, ego.”  
Williams, M. Empty Justice: One Hundred Years of Law, Literature and Philosophy (London: 
Cavendish Publishing) 2002 at xxix. 
10 Eagleton, above n.3 at 9. 
11 Ibid at 8.   65
capable of a single determinate definition and attempts to ascribe such to it are 
futile.  It is neither stable nor unified.  As Eagleton concludes: 
Some kinds of fiction are literature and some are not: some literature is 
fictional and some is not; some literature is verbally self-regarding, while 
some highly-wrought rhetoric is not literature.  Literature, in the sense of a 
set of works of assured and unalterable value, distinguished by certain 
shared inherent properties, does not exist.12 
Not only is literature incapable of conclusive definition, but, perhaps more 
importantly, how it is defined, perceived and critiqued is itself an ideological and 
political exercise.  As explained by Eagleton: 
the so-called ‘literary canon’, the unquestioned ‘great tradition’ of the 
‘national literature’, has to be recognized as a construct, fashioned by 
particular people for particular reasons at a certain time.13 
 
This is something that is also emphasised by Hodge and Mishra in relation to 
Australian literature.  They argue that “there is [not] a single agreed object, 
‘Australian literature’.”14  They state that, rather, literature is an entity: 
constructed by various agencies attempting to prescribe what texts should 
be written, what they should be taken to mean, and what authors and texts 
should be deemed to count as the major landmarks in the national 
tradition.15 
They highlight, in particular, that the way in which literature is defined in 
Australia has had (and continues to have) considerable impact on the way in which 
Australian society has been shaped, and, in particular, on the treatment of 
                                                 
12 Ibid at 9. 
13 Ibid at 10. 
14 Hodge, B and Mishra, V. Dark Side of the Dream: Australian literature and the postcolonial mind 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin) 1990 at x. 
15 Ibid at x.  They go on to discuss this in relation to literary history, focusing particularly on the 
Oxford History of Australian Literature, comparing what they label the nationalist and the 
eternalist model of literature and their competing ideologies, strategies and objectives, at 1 – 6.  See 
also the Introduction of Ashcroft et al., above n.5 for a general discussion of the development, 
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Australia’s Aboriginal people.  This is an important point, in the context of this 
thesis.  As they note, until the 1967 referendum “it was taken for granted that 
‘Australian literature’ did not include Aboriginal texts.”16  This exclusion of 
Aboriginal literature has impacted considerably on the way in which literature 
(and history) has been studied.  By excluding Aboriginal texts from the literary 
‘canon’, Aboriginal stories and accounts of their lives and experiences were 
marginalised, and, perhaps more importantly, Aboriginal voices were silenced.   
This restricted the knowledge available to the wider Australian public about 
Aboriginal people and their experiences to that promulgated by anthropologists, 
government agencies, and the like.  That is, it was confined to representations of 
Aboriginal people as ‘primitive’, ‘the noble savage’, or a people who, having 
previously lived an idyllic existence, were, in accordance with theories of social 
Darwinism, destined to ‘die out’.17  In this way, literature “act[ed] in parallel to the 
repressive government policies that attempted to ‘eliminate’ the ‘Aboriginal 
problem’.”18 
 
I am not concerned here with presenting a comprehensive definition of literature.  
My objective is simply to demonstrate that the object ‘literature’ is open to 
interpretation, that its definition, at any given point in time, is not ideologically or 
politically neutral, and that, as highlighted by both Eagleton and Hodge and 
Mishra, how it is defined and presented is a construct.  More importantly, I also 
wish to clarify what I mean by the term ‘literature’ in the context of this thesis.  In 
                                                 
16 Hodge and Mishra, ibid at xiv.  The 1967 referendum allowed for Aborigines to be included 
within Commonwealth legislative power and also allowed them to be counted in the census. 
17 These representations are dominant in Dark, above n.4, for example.  This work, and the way that 
it represents Aboriginal people this way is discussed in Chapter Six. 
18 Hodge and Mishra, above n.14 at xiv.   67
particular, I wish to emphasise that my interpretation of what constitutes literature 
is not confined to the ‘canon’ of literature.  Rather, I mean it to include the telling 
of minority stories, such as those of colonised and Aboriginal peoples.19  As 
Ashcroft et al. state: 
More than three-quarters of the people living in the world today have had 
their lives shaped by the experience of colonialism.  It is easy to see how 
important this has been in the political and economic spheres, but its 
general influence on the perceptual frameworks of contemporary peoples is 
often less evident.  Literature offers one of the most important ways in 
which these new perceptions are expressed and it is in their writing, and 
through other arts such as painting, sculpture, music, and dance that the 
day-to-day realities experienced by colonized peoples have been most 
powerfully encoded and so profoundly influential.20 
For Aboriginal people, literature is a way of telling stories about how the law has 
treated them and, importantly, of critiquing and commenting on the law, the 
western legal system and its effects on Aboriginal people.  As explained further 
below, I am less concerned with the ‘canon’ of literature, and more concerned with 
this conception of literature as a vehicle for critique. 
 
It is important in this context to acknowledge, however, that the very medium of 
literature is in itself a privileged one, and therefore is itself part of the dominant 
discourse.  The literary form was one, at least initially, that was forced upon 
Aboriginal peoples (who themselves had their own extensive oral and pictorial 
languages and traditions) as part of colonisation and assimilation.  And although it 
has recently given both Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples space to address 
Lyotard’s différend it remains, at least within mainstream Australia, a medium with 
                                                 
19 Lyotard, reminds us that we need to listen to minority voices.  This is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four.  It should also be noted here tha t  I  d o  n o t  c o n f i n e  m y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e s e  
minority stories to only those that are told by Aboriginal writers.  It also includes stories about 
Aboriginal experiences written by non-Aboriginal writers. 
20 Above n.5 at 1.   68
a history closely linked to the status quo.21   Notwithstanding this, literature, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, is a useful medium for informing readers about the law 
and through which the stories of those who have been marginalised and mistreated 
by the law can be put into the dominant public domain. 
 
Bearing the above in mind, when I talk about literature in this thesis, I mean 
(generally) novels and (generally) fictional works.  I say generally because these 
boundaries are fluid.  In some of the texts I discuss, the subject matter is not always 
entirely fictional, as in The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith or The Secret River, for 
example.22  Both of these works are based, to some extent, on historical events. 
They are not, however, presented as non-fictional works, but as fictionalised 
tellings of events in our history.  Other works, such as My Place are not fictional, 
but biographical accounts of the treatment of Aboriginal people by Australian 
governments, authorities and society.23  My Place is, however, written in an idiom 
easily accessible by both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal readers, and does not read 
as a strictly biographical work.  Other works, such as Sorry, while relating a story 
that has important and real implications, are entirely fictional.24 
 
The literature on which I focus is Australian literature of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.  It is written by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australian 
writers, and is generally readily available and widely read.25  I acknowledge that 
                                                 
21 I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  h e r e  t h a t  t h i s  p r i v i l e g e  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s o c i a l ,  e c o n o m i c ,  c u l t u r a l  a n d  
political distinctions within in non-indigenous communities also. 
22 Grenville, above n.2 and Keneally, T. The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith (Australia: Harper Collins) 
2001.  These texts are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.  As discussed in Chapter Seven, Grenville 
has, however, arguably presented her novel as more than a work of fiction. 
23 Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1988. 
24 Jones, G. Sorry (NSW: Vintage Books) 2007. 
25 Much of it has also been awarded, or shortlisted for, major prizes, such as the Miles Franklin 
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the specific works that I have chosen may reflect my particular ideological 
preferences.  However, as introduced above, definition necessitates limitations and 
choices.  That my choice of literature does not include, for example, the poetry of 
Henry Lawson or the plays of Jack Davis, does not mean that I do not consider 
these works to be ‘literature’, or that they do not provide useful insight into various 
aspects of Australian life.  I have simply chosen texts that are relevant to my 
argument (as demonstrated through a consideration of the effects of terra nullius 
and the rule of law) that law is a powerful mechanism that controls many aspects of 
the social and that it creates boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that have very 
real and long-term consequences, both for those who are identified by it as ‘other’, 
and for those who are part of its dominant discourse. 
 
Why is Literature Important? 
As a form of discourse, literature is important for a number of reasons.  Discourses, 
as explained in Chapter One, are a form of knowledge.  They can promote 
particular (official) knowledges and normalise particular constructed values and 
perspectives.  The truth and the reality that are thereby perpetuated impact on the 
way in which we live our lives and perceive and relate to others and to society 
generally.  As Eagleton states: 
Discourses, sign-systems, and signifying practices of all kinds, from film and 
television to fiction and the languages of natural science, produce effects, 
shape forms of consciousness and unconsciousness, which are closely related 
to the maintenance and transformation of our existing systems of power.26 
The discourse of law is one discourse that is examined in detail in this thesis.  The 
official story of the law is one of uniformity, objectivity, equality and justice.  It is 
about the impartial application of neutral rules by unbiased institutions and 
                                                 
26 Above n.3 at 183.   70
officers.  The discourse of colonialism is another discourse that I examine.  As 
explained in Chapter Four, the consequences of this particular discourse are far 
reaching, devastating (at least for some) and continuing.  It has contributed to the 
dispossession of Aboriginal people, and their subjection to assimilationist practices 
that have led, for example, to the removal of their children.27  These discourses, or 
narratives, have an enormous hold.  They authorise who has the right to speak, and 
what gets said.  As Lyotard states: 
Narratives …  define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in 
question, and since they are themselves a  p a r t  o f  t h a t  c u l t u r e ,  t h e y  a r e  
legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do.28 
 
Literature, as a form of narrative, is a medium of representation that serves an 
important function.  It can contribute to the knowledge we have about people, and 
so influence the way identities are constructed and the way that we relate to each 
other and to society generally.  It can, that is, contribute to genres of discourse, 
such as colonialism or the law.  And it can do so in two important ways.  Firstly, 
literary representations may support official narratives that tell official stories.   
Literature may, that is, promote particular knowledges and, in its representations, 
normalise particular constructed values and perspectives.  In so doing, it can 
contribute to the perpetuation of injustice “through the kinds of representation 
that judge certain kinds of identities as ‘lesser’ or ‘inferior’.”29  This is evidenced, for 
example, in the images of Aboriginal people that have been perpetuated by literary 
                                                 
27 Some of these practices are discussed in Chapter Nine. 
28 Lyotard, J-F. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. Bennington, G. and 
Massumi, B. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 1984 at 23. 
29 Rodan, D. ‘Identity’ and ‘Experience’: Theories of Representation and Justice in Selected Narrative 
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representations of them as ‘primitive’ or as the ‘noble savage’.30  As Marcia Langton 
highlights, non-Aboriginal people acquire their knowledge and understanding of 
Aboriginality from a variety of sources, including by reading a book about 
Aboriginal people.31  She states: 
Textual analysis of the racist stereotypes and mythologies which inform 
Australian understanding of Aboriginal people is revealing.  The most dense 
relationship is not between actual people, but between white Australians 
and the symbols created by their predecessors.  Australians do not know and 
relate to Aboriginal people.  They relate to stories told by former colonists32 
This form of representation is damaging for two reasons; firstly, it results in the 
marginalisation and oppression of Aboriginal stories and Aboriginal voices.  It 
silences them, denies them authority and delegitimises their right and ability to 
challenge official narratives and official truths about the injustices that they have 
suffered.  Secondly, it denies Aboriginal people the right to represent themselves so 
that the knowledge and image of Aboriginality that they acquire is that of the 
colonisers.33  In this way, the representation of Aborigines as the object of 
colonialism helps to construct and perpetuate an authorised version of history 
about colonisation.  That is, it contributes to the legitimation of one particular 
discourse, one version of events, and, as stated by Rodan, “it is this authorised 
version that constructs a hegemony and so causes a differend.”34  I n  t h i s  w a y ,  
                                                 
30 Ashcroft et al, above n.5 at 3.  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, particularly in 
reference to Dark, above n.4. 
31 Langton, M. Well I heard it on the radio and saw it on the television … (Sydney: Australian Film 
Commission) 1993 at 31. 
32 Ibid at 33. 
33 As Hodge and Mishra state: “since they … cannot represent themselves, ‘they must therefore be 
represented by others’ who know more about them than they know about themselves.”  Above, 
n.14 at 27. 
34 Rodan, D. Identity and Justice: Conflicts, Contradictions and Contingencies (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter 
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literature is a medium by which “conceptions of ‘truth’, ‘order’, and ‘reality’ 
become established.”35 
 
But literature can also question and challenge these authorised versions of truth 
and offer alternative realities.  As Anthony Uhlmann writes: 
One of the most powerful capacities of a work of literary fiction, is … to 
reflect an ideological horizon, an overview of a world as it is experienced, 
which does not present us with formulas and completed theories but with 
the representation of the process through which ideologies are generated 
and reformed. … 
For this reason literature is well placed to point us towards justice.36 
This is something encouraged by postmodernism and postcolonialism.  As 
explained in Chapter Four, these theories emphasise that there are forms of 
narrative other than the official grand narratives.  For postmodernism and 
postcolonialism, these local, or personal, narratives are important for it is these 
narratives that question and challenge official metanarratives.  Literature is one 
way in which these local stories can be told, and alternative (minority) voices 
heard.  These voices may be those of the colonised.  But they may also be those of 
women, refugees, or other marginalised groups.  Kim Scott, talking about the 
telling of Aboriginal stories states: 
I’d like to think that writing fiction is sometimes a way to explore, to 
rethink and possibly to retrieve or create something from between and 
behind the lines on the page.  As such it can help the revitalisation and 
regeneration of an Indigenous heritage, in so far as it involves ‘shaking up’ 
and making space within the most readily available language – that of the 
colonizers – for other ways of thinking.37 
                                                 
35 Ashcroft et al, above n.5 at 7.  This is something explored in the context of the colonial by Edward 
Said, for example, whose work will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
36 Uhlmann, A. “Law Translating Life and Life Translating Law Through Stories: Bringing Them 
Home and Benang by Kim Scott” (2001) 15 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 41 at 50 – 51. 
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Literature can, that is, allow that which has not been put into words to be, and 
open up the possibility for justice and alternative realities.  In this way, it is, as 
Trees notes, “often a site of contestation, a cry for legitimacy and therefore 
acknowledgement as a counter-history.”38 
 
Literature, then, serves an important function in challenging the exclusions that 
were discussed in Chapter Two of this work.  It is one way in which the dominant 
standard against which behaviour, actions and perspectives are measured can be 
questioned.39  And it is a way in which the law can be critiqued.  This happens 
every time a novel represents a legal process or the consequence of a judicial 
decision or the operation of particular legislation, for example.40  It allows, that is, 
for an interrogation of law.  There are a vast number of theorists who write in the 
area of law and literature, and who critique a wide range of issues, from Richard 
Posner’s economic analysis of law through the use of Kafka’s The Trial,41 for 
example, to the laws of marriage and cohabitation as revealed in Thomas Hardy’s 
Jude the Obscure.42  Equally, there has been much criticism of the law and 
                                                 
38 Trees, K. “My Place as Counter-Memory” (1991) 32 SPAN 66 at 69. 
39 And, as stated by Patton, “[s]o long as the standard itself is never questioned the only two possible 
attitudes towards the other are exclusion or assimilation.”  Patton, P. “Post-structuralism and the 
Mabo Debate: Difference, Society and Justice” in Wilson, M. and Yeatman, A. Justice and Identity: 
Antipodean Practices (Sydney: Allen & Unwin) 1995 at 160.  
40 The way legislation operates is written about in Morgan, above n.23 and Scott, K. Benang 
(Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000.  These works are discussed in Part Three. 
41 West, R. “Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political 
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner” (1985) 99 Harvard Law Review 384. 
42 Williams, M. Secrets and Laws: Collected Essays in Law, Lives and Literature (London: Cavendish 
Publishing) 2005 at 103 – 122.  For other examples of writing in this area see Aristodemou, M. Law 
and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2000; Dolin, K. A Critical Introduction to Law and 
Literature (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press) 2007; Morison, J. and Bell, C. eds. Tall Stories? 
Reading Law and Literature (Aldershot: Dartmouth) 1996; Posner, R. Law and Literature: A 
Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 1988; Ward, I. Law and Literature: 
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Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction (New Haven: Yale University 
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literature movement.43  I do not intend to provide a discussion of the law and 
literature movement here.  This thesis is not concerned with law and literature as a 
theoretical discipline.  It is concerned with the way in which postcolonial readings 
of literature can educate about and critique the way in which the law, as it operates 
in Australia, has constructed, marginalised and silenced Aboriginal people.  That is, 
at a theoretical level I am more concerned with the issues of exclusion and the 
creation of the ‘other’, discussed in Chapters One and Two, and with 
postmodernism and postcolonialism, which are discussed in Chapter Four.  My 
argument is that literature is important not just in educating about or representing 
how the law or the courts work.  Its importance lies in the insights it conveys about 
legal structures, practices and assumptions.  Its use is not limited, that is, to 
demonstrating what the laws of evidence require, for example, but in its discussion 
of how law includes and excludes and in its analysis of law’s myths of equality and 
objectivity.  In this way, it exposes the shortcomings of law’s underlying 
assumptions, and the substantive and long-term consequences that these have on 
the everyday lives of real people.  As Terry Threadgold states: 
Literature may help us to see how institutions like the law are themselves 
constituted and, more importantly, what they look like from somewhere 
else and how they could be constituted differently.44 
The texts that I examine throughout this thesis represent, critique and comment on 
the legal structures, systems and values that underpin the modern Australian legal 
system. 
 
                                                 
43 For an overview of some of the writers in this area and criticisms of the movement see, for 
example, Douzinas, C. and Gearey, A. Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing) 2005 at Chapter 13. 
44 Threadgold, T. “Law and Literature: Revised and Enlarged Edition by Richard Posner” (1999) 23 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have clarified what I mean by the term ‘literature’, and argued 
that, as a form of representation and narrative, literature is vital in both reinforcing 
and questioning dominant discourses and practices.  I have argued that literature is 
a valuable medium through which local stories and voices can be heard, and which 
can challenge and critique discourses that result in the construction, 
marginalisation and silencing of the ‘other’.  I have argued, that is, that literature is 
vital in questioning the exclusions that were discussed in Chapter Two of this 
thesis. 
 
In the next chapter, I examine further the ways in which narratives can be 
interpreted.  In particular, I examine postmodernism and postcolonialism.  I argue 
that these theories are enormously important in the way they create a space for 
local stories to be told and heard and in providing useful frameworks within which 
all literature can be read and particular discourses and authorised narratives 
questioned.   76
CHAPTER FOUR 
WAYS OF READING 
 
Introduction 
Texts, whether legal or literary, can be written, read and interpreted in a variety of 
ways.  They are open to a multiplicity of meanings.  The definition of such words as 
‘reasonable’, ‘careless’ or ‘family’, for example, can take on different meanings 
depending upon whether they are being used by a layperson in ordinary 
conversation, or by a lawyer in the course of legal argument.  Likewise, how one 
reads literary texts can depend upon their context, the way they are written and the 
perspectives and ideologies that the reader brings to the text.  Some readers, for 
example, may read The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith as nothing more than a tale of 
gratuitous violence.1  Others may read it simply as a fictionalised telling of an 
historical event.  Others may interpret it as an account of the injustices perpetrated 
against Aboriginal people as a result of the occupation and colonisation of their 
country.  Thomas Keneally, in writing the novel, wanted an Aboriginal voice and 
story to be heard.  The point is that reading is not always a neutral or value free 
exercise.  Literary texts do not have determinate, objective meanings. 
  
In the previous chapter, I argued that literature is an important mode of 
representation, education and criticism.  In this chapter, I discuss two theoretical 
approaches which have framed the reading and interpretation of the literary texts 
that I discuss.  I begin this chapter with a discussion of postmodernism.  Some of the 
key concepts of postmodernism were introduced in Chapters One and Two.  Here, I 
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focus more specifically on the way in which postmodernism challenges the telling 
of one universal story and advocates for alternative stories to be told and listened to.  
In the second part of this chapter, I examine postcolonialism.  I explain what I mean 
by this term, and why I find it a useful perspective to adopt in the reading of 
literature about law.  It is also useful, in this context, to note Leiboff and Thomas’s 
observation that while postmodernism and postcolonialism “originated outside law, 
[they] flowed through into legal thought during the 1980’s.”2  Larissa Behrendt 
expresses a similar view.  She argues that: 
Indigenous Australians approach the law with a particular subjugated 
resisting eye.  From this position, they have the least to lose and the most to 
gain from questioning the canonical structures of law.  As such, their 
experience and critique is essential in a post-colonial approach to law.3 
 
In Parts Two and Three of this thesis, I examine literary texts that comment on the 
law’s treatment of Aboriginal people.  Postmodernism and, more specifically, 
postcolonialism is the framework of analysis that I adopt in that discussion.  I do not 
do this naively.  I appreciate Leiboff and Thomas’s point that: 
Postcolonialism can have the effect of essentialising colonial and postcolonial 
experience, assuming that there is a single set of characteristics which define 
the intersection of colonising and colonised cultures.4 
This is undoubtedly true, and is a point which I examine further in this chapter.  
What I find useful about postcolonialism, however, is that it allows for the voice of 
the ‘other’ to be heard.  It creates a space for alternative (minority) stories to be told 
                                                 
2 Leiboff, M. and Thomas, M. Legal Theories in Principle (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2004 at 5.  They 
continue: “These theories operate at a conceptual level but can have highly practical consequences.”  
This is a point that I take up in Parts Two and Three. 
3 Quoted in Reilly, A. “Introduction” (2000) 1(1) Balayi: Culture, Law and Colonialism 1 at 4.  Kim 
Scott exemplifies this in his critique of the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA) in Benang (Fremantle: 
Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000.  This work is discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
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in the public domain.5  Postcolonialism also offers a set of guidelines for reading in 
ways that allow us to deconstruct and critique colonial representations.  All texts, 
that is, can be read from a postcolonial perspective, and thereby offer important 
insight into the way in which our law is structured, and the way that it treats its 
subjects.  It is important, within this framework, to remember that law, too, is a 
text.  My argument is that the positivist legacy, which underlies our law, masks the 
truth that law is neither objective nor treats everyone equally.  Rather, it constructs, 
marginalises and silences the ‘other’. 
  
Postmodernism 
Postmodernism is generally a response to modernism, or, more particularly, 
modernism’s desire for universality, reason and order.  This emphasis on order and 
reason has had considerable impact, providing the foundation for much of modern 
western society.  The law is one area where modernism has been (and continues to 
be) enormously influential.  As discussed in Chapter Two, legal theory largely 
focuses on identifying a unified, totalising theory of law.  As Leiboff and Thomas 
explain: 
The belief in underlying unity has led natural law theorists to try and 
explain law by reference to universal principles which hold true regardless 
of where or when you are.  A similar belief saw positivists try to close off the 
analysis of law from things which are not law, and to describe an idealised 
structure of the ‘legal system’.  In both cases, such theorists are attempting to 
provide ‘one right answer’, independent of its context.6 
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Law, according to these models, is about imposing order, and prescribing rules and 
obligations with which the legal subject must comply.  It is a reasoned, ordered and 
objective institution and set of practices. 
 
It is this conception of law as a reasoned and objective institution that gives it its 
legitimacy, and, as explained in Chapters One and Two, the power and the right to 
regulate and control how people should behave and act.  This is an important point.  
In creating boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, the law reflects 
modernism’s polarisation between order and disorder, and its assertion of the 
former’s superiority and the latter’s illegitimacy.  That which is not part of the 
ordered dominant discourse, not, that is, white, heterosexual, or male, becomes part 
of the disorder, is labelled as ‘other’ and is often marginalised and silenced.  As such, 
the principles of modernism have done much to contribute to the perpetuation of 
the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion that I discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
Postmodern theorists critique modernist discourses, such as the law.  Leiboff and 
Thomas explain that: 
Postmodernism is a broad term which encompasses an approach to analysis 
which rejects (or at least critiques) Enlightenment values and the belief in 
absolute values which had characterised modern philosophy, including legal 
theory. 
Postmodernism is suspicious of authority, received wisdom and values, and 
does not accept that rationalism represents an unbiased, neutral and 
independent tool for seeking truth.7 
Rather than focusing on unity and totality, postmodernism embraces diversity and 
plurality.  Whereas modernism contributes to the perpetuation of the suppression 
and victimisation of difference, postmodernism seeks to legitimate and give a voice 
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to the ‘other’ that has been suppressed.  It questions, critiques and challenges 
dominant discourses, and rejects modernism’s telling of grand narratives.8  It 
emphasises smaller local narratives.  As encapsulated by Rice and Waugh: 
We live in a pluralized culture surrounded by a multiplicity of styles, 
knowledges, stories that we tell ourselves about the world.  To attempt to 
impose an overarching narrative on such experience is to perpetuate the 
violences of modernity with their exclusions and terrors.  The relativization 
of styles which is postmodernism, throws into doubt the claims of any one 
discourse or story to be offering the ‘truth’ about the world or an 
authoritative version of the real.9 
 
In the context of the legal, postmodernism denies that the law is something that has 
a single, unified identity or meaning.  It seeks to deconstruct the combination of 
reason and law that characterises modernist jurisprudence.10  It focuses on the legal 
subject and the understanding and perception they have of, and bring to, the legal 
system.11  It: 
is a way of looking at the world which rejects the underlying unity which 
drives modernist approaches to law.  For postmodernists, there can be no 
absolute or universal principles which are true in all circumstances – or at 
least, if there are, then we cannot fully know them.  ‘Truth’, from a 
postmodern perspective, is always contingent, and as such, loses its capital ‘T’ 
and becomes plural – there is not one ‘Truth’ but many localised ‘truths’, 
which change according to when and where they relate to, and who is 
claiming them as truth.12 
And so, postmodernism promotes a re-thinking of the legal order and foregrounds 
the plurality of law’s subjects.  As Douzinas et al explain: 
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at 1151. 
9 Rice, P. and Waugh, P. Modern Literary Theory: A Reader 3rd ed. (London: Arnold) 1991 at 290. 
10 Douzinas, C., Warrington, R. and McVeigh, S. Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in the 
Texts of Law (London: Routledge) 1991 at 27. 
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The orthodox jurisprudence of modernity constructs theories that portray 
the law as a coherent body of rules and principles, or of intentions and 
expressions of a sovereign will.  Jurisprudence is obsessed with the self-
confessed and well-documented desire to dress the exercise of political 
power in legitimacy.  Its predominant strategy is to try to weave the legal 
texts into a single, seamless veil in which authorised and symmetrical 
patterns are endlessly produced, circulated and repeated. 
In this, postmodern theory could not be more different.  It distrusts 
all attempts to create large-scale, totalising theories in order to explain social 
phenomena.  It refuses to accept that there is a ‘real’ world or legal system 
‘out there’, perfectly formed, complete and coherent, waiting to be 
discovered by theory.  It tells small-scale, provisional, open stories about our 
lives and the world.13 
 
Opposition to modernism’s grand narratives is something of particular concern to 
Lyotard.14  He expresses disillusionment with two of modernism’s grand narratives, 
namely, the political (advocating humanity and emancipation) and the 
philosophical (advocating a unity of spirit and totalisation).15  He argues that the 
pursuit of these narratives, these “tall tales of emancipation or totality”16 can only 
“end in terror.”17  Indeed, “the attempt to put them into practice led respectively to 
the Gulag and Auschwitz.”18  This all leads Lyotard to conclude that: 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we 
can take.  We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia for the whole 
and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the 
transparent and the communicable experience. … Let us wage war on 
totality, let us be witness to the unrepresentable; let us activate the 
differences and save the honour of the name.19 
                                                 
13 Above n.10 at ix – x. 
14 Lyotard’s theories were also discussed in Chapters One and Two. 
15 Douzinas et al., above n.10 at 16. 
16 Ibid at 16. 
17 Ibid at 17. 
18 Ibid at 16. 
19 Lyotard, J-F. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. Bennington, G. and 
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Importantly, Lyotard desires to see that the unrepresentable are represented, are 
given a voice, and for this to occur modernism’s totalising and homogenising grand 
narratives must be dismantled: 
For Lyotard, universals do not allow for other stories that are 
incommensurably different from the great history.  Evidence of this problem 
is to be found in the exclusion (from authorised perspectives of history) of 
stories by women, people of colour, indigenous people, and non-Christian 
groups or individuals.  Only recently has there been an acknowledgement 
and recognition that there are other ways of seeing and constructing the 
world.  Despite this, other versions of history written by some women, 
indigenous people and people of colour are considered not ‘truthful’ or ‘right’ 
because they are represented as confessional, testimonial, or personal 
accounts and do not, therefore, conform to master narrative notions of 
historiography.20 
Lyotard is concerned about the nature of discourse and its ability to perpetuate 
dominant ideology and silence those who do not fall within it.  He argues that the 
discourse used ensures that these ‘outsiders’ are denied a voice of opposition, or at 
least one that is heard or considered legitimate within the dominant domain.  As 
explained in Chapter One, Lyotard expresses this in his theory of the différend.  It is 
this issue of the différend, and the call for the voice of the local to be heard that is of 
most interest to me in this thesis. 
 
In the reading of literature, postmodernism is, therefore, useful in a number of 
ways.  Firstly, it allows the reader to be critical of texts that tell only one story and 
exclude those who challenge, disagree or fail to conform to that narrative or who 
are denied the right or the ability to speak within it.  It allows us, that is, to bear 
witness to the différend.  And so, when reading a text such as The Chant of Jimmie 
Blacksmith, postmodernism allows us to read it not simply as a story of murder by 
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an Aboriginal man, but as an account of the exclusion of Jimmie Blacksmith and his 
people by and from mainstream (non-indigenous) society and law.  It allows us to 
read it as an account of the consequences of denying Jimmie access to the dominant 
discourse.  Secondly, postmodernism has advocated for the creation of a space that 
allows smaller local stories to be told and to be heard.  It has, for example, allowed 
for stories such as Sally Morgan’s My Place and Kim Scott’s Benang to be told.21  It is 
in reading such texts that we are made aware of the unrepresented.  These are issues 




Postcolonial theory draws on, or has at least been facilitated by, postmodernism 
and, to some extent, post-structuralism.  Postmodernism’s denial of universality, and 
recognition and celebration of plurality, post-structuralist conceptions of the nature 
of knowledge and Foucauldian notions of the relationship between government, 
knowledge and power, all call for the creation of space for local and minority voices 
to be heard.22  This includes the voice of the colonised.  At a general level, therefore, 
it can be said that postcolonialism shares with these other theories a focus on 
marginality and local voices and the relationship between the centre and the 
periphery, an emphasis on plurality,23 a concern with relationships of power and 
knowledge,24 and a rejection of totalising universalism.  This is not to suggest, 
however, that these movements share purely common concerns.  There are crucial 
                                                 
21 Morgan, above n.5; Scott, above n.3. 
22 Foucault’s theories were discussed in Chapter One. 
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differences between them.  Mishra and Hodge, in particular, emphasise the distinct 
political agendas of postmodernism and postcolonialism.  They emphasise a need to 
clearly define the subject, stating that: 
If for postmodernism the object of analysis is the subject as defined by 
humanism, with its essentialism and mistaken historical verities, its unities 
and transcendental presence, then for post-colonialism the object is the 
imperialist subject, the colonized as formed by the processes of imperialism.25 
They warn against postcolonialism being subsumed by postmodernism, with its own 
totalising tendencies, and potential to homogenise “particularities … into a more or 
less unproblematic theory of the Other.”26  They also express concern with settler 
colonies being incorporated into a general theory of postcolonialism, asserting that 
the “‘justifying’ discourse which allows this settler incorporation into post-
colonialism is clearly postmodernism.”27  Defining the space of postmodernism and 
postcolonialism is, however, only one area of concern.  As I discuss briefly there are 
also considerable divergences over exactly what is meant by postcolonialism, what 
postcolonialism seeks to achieve and how to deal with settler colonies, indeed 
whether settler colonies can even be considered postcolonial. 
 
Bearing this in mind, at an introductory level postcolonialism can be defined simply 
as a response to colonialism.  Largely, this colonialism is that wrought by the 
European imperialism of the last four centuries.  Arguably, it was the British Empire 
that represented the pinnacle of European imperialism.  At its peak in the early 
twentieth century the Empire stretched as far as India, Africa, the Middle East, the 
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West Indies, South Asia, New Zealand, Canada and, of course, Australia.28  Then 
came independence.29  With this independence came the opportunity for the 
inhabitants of these diverse countries, anglicised for so long, to re-assert their own 
cultural identities.  It is here that we can find the beginnings of postcolonialism as a 
specifically articulated theory.30  Thus, while postcolonialism may well be a 
response to colonialism it is much more than a mere reaction to imperial 
domination.  It is about culture, identity and self.  As Franz Fanon argues in 
Wretched of the Earth: 
[b]ecause it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious 
determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity, 
colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question 
constantly: “In reality, Who am I?”31 
 
Colonialism is a part of modernism, with its concern for order, unity, rationality and 
universality.  This need for a rational world order, combined with the expansion of 
scientific knowledge (that is, biological and evolutionary theory, with the work of 
Darwin and Spencer) which treated human beings as an object of study, rendered it 
necessary to classify, categorise and order human beings.  Consequently, a construct 
of race emerged that allowed for the ordering of the races into a hierarchy.  This 
construct of race naturally reflected the culture and values of its propagators.32  And 
                                                 
28 There are many writers who write about the layers of non-European colonialism and the meeting 
of these different colonial experiences. 
29 At least for most.  As a settler colony, Australia today, although formally an independent nation, is 
still very much attached to Britain, as will be discussed below. 
30 Although, as noted by Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H.: “‘post-colonial theory’ has existed 
for a long time before that particular name was used to describe it.” Post-colonial Studies Reader 
(London: Routledge) 1995 at 1. 
31 Fanon, F. Wretched of the Earth (Hammondsworth: Penguin) 1967 at 15. 
32 As we now know, there is no such thing as race.  This construct of race was driven by theories of 
social Darwinism that were prevalent at the time, as expressed, for example, in one Western 
Australian parliamentarian’s statement that: “All we can do is protect them [Aborigines] as far as 
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so it is no surprise that it was the Europeans who occupied the dominant position 
within this new hierarchy or that the non-European was depicted as ‘inferior’ or 
‘other’.33  According to this model they were ‘uncivilised’ and lawless.34  T h i s  
constructed knowledge of, and associated assumptions about, race had enormous 
impact.  At a foundational level, it provided a moral and political justification and 
obligation for colonial expansion.  It also allowed for and encouraged exclusion.  
That is, it gave the dominant colonial powers the power to exclude the ‘other’, the 
colonised, as ‘uncivilised’, ‘primitive’, and ‘inferior’. 
 
In the context of the legal, these precepts of colonialism have played a central role 
in the construction and legitimation of law’s narrative.  The distinction between 
‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ has shaped the development of colonial legal systems.  As 
explained in Chapter Two, one of the key concerns of positivist legal theory is to 
describe an ordered legal system.  For Hart, in particular, this translated into a 
distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ systems of law.  Only the former 
consisted of primary and secondary rules, and only the former possessed the all 
important ‘rule of recognition’.35  As Douzinas and Gearey state: 
A central concept of western jurisprudence is that of ‘primitive’ law.   
Primitive law represents a crude beginning that must be superseded.  This is 
a view of history that takes as its central reference point the birth of the 
modern western state.  The ‘gift’ of law to the ‘savage’ becomes one of the 
central justifications of the colonial project and becomes synonymous with 
the modern nation.36 
                                                                                                                                             
their best.”  Quoted in Haebich, A. For Their Own Good: Aborigines and Government in the 
Southwest of Western Australia (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press) 1988 at 80. 
33 Davies, M. Asking the Law Question 2nd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002 at 262 – 264. 
34 Although they were also hierarchised.  Aborigines, for example, were considered lowest in the 
hierarchy.  Only ‘half-caste’ Aborigines, that is, those with white blood, were considered fit to be 
assimilated into white Australia.  This is discussed more fully in Chapter Nine. 
35 See discussion in Chapter Two. 
36 Douzinas, C. and Gearey, A. Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Oxford: 
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In the case of Australia, the English colonisers were able, as part of law’s narrative, 
to completely foreclose the ‘primitive’ law of Aboriginal peoples and, in an effort to 
contain and control (and, for some, protect) Aborigines, bring them within the fold 
of the colonial law and so ensure and legitimise their subordinate status.37 
 
As indicated above, postcolonial theories and responses to colonialism vary.  One 
particularly influential version of postcolonialism is that of Edward Said.  He first 
put forward his theories in his work Orientalism published in 1978.  His main 
concern was knowledge and power, or, more specifically, the way in which the 
production of knowledge was itself power.  Applying his theories to the Orient, he 
argued that the West was concerned with the creation of knowledge about those 
‘others’ who were under its rule, and so to create a construct of the Orient.  He 
defined Orientalism as: 
the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by 
making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching 
it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient.38 
This knowledge about and imagery of the non-West, or non-European, was 
presented in such a way as to make the latter appear ‘lesser’.  Less civilised, less 
intelligent, less cultured.  This construct was then used in the assertion and 
maintenance of power.39  That is, Said’s argument is essentially that Orientalism was 
simply the West exercising control and power over the Orient.  It constructed a 
cultural representation of the Orient, creating a Western / Orient discourse that 
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38 Said, E. Orientalism (London: Penguin) 2003 at 3. 
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“gave (and still gives) the West power over its object, justifying Western 
imperialism.”40 
 
Said argued that, as such, the construct of the Orient represents the paradigm of 
colonialism.41  As summarised by Rice and Waugh: 
In each case, the mysterious and duplicitous ‘other’ which is the colonised 
culture functions as a means of stabilising and affirming the identity of the 
imperialist power.  Said’s book emphasised the centrality of cultural 
representation in this process. … Said shows how imperialism maintains 
power through the designation of a discursive space which makes silent and 
invisible all those perspectives which are excluded by and from its frame.  
He shows … how the construction of ‘them’ is necessary for the affirmation 
of ‘us’.42 
The dichotomy created between ‘them’ and ‘us’ had a further purpose.  The imagery 
and educational institutions used to perpetuate this image of ‘them’ in the West 
were also used in the colonies to subjugate the colonised population so that they too 
were forced to believe this entirely western view of themselves.  Slemon explains 
that in Said’s thesis colonialist power operates through a complex relationship 
between apparatuses that he labels institutional (colonialist educational apparatuses) 
and semiotic (textuality).43  This operates, according to Slemon, as follows: 
a scholarly educational apparatus called ‘Orientalism’ … appropriates textual 
representations of ‘the Orient’ in order to consolidate itself as a discipline 
and to reproduce ‘the Orient’ as a deployable unit of knowledge. … Said’s 
thesis is that a function at the top of this line is employing those 
representations created at the bottom of the line in order to make up 
‘knowledges’ that have an ideological function … ‘Orientalism’ manufactures 
the ‘Orient’ and thus helps to regulate colonialist relations. … But in Said’s 
analysis, colonialist power also runs … in a downward movement, where the 
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scholarly apparatus of Orientalism is u n d e r s t o o d  t o  b e  a t  w o r k  i n  t h e  
production of a purely fantastic and entirely projected idea of the ‘Orient’.44 
 
Said’s theories have proved both useful and controversial.  They are useful in the 
extent to which his work has contributed to the development of thoughts and 
discourses of the theorised colonised ‘other’.  But Said’s work also presents a number 
of difficulties.  One of these is pointed to by Mishra and Hodge.  That is, that 
Orientalism is a totalising theory that reduces the “multiplicity of languages and 
ideologies into a homogenized European discourse.”45  That is, it reduces all 
difference into one theory of the ‘Other’.  This is an important point to remember in 
light of one of the defining characteristics of postcolonialism being its emphasis on 
the local and the individual.  Any totalising theory of postcolonialism that 
homogenises all ‘others’ into one ‘Other’ is itself a form of colonialism or 
imperialism.  This is something that is particularly important in the context of the 
application of postcolonial theory to the ‘aboriginal’ within Australia.46  As Marcia 
Langton states, there is: 
an ancient and universal feature of racism: the assumption of the 
undifferentiated  Other.  More specifically, the assumption is that all 
Aborigines are alike and equally understand each other, without regard to 
cultural variations, history, gender, sexual preference and so on.47 
Kim Scott makes a similar point.  He reiterates that emphasis must be on the local.  
He states: 
It seems to me that any ‘global discourse’ has strong homogenising 
tendencies, and therefore we need to strengthen regional voices so they 
remain true to their own imperatives at the same time as being empowered 
                                                 
44 Ibid at 47. 
45 Mishra and Hodge, above n.25 at 402. 
46 Bearing these criticisms in mind, Orientalism is, however, important in its influence on the 
development of the concept of Aboriginalism.  This is discussed further below. 
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to enter into exchange and dialogue.  That means being willing to change, 
but also to cause change, and that seems out best hope for a transformation 
that increases, rather than reduces, the possibilities available to us – 
particularly for expressing who we are and what we might be.48 
 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin emphasise this complexity and heterogeneity of 
postcolonialism.  They state: 
All post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to overt or 
subtle forms of neo-colonial domination, and independence has not solved 
this problem.  The development of new elites within independent societies, 
often buttressed by neo-colonial institutions; the development of internal 
divisions based on racial, linguistic or religious discriminations; the 
continuing unequal treatment of indigenous peoples in settler / invader 
societies – all these testify to the fact that post-colonialism is a continuing 
process of resistance and reconstruction.  This does not imply that post-
colonial practices are seamless and homogenous but indicates the 
impossibility of dealing with any part of the colonial process without 
considering its antecedents and consequences. 
Post-colonial theory involves discussion about experience of various 
kinds: migration, slavery, suppression, resistance, representation, difference, 
race, gender, place and responses to the influential master discourses of 
imperial Europe.49 
                                                 
48 Scott, K. “Covered up with Sand” (2007) 66(2) Meanjin 120 at 124. 
49 Above n.30 at 2.  It should be noted, however, that concerns have been raised in relation to 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin’s earlier work, The Empire Writes Back., above n.26.  In this work they 
examine literature written by people once colonised by Britain.  In this endeavour, they use the term 
postcolonialism “to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of 
colonization to the present day.  This is because there is a continuity of preoccupations throughout 
the historical process initiated by European imperial aggression.” At 2.  This work has received much 
criticism.  Mishra and Hodge, for example, above n.25, argue that the authors here try to present a 
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into post-colonialism is clearly postmodernism.” At 405.  Likewise, Trees, K. Narrative and Co-
existence: Mediating Between Indigenous and Non-indigenous Stories (Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch 
University) 1998 agrees that the definition of post-colonialism in The Empire Writes Back is “too 
inclusive.”  She is concerned that the width of the authors’ use of the term is such that it leaves no 
space for a “local focus”.  She agrees with Mishra and Hodge that The Empire Writes Back fails 
sufficiently to “critique neo-colonial practices” and recognise the “unequal treatment of indigenous 
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Similarly, Margaret Davies highlights that there is no clear dividing line between 
colonial and postcolonial states and that colonial practices continue to impact on 
those who were (and are) colonised: 
where speaking of “colonialism” implies a clear dividing line between the 
colonisers and the colonised, “postcolonialism” implies a more complex 
situation, where the mentality and culture of the (physically departed) 
colonisers has been brought to bear on the colonised people: the term 
recognises that decolonisation does not result in a return to a pre-colonial 
state, but rather movement into a “postcolonial” state, where the effects of 
colonialism have become an inextricable part of the culture and of its legal, 
educational, and political institutions, and where the colonial state still 
serves as a reference point in local discourse.50 
Importantly, these understandings of postcolonialism emphasise its complexity and 
highlight that it is not simply something “post” colonialism.  Rather, it is about the 
ongoing impact of colonialism, and its continuing, pervasive presence. 
 
Hodge and Mishra also emphasise the “heterogeneity that is intrinsic to the 
postcolonial complex”.51  They distinguish between “oppositional” and “complicit” 
postcolonialism.  They argue that: 
it is useful to distinguish between the postcolonial as an historical moment, 
and something broadly akin to Lyotard’s postmodernism, a postcolonialism 
(like postmulticulturalism) in which certain tendencies are always 
inherently present.  Postcolonialism in this second sense is the underside of 
any colonialism, and it can appear almost fully formed in colonial societies 
before they have formally achieved independence.  Conversely, 
‘postcolonialism’ as the period that follows a stage of colonisation is not 
necessarily subversive, and in most cases it incorporates much from its 
colonial past.52 
Importantly, Hodge and Mishra foreground the distinction between settler and 
non-settler postcolonialism.  They argue that the postcolonialism that characterises 
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the latter is not applicable to the former.  In non-settler colonies, such as India, for 
example, the colonising powers have left, giving them independence.  In countries 
such as Australia, however, where the position of the colonisers remains intact, it is 
difficult to separate the postcolonial from the colonial and the neo-colonial.  This 
distinction between settler and non-settler colonies is an important issue and one to 
which I will return below. 
 
The subject matter of post-colonialism is vast and complex.  There is no uniform 
postcolonial experience.  It will vary depending on time, location and situation.  
Nowhere is this more pronounced than in a consideration of the experiences of 
settler countries and those of the post-independent nations.  There are many forms 
of postcolonialism, and there is a danger in oversimplification.  Generally, however, 
it can be stated that the theme of these many postcolonialisms is a challenge to the 
assumption of the superiority and universality of European culture and the 
consequent marginalisation of the non-western.  It questions the representations of 
the colonised in western discourse and seeks to create a space for the voice of the 
colonised to be publicly heard.  It engenders debate about forms of representation of 
the colonised ‘other’.  And, perhaps most importantly, it is about specific, local 
experiences and local voices.  As expressed by Stephen Slemon: 
We need to remember that resistances to colonial power always find 
material presence at the level of the local, and so the research and training 
we carry out in the field of post-colonialism, whatever else it does, must 
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Postcolonialism in Australia? 
One issue that needs further attention, particularly in the context of this thesis 
given my focus on Australian literature, is that of settler (or invader) colonies.  As 
introduced above, one question that arises is whether postcolonialism is applicable 
to these countries.  The Indigenous peoples of Australia are in a different position to 
the peoples of formally independent nations such as India, for example.  This is 
because in Australia the colonial power remains firmly in place.  Consequently, so 
do its laws, institutions, educational and other power structures.  To put it simply, 
in countries such as Australia it is difficult to talk of postcolonialism given that the 
colonial power remains in control.  We are, after all, still here. 
 
The pervasiveness and continuance of colonial law is prevalent in many areas.  It is, 
for example, pertinently demonstrated by a consideration of native title.  By virtue 
of  Mabo v Queensland (No.2) native title is now clearly a recognised part of 
Australian law.54  However, the level of recognition it is accorded is limited.  Mabo 
does not recognise Aboriginal ownership of the land, but simply allows for the 
recognition of limited rights within the colonial legal system.  It does not provide 
for the return of land that has otherwise been alienated, nor does it provide for 
compensation for the mass dispossession of Aboriginal peoples.  The colonisers, that 
is, have simply allowed for a new construct of native title to be allowed to fall 
within their colonial law.  While the decision accepts that it was wrong for the 
colonisers to have assumed that the land was without ‘settled inhabitants’, the right 
and legitimacy of colonial law was not questioned in the High Court’s judgment.  
The colonisers’ sovereignty over Australia was not denied.55  And so, despite the 
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obvious importance of this decision, arguably it simply presents another explanation 
(and justification) for Aboriginal dispossession and so remains part of the colonial 
discourse that sanctioned (and sanctions) this dispossession.  As Irene Watson, a 
lawyer and Indigenous woman from the Coorong in south-east South Australia, puts 
it: 
Many people might argue that terra nullius was put to rest by the High 
Court in the Native Title decision.  The decision was celebrated as being an 
initiative in reconciliation, when it overturned the application of terra 
nullius to Australia’s law of real property.  However the High Court did not 
fully reject the terra nullius doctrine.  This was avoided through their failure 
to question the legitimacy of the British occupation of Australia.  The High 
Court decided that the invasion and the British Crown’s acquisition of 
sovereignty over the Australian colony was an ‘act of state’ that could not be 
challenged in any Australian court.  In reaching this conclusion the High 
Court sanctioned colonialism, dispossession and disempowerment of Nungas, 
as a legitimate ‘act of state’.56 
 
Clearly, therefore, it may be inappropriate to use the term postcolonial in the 
Australian context.  This is a point emphasised by Marcia Langton.  She argues that 
an anti-colonial approach is more appropriate than a postcolonial one.  By anti-
colonial she means: 
A practical commitment to the political consequences of representation.   
Anti-colonialism requires a rupture and a positive awareness of the way 
colonial representation has shaped, and misshaped, reality for coloniser and 
colonised alike.57 
This approach recognises that Australian institutions, including the law, cannot be 
decolonised.  The law remains a colonialist institution.  An anti-colonial approach is 
one way in which the law can be critiqued, and colonial hegemony undermined.58  
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It can challenge colonial representations of, and knowledges about, Aboriginal 
people that underpin decisions made by the law about them.  It can, that is, “make 
law mindful of its propensity to further colonise indigenous people.”59  For Langton, 
an anti-colonial critique is a deliberate political critique of how institutions such as 
the law represent, and silence, Aboriginal people.  In this, her work is useful as it 
highlights the existence of, and reason for, the différend.60 
 
Langton is also useful in highlighting the heterogeneity of ‘otherness’.  As stated 
above, postcolonialism must be aware not to reduce or homogenise the diversity of 
‘otherness’ into a totalising theory of ‘Other’.  To do so reduces postcolonial theory 
to another form of colonialism.  Langton highlights this in the context of 
Aboriginality.  Her concern is that all Indigenous Australians are constructed as 
Aboriginal, that is, as one homogenous group of people.  However, when we are 
talking about Aborigines there is not a unified ‘otherness’ of being Aboriginal.   
There is not a single Aboriginal culture or language.  There are many Aboriginal 
peoples.  This is recognised in native title law, which requires Aboriginal people to 
identify themselves in their specific relationship to land.  It is also expressed by 
Irene Watson when she states, “[a]s an Indigenous woman of the Tanganekald 
Peoples, I don’t make-out that I speak for all indigenous peoples.”61  I n  u s i n g  
postcolonialism in the Australian context, therefore, the emphasis on the local and 
diversity is fundamental.62 
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Bearing these limitations and dangers in mind, I do, nevertheless, adopt a 
postcolonial framework of analysis in this thesis.  My understanding and use of 
postcolonialism is one which emphasises that in the Australian context the ‘post’ is 
not temporal.  Postcolonialism does not simply mean the end of colonialism.   
Australia remains a colonial country.  When I use the term postcolonialism, 
therefore, I am referring to the telling of, and listening to, local stories, the stories of 
different experiences of (continuing) colonisation and the many forms of exclusion 
that these stories reveal.  I also use it to mean the reading of all literature from a 
postcolonial perspective.  In adopting such a perspective or framework in reading 
literary texts we are able to learn about our history and our position within 
society.63 
 
There is one final point that I wish to raise here which has particular relevance to 
this thesis: namely, the concept of Aboriginalism.  This is a term adopted by Hodge 
and Mishra in their application of postcolonial theory to the Australian context.  
They argue that within Australian culture there is a phenomenon similar to Said’s 
Orientalism which they label Aboriginalism.  According to Hodge and Mishra, 
Orientalism (or Aboriginalism): 
has a double movement, a fascination with the culture of the colonised along 
with a suppression of their capacity to speak or truly know it.  One of its 
great themes … is that since they (the Other) cannot represent themselves, 
‘they must therefore be represented by others’ who know more about them 
than they know about themselves.64 
This representation is one which serves the interests of the colonisers, one which 
reinforces their power and legitimacy.  In relation to Australia, Hodge and Mishra 
                                                 
63 Rodan, D. ‘Identity’ and ‘Experience’: Theories of Representation and Justice in Selected Narrative 
Forms (Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch University) 2000 at 5. 
64 Above n.51 at 27.   97
argue that Aborigines are important in according legitimacy to the white settlers 
who invaded their country and dispossessed them.  Their voice is needed to 
legitimate Australia’s settlement: 
So they cannot be silenced: or more precisely, a voice that is labelled as 
theirs must have a place, legitimated as theirs yet not disrupting the fine 
balance of contradictions in the foundation myth.65 
The voice they are given is often one of the ‘noble savage’, a ‘primitive’ yet mystical 
or wise, creature.  The effects of this: 
is to deny Aborigines the ability (as Aborigines) to establish an alternative 
account of the foundation event and its aftermath, an account which might 
refuse to contain the violence and illegalities within the moment of 
innocence.66 
Aboriginalism, that is, has a discursive, ideological and political function.  It reduces 
the plurality of Aboriginal voices into one discourse of Aboriginality.  It denies 
Aborigines the right to represent, or speak for, themselves and so silences and 
excludes them, but without denying their presence.  The adoption of Aboriginalism 
in literature is one of the techniques by which the silencing and representation of 
Aborigines as ‘other’ is reinforced, and, as stated by Rodan, “it is the representations 
by the dominant group that legitimate particular conceptions of minority groups 
which in turn contribute to injustices.”67  I n  m y  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  l i t e r a r y  t e x t s  I  
discuss in this thesis I draw on the work of Hodge and Mishra, and the concept of 
Aboriginalism. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed postmodernism and postcolonialism, and suggested 
that each provides a useful theoretical framework within which to analyse specific 
literary texts.  Both are large fields and I have only presented aspects of each which 
are relevant to this thesis.  There are many theorists and issues that I have not 
discussed here, such as the works of Spivak, Bhabba and Fanon, or the dangers of 
neo-colonialism resulting from attempts to identify an ‘authentic’ Aboriginal voice, 
for example.  My objective in this chapter has been to highlight that postmodernism 
and postcolonialism can assist us in reading literary texts in a number of important 
ways.  They allow us to critique existing structures and systems as they are 
represented through literature.  They allow us to bear witness to the silences and 
exclusions created by these structures and systems.  And, perhaps most importantly, 
they create a space for the voice of the local to be heard.  As explained in Chapter 
Three, the way that literature represents and critiques institutions and structures 
such as the law and its impact is important.  Postmodernist and postcolonialist 
understandings are important in assisting us in the interpretation of these literary 
texts.  As will be shown in Parts Two and Three, postcolonialist readings of 
literature allow for the recognition and acknowledgement of that which the law has 
refused to recognise. 
 
In this part of this thesis I have presented a number of issues that I will examine, 
and that influence my reading, throughout the rest of this work.  I have argued that 
the law is a modernist and colonial institution.  As such, it represents itself as an 
objective institution that seeks to order and regulate the behaviour and actions of its 
subjects.  As explained in Chapter One, this has consequences beyond the purely   99
legal.  Law’s force extends into the social.  The force of this law is also felt, as 
explained in Chapter Two, in its inclusions and exclusions.  In its designation, that 
is, of ‘other’.  In the remainder of this thesis I examine literary representations and 
critiques of these issues of inclusion and exclusion and of law’s supposed objectivity.  
As explained in this chapter, in so doing I adopt a postmodern / postcolonial 




The impact of terra nullius surrounds us: violations of our law, ecological 
destruction of our lands and waters, dispossession from our territories and 
the colonisation of our being.  Terra nullius has not stopped; the violations 
of our law continue, the ecological destruction of the earth our mother 
continues with a vengeance, we are still struggling to return to the land, and 
the assimilator-integrator model is still being forced upon us.  This is terra 
nullius in its continuing and practical application.  There is no death of terra 
nullius.  Its life is my struggle against extinguishment: the end of struggle 
against extinguishment would be the death of terra nullius.  The celebration 
of the death of terra nullius is a farce: a collective act of schizophrenia, a 
false-hood, a conspiratorial lie, which has lulled the Australian psyche into a 
fantasy myth that there had been in the Native Title decision an act of 
recognition of indigenous peoples rights.1 
 
In Part One of this thesis, I argued that law is a grand narrative that regulates many 
aspects of our social existences beyond the purely legal.  It creates boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion that protect its position of dominance and silences and 
marginalises those ‘other’ who question or challenge it, or fall outside it.  In this 
part, I examine the way in which law’s discourse of terra nullius has constructed, 
silenced and marginalised the Aboriginal ‘other’. 
 
I have chosen terra nullius as a specific site of analysis in this part for a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, terra nullius provides the foundation of Australia’s modern legal 
system.  As explained in Chapter Five, if Australia had not been deemed ‘empty 
land’ our legal system would have evolved differently.  This could have had 
enormous consequences for Indigenous peo p l e s ,  i n  a  n u m b e r  o f  a r e a s ,  f r o m  
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recognition of their legal systems and laws, to acknowledgement of their rights to 
land within their law.  Secondly, the subject matter of terra nullius and its 
continuing consequences poignantly exposes the gap between law and society and 
demonstrates the (often negative) social impact of the law in the way that it has 
eroded traditional cultures and displaced Aboriginal peoples.  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, as Irene Watson points out, terra nullius is not merely of 
historical interest.  It continues to influence the way in which the law (and society) 
perceive and relate to Aboriginal people in Australia. 
 
Using the theories explicated in Part One of this thesis, I argue that law’s discourse 
of terra nullius enabled the law to construct Aboriginal people as ‘other’, deny 
them full access to its benefits and protections and deny them a voice, within the 
dominant discourse, with which to challenge the injustices perpetrated against 
them.  I further argue that literature is one way in which these stories of injustice 
can be represented, and that it is in the telling of these stories that the law can be 
critiqued and challenged.  Importantly, these stories also allow for the reader to 
engage with the critique as part of their knowledge and understanding of the law. 
 
The texts I discuss here are Eleanor Dark’s The Timeless Land, Mudrooroo’s Doctor 
Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World, Thomas Keneally’s 
The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith, Kate Grenville’s The Secret River, Andrew 
McGahan’s  The White Earth and Alex Miller’s Journey to the Stone Country.  
These texts tell us about the settlement of Australia, its designation as terra nullius, 
the way Aboriginal people were (and are) treated by the law and the continuing 
impacts of terra nullius.  They provide important critical insights about the law, the   102
ways in which it creates boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, its lack of equality 
and objectivity and, importantly, the way in which it creates a différend in its 
denial of a voice to Aboriginal people within the dominant discourse. 
 
In Chapter Five, I provide a discussion of the principle of terra nullius and the 
settlement of Australia.  I explain what is meant by terra nullius, the way in which 
it was used to enable the occupation of Australia, the justification it accorded for 
the dispossession of Aboriginal people and challenges to its application.  In Chapter 
Six, I examine accounts of Aboriginal dispossession written prior to the 1992 Mabo 
decision.  I argue that these stories, when read from a postcolonial perspective, 
highlight the way in which the law constructed Aboriginality in a way that 
legitimated Australia’s settlement and justified Aboriginal dispossession.  In 
Chapter Seven, I examine texts written after Mabo.  I argue that these texts engage 
with the change in the law heralded by this decision.  They revisit constructions of 
Aboriginality and allow for alternative accounts of Australia’s history to be told.   103
CHAPTER FIVE 
AN EMPTY LAND? 
 
Introduction 
There were no signs that the blacks felt the place belonged to them.  They 
had no fences that said this is mine.  No house that said, this is our home.  
There were no fields or flocks that said, we have put the labour of our hands 
into this place.1 
Until the 1990’s many Australians were unaware of what the term terra nullius 
meant.  It was not (and in most cases still isn’t) something which impacted greatly 
on the lives of a majority of this country’s citizens.  Yet it was the principle of terra 
nullius that provided the basis upon which the nation of Australia was founded.   
 
The question of rights of ownership of Australian soil has been (and continues to be) 
a contentious and contested domain.  It is a dispute that began on the 22nd of August 
1770 when Captain James Cook, on behalf of the British Crown, formally took 
possession of the east coast of Australia.2  Eighteen years later on the 26th of January 
1788 the British occupation of this previously unclaimed, and apparently unowned, 
territory officially commenced with a ceremonial unfurling of the Union Jack and 
firing of canons.3  As we now know, this foundational presumption of the land 
being unclaimed and unowned did not mirror reality.  Aboriginal peoples had lived 
on this land, utilised it and cared for it for thousands of years.  Their presence was, 
                                                 
1 Grenville, K. The Secret River (Melbourne: Text Publishing) 2006 at 93. 
2 Castles, A. An Australian Legal History (Sydney: Law Book Company) 1982 at 22.  It should be 
noted, however, that disputes amongst European nations for the land were occurring for some time 
before the arrival of the English.  The first recorded landing was by Willem Jansz in 1606 on the 
west coast of Cape York Peninsula.  Clancy, R. The Mapping of Terra Australia (NSW: Universal 
Press) 1995 at 73.  This is not to say, however, that there were not any other earlier unrecorded 
landings. 
3 Castles, ibid at 24.   104
in fact, acknowledged in Governor Phillip’s second commission, issued in 1787, 
which instructed him to: 
endeavour by every possible means to open an intercourse with the natives, 
and to conciliate their affections, enjoining all our subjects to live in amity 
and kindness with them.4 
Despite such concern, however, the existing occupants of the new colony were not 
treated with respect.5  In apparent opposition to these expressed sentiments, 
Aborigines were treated as a problem or a nuisance, or even as invisible, non-
existent.6  It was certainly clear that, despite their presence, they were considered in 
no way to own the land upon which they had lived for centuries. 
 
In this chapter, I examine the basis of England’s settlement of Australia.  In the first 
section, I explain the concept of terra nullius.  In the second section, I show how 
this principle was used to justify the acquisition of Australia, and in the third 
section, I examine challenges to the application of the doctrine.  I also explain how 
Australia’s designation as terra nullius continues to impact on the lives of Aboriginal 
people today.  My argument throughout is that the discourse of terra nullius 
enabled the introduction of a colonialist and discriminatory law into Australia that 
has publicly excluded and silenced Aboriginal people.  In this chapter, therefore, I 
provide the legal background against which the literary texts analysed in Chapters 
Six and Seven can be read. 
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Terra Nullius 
The basis upon which ownership of Australia was asserted by the English was 
relatively straightforward.  It was an established principle of seventeenth century 
international law that colonising powers could acquire new territory through 
conquest, whether by the exertion of military power or by treaty.  By the 
eighteenth century it was further accepted that foreign lands could also be acquired 
through occupation.7  This was an available option where the territory was 
considered uninhabited and, as such, terra nullius, that is, empty land belonging to 
no-one.  In the case of land that was terra nullius, colonising countries were 
permitted to simply move in and claim the land through occupancy.  Fundamental 
to the understanding of this principle of terra nullius was the idea of cultivation.  As 
explained by influential international jurist, Emerich Vattel, in his 1758 Law of 
Nations, there was a duty at international law on a country’s inhabitants to cultivate 
the land.  Lack of cultivation was a decisive factor in determining if the land was 
empty and, as such, available for occupation.8  Referring to inhabited yet 
‘uncultivated’ lands, Vattel stated: 
in speaking of the obligation of cultivating the earth … these tribes cannot 
take to themselves more land than they have need of or can inhabit or 
cultivate.  Their uncertain occupancy of these vast regions cannot be held as 
a real and lawful taking of possession; and when the Nations of Europe, 
which are too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have no 
special need of and are making no present and continuous use of, they may 
lawfully take possession of them and establish colonies in them.9 
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Unresolved Jurisprudence” (1993) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 195 at 203 – 205; 
Nettheim, G. “Judicial Revolution or Cautious Correction? Mabo v Queensland” (1993) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 1 at 4 – 5. 
8 Castles, above n.2 at 16 – 17. 
9 Quoted in Davies, M. Asking the Law Question 2nd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002 at 275.   106
In the context of English law, jurist William Blackstone, in examining methods of 
territorial acquisition, agreed that if land was “desert and uncultivated” it was 
available for occupation.10  In the seminal case of Cooper v Stuart this was 
interpreted as meaning land “practically unoccupied without settled inhabitants or 
settled law.”11  The doctrine of occupation and its justifying foundation of terra 
nullius was expanding.  Lack of cultivation, ‘settled’ inhabitants or ‘settled’ law 
meant that land was available for occupation by a colonising country.  As stated by 
Justice Gibbs in 1979 in Coe v Commonwealth, “settlement could occur ‘in a 
territory which, by European standards, had no civilised inhabitants or settled 
law.’”12 
 
It is perhaps no surprise that this theory of, and justification for, occupation of so-
called ‘empty land’ strengthened during the eighteenth, nineteenth and even into 
the twentieth centuries.  This was, as explained in Chapter Four, the age of 
modernism and colonialism.  With the expansion of colonialism and rights of 
occupation the fate of the future Australian colonies was sealed: 
[T]he lack of recognition of Aboriginal land rights, and the expanded 
doctrine of terra nullius, were driven by … racist and ethnocentric “truths”: 
the moral superiority of Western civilization and the wasteful, primitive, 
lawless, backwardness of indigenous peoples.  It was the operation of the 
same discourses of power which allowed Australia to be classified as terra 
nullius at international law, and which represented the Aboriginal people of 
Australia as inherently vagabond under the common law.13 
The colonisers determined that Aboriginal people did not cultivate the land and 
that they therefore did not possess it.  Nor were they considered to abide by ‘settled’ 
                                                 
10 Simpson, above n.7 at 199; Castles, above n.2 at 11. 
11 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286 at 291.  Emphasis added. 
12 (1979) 24 ALR 118 at 129.  Quoted in Simpson, above n.7 at 201.  Simpson’s emphasis. 
13 Ritter, D. “The “Rejection of Terra Nullius” in Mabo: A Critical Analysis” (1996) 18 Sydney Law 
Review 5 at 12.   107
law.  The land, therefore, could be judged to be terra nullius.14   As poignantly 
captured by Dodson: 
by representing Indigenous peoples as peoples without a social order, 
without a law, with no system of ownership, the doctrine of terra nullius 
became a logical conclusion.  A people incapable of ownership cannot be 
party to a contractual transfer or negotiation; to take possession of the 
country was not theft, but acquisition of available goods.15 
 
The Settlement of Australia 
That Australia was considered, by the occupiers, to be a settled colony is 
unquestionable.  Judicial confirmation of this came as early as 1847 in Attorney-
General (NSW) v Brown, in which the New South Wales Supreme Court 
unanimously determined that the colony was settled and that consequently title to 
all land therein was vested in the Crown.16  This approach was later confirmed by 
the Privy Council in the case of Cooper v Stuart, in which Lord Watson notoriously 
stated that: 
There is a great difference between the case of a Colony acquired by 
conquest or cession, in which there is an established system of law, and that 
of a Colony which consisted of a tract of territory practically unoccupied, 
without settled inhabitants or settled law, at the time when it was peacefully 
annexed to the British dominions. The Colony of New South Wales belongs 
to the latter class.17 
                                                 
14 In Dark, E. The Timeless Land (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2002, for example, Aborigines are 
portrayed as ‘primitive’.  This novel is discussed in Chapter Six.  Grenville, above n.1 highlights the 
way in which lack of cultivation was equated, by the law and by the settlers, with lack of ownership 
of the land and so used as justification for ‘taking up’ Aboriginal land.  This novel is discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
15 Dodson, M. “The Wentworth Lecture: The end in the beginning: re(de)fining Aboriginality” 
(1994) 1 Australian Aboriginal Studies 2 at 7. 
16 (1847) 1 Legge 312. See McNeil, K. “A Question of Title: Has the Common Law been Misapplied 
to Dispossess the Aboriginals?” (1990) 16 Monash University Law Review 91 at 96. 
17 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286 at 291.  Quoted in McNeil, ibid at 91.   108
In 1913, the newly constituted High Court of Australia reaffirmed that the English 
Crown acquired rights over Australia through possession or occupancy.18  If there 
was any doubt remaining that Australia was, and should continue to be, treated as a 
settled colony this was authoritatively answered by the High Court in 1979 in Coe v 
Commonwealth, in which Justice Gibbs asserted that “[i]t is fundamental to our 
legal system that the Australian colonies became British possessions by settlement 
and not by conquest.”19 
 
Declaring land to be terra nullius did not only mean that no one lived on or 
cultivated the land.  It meant that the land was empty in every sense, including 
legally.  That is, no system of law was considered to exist.  Consequently, the legal 
system and laws of a colonising nation were simply received into the empty infant 
space as the parent nation assumed absolute sovereignty over its new possession.  In 
the case of Australia, those laws in operation in England at the time of settlement 
that were applicable to the conditions of the new colony were duly received into it.  
These laws regulated everything from crime and the establishment and operation of 
judicial bodies, to rights of property ownership.  One thing was, however, made 
very clear.  Namely, that the ‘Common Law of England’ was something which 
should not be denied to Englishmen settling new lands.  For, such is “the birth-right 
of every subject”.20 
 
One area where the introduction of English law had immense, immediate and 
continuing long-term impact in the new colony was that of property.  On the 
                                                 
18 Williams v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 16 CLR 404. 
19 (1979) 24 ALR 118 at 129.  Quoted in Simpson, above n.7 at 198. 
20 Blackstone, W. Commentaries 18th ed. quoted in Castles, above n.2 at 11.   109
reception of English law into the colony all land was vested in the Crown of 
England.  As confirmed by Justice Blackburn in Milirrpum v Nabalco: 
the principle, fundamental to the English law of real property, [is] that the 
Crown is the source of title to all land; that no subject can own land 
allodially, but only an estate or interest in it which he holds mediately or 
immediately of the Crown. On the foundation of New South Wales, 
therefore, and of South Australia, every square inch of territory in the 
colony became the property of the Crown. All titles, rights, and interests 
whatever in land which existed thereafter in subjects of the Crown were the 
direct consequence of some grant from the Crown.21 
This was a simple application of the doctrine of tenure, one of the foundational 
building blocks of English property law.  Upon the settlement of Australia this 
doctrine of tenure was received into the new colony.  It determined simply that 
King George III became the absolute owner of all land in the colony and that no 
other person, including the Aborigines, had any rights to, or interests in, that land 
unless by virtue of a Crown grant of that interest.22  They had, after all, failed to 
cultivate the land and had already been deemed not to possess it.  Thus, in 1835 
when John Batman asserted ownership of roughly five hundred thousand acres of 
land around Port Philip Bay and another one hundred thousand acres around what 
is now Geelong, claiming to have purchased this land from local Aborigines, he fell 
f o u l  o f  E n g l i s h  p r o p e r t y  l a w .   H e  h a d entered into two ‘treaties’ with the 
Aborigines, in which they purported to convey the land to him.  He had the deeds 
of conveyance properly executed by a local lawyer, and duly agreed to ‘pay’ for the 
land with goods including blankets, knives and flour, plus a yearly rent.  The British 
government, not surprisingly, refused to recognise the purchase, and, declaring the 
agreement between Batman and the Aborigines invalid, stated that the Aborigines 
                                                 
21 (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 245.  Emphasis added. 
22 Bradbrook, A., MacCallum, S. and Moore, A. Australian Real Property Law 3 rd ed. (Sydney: 
Lawbook Co.) 2002 at 35 – 38.  This is also commented on in Grenville, above n.1 at 121: “King 
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had no rights in the land and therefore had no right to sell that which was not 
theirs.  The land belonged to the Crown of England.23  In a consequent declaration 
issued by the Governor of New South Wales it was announced that “any bargain or 
contract made with the Aboriginal natives of New Holland … will be held to be 
null and void as against the rights of the Crown.”24  It further asserted “the right of 
the Crown of England to the Territory in question and the absolute nullity of any 
grant … made by any other party.”25  The common law principle of tenure had, in 
granting title over the land to the Crown, resulted in the absolute dispossession of 
the Aborigines. 
 
A Challenge to Terra Nullius: From Milirrpum to Mabo 
The first major attempt to challenge this dispossession, and so question the status of 
the Australian colonies, was not mounted until 1971 in the case of Milirrpum v 
Nabalco Pty. Ltd., in which Justice Blackburn rejected a claim by Yolgnu people at 
Yirrkala on the Gove Peninsula in the Northern Territory that they had a 
recognisable title to the land.26  They argued that as they had used and occupied the 
area from time immemorial they had a common law right to the land under what 
Blackburn J. labelled the doctrine of “communal native title”.  Blackburn J. 
acknowledged that the Yolgnu people had indeed lived in the area prior to its 
occupation and that there was some form of recognised law in place at the time of 
settlement.27  Despite this finding, however, he concluded that, as a question of fact, 
                                                 
23 Castles, above n.2 at 28 – 29. 
24 Quoted in ibid at 29. 
25 Quoted in ibid at 29. 
26 Above, n.21. 
27 “The evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the 
people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society and was remarkably free from the 
vagaries of personal whim or influence.  If ever a system could be called “a government of laws, and 
not of men”, it is that shown in the evidence before me.”  Ibid at 267.   111
any links to the land asserted by the plaintiffs were not the same as those enjoyed 
by their ancestors at the time of settlement.  This finding of fact was immediately 
and conclusively fatal to the land claim.28 
 
Nevertheless, and perhaps more importantly, Blackburn J. examined in depth the 
legal ramifications of the claim.  He confirmed that, as a matter of law, Australia 
was a settled colony and, accordingly, concluded that “the doctrine [of communal 
native title] does not form, and never has formed, part of the law of any part of 
Australia.”29  To have found otherwise would have been inconsistent with the 
colony’s status as settled and the system of tenure introduced with settlement.30  
Furthermore, he found that Aboriginal people did not have any rights or interests 
that could, despite his earlier finding of a recognised system of law and society, be 
deemed to be recognisable proprietary interests in the land.  English property law, 
according to Blackburn J., has three characteristics: the right to use and enjoy, the 
right to exclude and the right to alienate.31  The nature of the plaintiffs’ interest in 
the land claimed bore, according to Blackburn J.: 
so little resemblance [to] property, as our law, or what I know of any other 
law, understands the term, … that I must hold that these claims are not in 
the nature of proprietary interests.32 
                                                 
28 Hocking, B. “Does Aboriginal Law Now Run in Australia?” (1979) 10 Federal Law Review 161 at 
173; Van Krieken, R. “From Milirrpum to Mabo: The High Court, Terra Nullius and Moral 
Entrepneurship” (2000) 23(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 63 at 66. 
29 Above n.21 at 245. 
30 “On the foundation of New South Wales, therefore, and of South Australia, every square inch of 
territory in the colony became the property of the Crown.  All titles, rights and interests whatever 
in land which existed thereafter in subjects of the Crown were the direct consequence of some grant 
from the Crown”  Ibid at 245. 
31 Ibid at 272.  And, of course, Blackburn J. was concerned only with English property law.  The 
“proper procedure to bear in mind is the concept of “property” in our law.” Ibid at 270.  He “was 
unwilling to embrace concepts of property other than those traditional to the English common law 
itself.”  Hocking, above n.28 at 174 – 175. 
32 Ibid at 273.   112
The spiritual connection that Aboriginal people had with the land, although 
acknowledged by Blackburn J., was quite simply not a sufficient basis upon which 
to challenge the niceties of the newly implanted English property law.33  F o r  
Blackburn J. there was absolutely no common law basis upon which Aboriginal 
rights to land could be founded.  The political imperative of maintaining the status 
quo of Australia as a settled colony was paramount.34 
 
Over the next twenty years community attitudes towards the treatment of 
Aboriginal people began to change.  There was an increasing awareness of the fact 
of dispossession, and the denial of rights and lack of equality consequently accorded 
to Aborigines.  The 1960’s saw constitutional change with the 1967 referendum 
granting the Commonwealth the power to legislate for Aboriginal people and 
allowing them to be counted in the census.35  Legislative reform during this period 
also saw the repeal of some (but certainly not all) restrictive legislation prescribing 
the rights and activities of Aborigines.36  By the 1970’s, Aboriginal activism was 
growing and Aboriginal people began to push for land rights, compensation, self-
                                                 
33 Blackburn J. acknowledges the relationship Aboriginal people had with the land on a number of 
occasions.  For example, “The spiritual relationship is well proved.” Ibid at 270; “The evidence seems 
to me to show that the aboriginals have a more cogent feeling of obligation to the land than of 
ownership of it.  It is dangerous to express a matter as subtle and difficult by a mere aphorism, but it 
is easier, on the evidence, to say that the clans belong to the land than that the land belongs to the 
clan.”  Ibid at 270 – 271. 
34 The case was undoubtedly important and has been subjected to much criticism.  See, for example, 
Hookey, J. “The Gove Land Rights Case: A Judicial Dispensation for the Taking of Aboriginal Lands 
in Australia?” (1972) 5 Federal Law Review 85; Hocking, above n.28; Hocking, above n.7; Bartlett, 
R. Native Title in Australia 2nd ed. (Chatswood NSW: Butterworths) 2004 at 11 – 13.  See Ritter, 
above n.13 for a discussion of Milirrpum as a product of the discourse of terra nullius, despite the 
changing perceptions about the ‘truths’ of Aboriginal people. 
35 Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody volume 
2, 1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/rciadic/national/vol2/> at 20.3.27.  
Retrieved on 30 June 2008. 
36 For example, restrictions on drinking were relaxed.  There were many other restrictions on the 
rights of Aborigines, such as the removal of children that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Nine.   113
determination and the like.  To this end, in 1972 the Tent Embassy was established 
outside Parliament House in Canberra.  Aboriginal affairs had been irreversibly 
thrust into political prominence and the Whitlam government of 1972 announced 
an intention to legislate for land rights and social change.37  In 1975 it enacted the 
Racial Discrimination Act in order to give effect to the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  As stated by Webber, such 
developments and consequent changes in attitude towards Aboriginal people 
allowed for: 
increasing understanding in the non-indigenous community of the social 
organisation of Aborigines, the complexity and sophistication of their 
cultural life, and their deep ties to the land.  This, combined with greater 
humility about the merits of non-indigenous society, has made it easier to 
think of indigenous and non-indigenous as alternative modes of social 
organisation, each with their own integrity.38 
1988 marked the bicentenary of Australia’s founding.  Aboriginal Australians used 
this event to assert the injustices that they had suffered two hundred years earlier 
when their land was occupied, and have continued to suffer through to the present 
day.  Slogans of “we have survived” were chanted and Aboriginal activist Burnum 
Burnum, highlighting the nature of Australia’s occupation, raised the Aboriginal 
flag in Dover and claimed possession of Great Britain.39  The non-indigenous 
community was being made more aware of the way that Aborigines had been 
treated for the past two hundred years. 
 
Such changes provided the context for the High Court’s hearing of the Mabo case.  
In 1982, Eddie Mabo challenged the lack of recognition of the rights and interests of 
                                                 
37 Johnston, above n.35 at 20.3.34. 
38 Webber, J. “The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for Standards of Justice in Mabo” (1995) 17 
Sydney Law Review 5 at 14. 
39 Johnston, above n.35 at 10.3.11.   114
Aboriginal people to their land.  He claimed that his people had lived on the 
Murray Islands located in Torres Strait for generations before white settlers arrived, 
that they had cultivated the land, lived in small communities and that they had 
handed down the land from generation to generation and that therefore their title 
to the land should be recognised.  Ten years later, in 1992, the High Court of 
Australia finally handed down its decision in Mabo v Queensland (No.2), one of the 
most important cases in this country’s legal history.40  The High Court agreed with 
Eddie Mabo and concluded that the Meriam people “were entitled as against the 
whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the 
Murray Islands.”41  It declared that native title was part of the common law of 
Australia, that the source of such title was a continuing connection with the land 
and that its content derived from the nature of that connection and traditional 
customs.42 
 
In providing for the recognition of native title, the Court questioned the 
appropriateness of the application of the principle of terra nullius to this country.  
After all, it was now clear that Australia was not uninhabited, ‘practically’ or 
otherwise, at the time of settlement.  Justice Brennan, in particular, posited that 
“[t]he common law of this country would perpetuate an injustice if it were to 
continue to embrace the enlarged notion of terra nullius.”43  It is important to note, 
however, that this case does not declare that terra nullius, as a principle of 
international law justifying the territorial acquisition of Australia, is inapplicable to 
                                                 
40 (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
41 Ibid at 76.  Note also that this was not a unanimous decision but 6:7 with Dawson J. in dissent. 
42 Ibid per Brennan J. at 59 – 60; Deane and Gaudron JJ. at 110; Toohey J. at 118. 
43 Ibid at 58.  These sentiments were reiterated by Deane and Gaudron JJ. at 108 – 109.   115
Australia, or that Australia is not a settled colony.44  It does not challenge England’s 
sovereignty over Australia.  Brennan J. makes this abundantly clear, stating that: 
[t]he acquisition of territory by a sovereign state for the first time is an act of 
State which cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by the 
courts of that State.45 
Nor does the Mabo decision challenge the basis of the legal system that was 
introduced into this country at the time of settlement.  Again, as stated by Brennan 
J.: 
recognition by our common law of the rights and interests in land of the 
indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony would be precluded if the 
recognition were to fracture a skeletal principle of our legal system.46 
 
As such, the case determines only that the common law should no longer continue 
to perpetuate the fiction that Australia was uninhabited at the time of settlement, 
and that the rights of Aboriginal people to their land must be recognised.  It does 
not challenge the fundamental rubric of property law in this country, but declares 
that, within the English common law system, common law native title rights can 
exist.  It allows, that is, for the recognition of native title within the common law 
system of tenure.  The application of this principle of tenure was not something 
questioned by the High Court.47  Rather, it was adopted as the means by which 
                                                 
44 Ibid at 58, 79 and 182.  It simply states that the basis of its application, namely that the land was 
empty, was incorrect.  This is nevertheless important.  As stated by Detmold, “It was precisely the 
point of terra nullius to deny this otherness: the land was not fixed with another’s set of perceptions 
and desires (including, as a subset, their law).  And this the High Court (happily) has rejected.”  
Detmold, M. “Law and Difference: Reflections on Mabo’s Case” in Essays on the Mabo Decision 
(Sydney: Law Book Company) 1993 at 41. 
45 Mabo, above n.40 at 69, quoting Gibbs J. in NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337.  See also 
at 78 – 79 where the Court states that sovereignty cannot be challenged in a domestic court.  This is 
a matter of international law. 
46 Ibid at 43. 
47 Brennan J. stated that tenure “is a basic doctrine of land law … which could not be overturned 
without fracturing the skeleton which gives our land law its shape and consistency.”  Ibid at 45.  So 
while there was a willingness to accept that there was some form of native title right there was not a 
willingness to accept alternative forms of law.  As stated by Detmold, above n.44 at 41 – 42: “The   116
native title could exist, through the use of the concept of radical title.  Radical title 
means simply ultimate title but not full beneficial title.  Radical, or ultimate, title 
entitles the Crown to full beneficial ownership of the land only if it is truly empty 
and unclaimed.  Beneficial ownership gives it the right to do with it whatever it 
desires.  Common law native title is a burden on the Crown’s radical title.48  As 
such, Mabo does not recognise Aboriginal ‘ownership’ of the land, but simply allows 
for the recognition of limited rights within the English legal system.  It does not 
provide for the ‘return’ of land that has otherwise been alienated, nor does it 
provide for compensation for the mass dispossession of Aboriginal peoples.49 
 
                                                                                                                                             
other had a different law.  From the recognition of the existence of the indigenous inhabitants there 
followed the recognition of the possibility that their law was a different law.  There is also in the 
various High Court judgments a recognition and acceptance of the fact that the indigenous property 
conceptions were different and that the common law needed to be modified accordingly.  But that 
(unhappily) is as far as it goes.” 
48 Brennan J. explains it as follows: “The notion of radical title enabled the Crown to become 
paramount Lord of all who hold a tenure granted by the Crown and to become absolute beneficial 
owner of unalienated land required for the Crown’s purposes.  But it is not a corollary of the 
Crown’s acquisition of title to land in an occupied territory that the Crown acquired absolute 
beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of the indigenous inhabitants.  If the land were 
desert and uninhabited, truly a terra nullius, the Crown would take absolute beneficial title … But if 
the land were occupied by the indigenous inhabitants and their rights and interests are recognised 
by the common law, the radical title which is acquired with the acquisition of sovereignty cannot 
itself be taken to confer an absolute beneficial title to the occupied land.  Nor is it necessary to the 
structure of our legal system to refuse recognition to the rights and interests in land of the 
indigenous inhabitants.  The doctrine of tenure applies to every Crown grant of an interest in land, 
but not to rights and interests which do not owe their existence to a Crown grant.  The English legal 
system accommodated the recognition of rights and interests derived from occupation of land in a 
territory over which sovereignty was acquired by conquest without the necessity of a Crown grant”  
Mabo, above n.40 at 48 – 49. 
49 That is, native title does not recognise complete Aboriginal ‘ownership’ of land but is still trying 
to fit it into the English common law.  One of the consequences of this conception of native title is 
that it forces difference (indigenous relationships with land) into sameness (western conceptions of 
land ownership).  See Detmold, above n.44.  The issue of forcing, or reducing, difference into 
sameness is explored further in Chapters Nine and Ten in relation to policies of assimilation pursued 
by Australian governments.   117
The case is, however, important, marking, as it does, the beginning of attempts in 
the legal sphere to address the question of native title rights.50  Importantly, in so 
doing, the case begins to break down the incommensurabilities that give rise to a 
différend.  That is, the judges in Mabo were able to reach their decision based on 
the fact that the Meriam people had gardens and used stones to delineate particular 
individual plots of land in a manner similar to systems of land ownership in English 
property law.  They were able to hear the claims of the Meriam people within the 
framework of the English common law.  The two parties were beginning to speak in 
the same language and in this way the conditions giving rise to the différend were 
being broken down.51  
 
The case is also important for two further reasons.  Firstly, it illustrates a point that I 
take up in Part Three of this thesis: namely, that the (positivist, colonialist) law 
needs to be more flexible in order to accommodate difference and achieve equality.  
That is, it highlights the weakness of unquestioned legal positivism as a theory for 
addressing injustice.52  As stated by Van Krieken: 
The success of the critique of legal positivism has been such that there is in 
current legal thought a widespread adherence to the idea that normativity – 
with norms understood as ‘morals’, ‘ethics’ or ‘principles’ – is central to law, 
and that moral integrity in the legal field is closely tied to a critical attitude 
towards the past.  Legal positivism and the framing of judgments in terms of 
precedent or ‘good law’ risks being equated, then, with a hide-bound 
                                                 
50 Since Mabo there have been many attempts to explain, elaborate, expand and limit the extent and 
content of this common law native title.  For example, Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1; 
Western Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1; Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 
194 ALR 538; the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). 
51 Although, as highlighted above, the Meriam people had to ‘conform’ to the mainstream law in the 
first place so that this could happen.  In other cases such as Milirrpum v Nabalco, above n.21 the 
language used by the parties was different and they were unable to understand each other, clearly 
highlighting the existence of the différend.  This is also highlighted in Grenville, above n.1 as 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
52 Such as was evidenced in Milrrpum v Nabalco, above n.21 for example.   118
inability to adjust to the changed nature of the current moral community.  
Precedent, wrote Sir Anthony Mason, “brings in its train … a mode of 
argumentation which … is preoccupied with past decisions and dicta, and an 
inability to respond to the need for change.”53 
 
Secondly, it demonstrates the impact that the law has on the lives of its subjects 
beyond the legal.  It highlights one of the major consequences of the declaration of 
Australia as terra nullius: namely, the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples.54  It is 
important to note here that this dispossession did not simply mean loss of land.  The 
application of terra nullius to Australia had very specific cultural implications.   
Aboriginal people did not only inhabit and care for their land.  The land itself was 
integral to the very identity of Aboriginal people.  The mountains, rivers and the 
landscape itself, as well as the animals which inhabited it, not only provided food, 
water and shelter, but also formed the cultural and spiritual nucleus of Aboriginal 
life.  Dreaming stories were concerned with what could be seen and felt.  Physical 
locations formed ritual, spiritual and sacred sites.  Even the recording of history and 
culture was in physical locations such as rock art sites.  This concept of country as 
‘mother’ was (and is) very real and is characterised by Kim Scott’s “First Thing, 
Welcome.”55  He writes: 
it is a beautiful place, this place.  Call it our country, our country all ‘round 
here.  We got river, we got sea.  Got creek, rock, hill, waterfall.  We got bush 
tucker: apple, potato, sugarbag, bush turkey, kangaroo, barramundi, dugong, 
turtle … every kind.  Sweet mangoes and coconuts too.56 
                                                 
53 Above n.28 at 63. 
54 The impact of the application of terra nullius is illustrated in Mudrooroo, Doctor Wooreddy’s 
Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World (Victoria: Hyland House) 2001 and Keneally, T. 
The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2001.  These works are discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
55 Scott, K. True Country (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1993 at 13. 
56 Ibid at 13.  This concept of country as mother is also commented on by Miller, A. Journey to the 
Stone Country (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2003 at 80 when Bo explains how his 
grandmother, a Jangga woman, “showed us how to live off the country.  And when we was hungry 
and complaining she told us, This country is your mother.  You wouldn’t even be here if it wasn’t   119
Terra nullius sanctioned separation from country and so not only dispossessed 
Aboriginal people but effectively isolated them from the very location that provided 
their cultural and spiritual identity, giving rise to the notion of a ‘cultural genocide’ 
the likes of which is very hard for a non-indigenous person to comprehend. 
 
This separation from country was not the only deprivation that white occupation 
wrought upon Aboriginal people.  They were also denied equality.57  As introduced 
in Chapter Four, the consequences of England’s colonial expansion were (and are) 
far reaching.  Aborigines have not been (and are not) accorded the same level of 
opportunity in this country as non-Aboriginal Australians, legally, educationally, 
economically and socially.  They are forced to obey a law that is not theirs and yet 
they do not always reap the benefits of its opportunities and protection.  As 
encapsulated by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, for 
example: 
Following the takeover of their land by the British, the personal liberty of 
the Aboriginal people was jeopardised.  They no longer had the freedom to 
live as they pleased and their life choices were dictated much more by 
government and government-approved missions than was the case for non-
Aboriginal people.  Their children were taken away to dormitories or distant 
towns, as parents and kin were thought to be a degrading influence.  The 
various colonial and later State, Commonwealth and Territory Governments 
introduced policies which led to intrusions into most aspects of their 
everyday lives.  These included inspections of camp sites and other 
residences, and limitations upon their mode of living, work, financial and 
leisure activities.  Institutionalisation was to be a dominant theme in 
Aboriginal lives.  The general population discriminated against Aboriginal 
people in many ways, which affected their education, housing, employment, 
income and self-esteem.58 
                                                                                                                                             
for her.  You treat her with respect.  If she got a reason to starve you, you just starve and don’t think 
nothing about it.” 
57 Equality before the law is the focus of Part Three. 
58 Johnston, above n.35 at 10.1.1.   120
Aboriginal people lost control of and, perhaps more importantly, the right to 
control, their right to self-determination and their right to speak.59  And so the 
stories of the settlement of Australia and its consequences were (and are) the 
colonisers’ stories.  They were (and are) not the stories of Aboriginal people. 
 
Conclusion 
The disadvantages, abuses and inequalities discussed above are not of purely 
historical interest.  The impact of white colonisation and the relationship between 
the colonisers and the colonised continues today.  As summarised by Webber, the 
effects of the injustices and inequalities upon which Australia was founded: 
continue in the deprivation of Aborigines and their banishment to the 
margins, so that they lack, on the one hand, full acceptance in the broader 
society and, on the other, their own land on which to stand.60 
It is the related issues of the declaration of Australia as terra nullius, the rights to 
land and property ownership and the impact and continuing consequences thereof 
that I examine in Chapters Six and Seven. 
                                                 
59 Dodson, above n.15 at 5. 
60 Above n.38 at 14.   121
CHAPTER SIX 
“THE MISERABLEST RACE ON EARTH”
1: STORIES OF ‘PRIMITIVES’, 
DISPOSSESSION AND THE FOUNDING OF A NATION 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Five, I explained how the discourse of terra nullius enabled the English 
to occupy, and claim ownership of, Australia without negotiating with or 
compensating the Aboriginal peoples who already lived here.  This ‘settlement’ of 
Australia had devastating long-term consequences for Aboriginal people.  As the 
settlers continued to take more and more land many Aborigines were either killed, 
died from introduced diseases or were otherwise forcibly removed from the land.2  
And, as detailed in the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, this 
dispossession did not simply mean loss of land.  It: 
meant the destruction of the Aboriginal economy which everywhere was 
based upon hunting and foraging.  And the land use adopted by settlers 
drastically reduced the population of animals to be hunted and plants to be 
foraged.  And the loss of the land threatened the Aboriginal culture which 
all over Australia was based upon land and relationship to the land.3 
                                                 
1 Brady, V. “Reading Aboriginal Writing” (1994) 2 Westerly 41 at 43, paraphrasing William 
Dampier’s observation that Aborigines on the west coast of Australia were “the miserablest people 
in the World.” 
2 In 1939 W.E.H. Stanner wrote “Year by year since 1788 the tribes have gone downhill.  When the 
colony was founded the aborigines probably numbered at least 300,000, but have now dwindled to 
about 50,000.  Their decline was most rapid in the nineteenth century, in the years when the 
upward surge of the white Australian population widened the inner frontiers of the settlement at 
great cost of body and spirit, no less to the invaders than to the dispossessed tribes whose lands they 
seized.  Officially, there are supposed to be 60,000 natives still alive, but this guess (it is little more) 
is almost certainly wrong.  No proper aboriginal census has ever been undertaken.  A national 
headcount would probably show that 50,000 is a generous estimate.  In any case it is a fact that 
about five-sixths of the original black population have been wiped out in 150 years, a rate 
equivalent to the death every year since 1788 of two large tribes totalling 1,700 souls.” Quoted in 
Reynolds, H. Dispossession: Black Australians and White Invaders (New South Wales: Allen & 
Unwin) 1989 at 17-18. 
3 Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody volume 
1, 1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/rciadic/national/vol1/> at 1.4.2.   
Retrieved on 30 June 2008.  See also the discussion in Chapter Five.   122
In this chapter, I analyse literary representations of settlement and dispossession.  
As I argued in Chapter Three, literature is a form of narrative that contributes to 
the discourse of law.4  Its representations can both create and perpetuate, or 
critique and question official narratives and authorised truths.  It can contribute to 
the way that identities are constructed and particular values and perspectives 
normalised.  It can also convey critical insights about the narrative of law and its 
underlying assumptions.5  Literary representations of the settlement of Australia 
and the consequent dispossession and mistreatment of Aboriginal people are, 
therefore, an integral and significant part of the debate about the foundation of this 
country and its continuing long-term consequences. 
 
In particular, I argue here that stories about dispossession provide useful insight 
into the impact of law on the social, and the way in which the law includes, 
excludes and silences.  The texts analysed tell us not simply that Aborigines were 
removed from the land, but that this removal both legitimated, and was legitimated 
by, the discourse of law that represented the land as empty, and denied Aborigines 
the right to many aspects of white (and Aboriginal) society.  They offer valuable 
insight into the structure of our law, the way it operates and the way in which it 
can create a différend.  In this way, these stories explicate the arguments which I 
raised in Chapters One and Two about the power of the law to include and exclude 
and discriminate against the ‘other’, and the enormous impact that this can have on 
the lives of its subjects beyond the purely legal. 
 
                                                 
4 And history. 
5 Particularly of equality and objectivity.  These standards are explored in more detail in Part Three.   123
In this chapter, I examine literary texts written prior to the Mabo decision.6  Those 
written after this case will be discussed in Chapter Seven.7  The texts that I focus on 
here are The Timeless Land,8 Doctor Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring the 
Ending of the World 9 and The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith.10  These novels raise 
the issues of inclusion and exclusion, silencing and the impact of the law through 
their portrayal of first settlement in New South Wales and Tasmania, and the 
consequences wrought by dispossession by the time of Australia’s federation in 
1901.  I argue that a postcolonial reading of these texts reveals much about the 
narrative of our law.  In particular, I argue that they inform the reader about the 
way that the law constructed Aboriginality by creating a knowledge of Aboriginal 
people as ‘primitive’ and without a system of law or society, and that this 
construction of identity was essential in supporting and justifying the application of 
the principle of terra nullius to Australia.  I also argue that these texts reveal that 
by creating this knowledge and image of Aboriginal people, the law created a 
différend and silenced Aboriginal voices and Aboriginal stories, within the public 
domain, further reinforcing the fiction of terra nullius and the legitimacy and 
superiority of the settlers’ law.11  I begin this chapter by arguing that the three texts 
discussed here tell colonial stories that we can now read from a postcolonial 
perspective.  In the second section of this chapter, I explain how these novels 
inform the reader about the reality of Aboriginal dispossession.  In the third 
                                                 
6 Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.  This case was discussed in Chapter Five. 
7 It is after this time that we begin to see an increasing number of works that give voice to the 
Aboriginal experience and tell Aboriginal stories.   
8 Dark, E. The Timeless Land (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2002, first published in 1941. 
9 Mudrooroo, Doctor Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World (Victoria: 
Hyland House) 2001, first published in 1983. 
10 Keneally, T. The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2001.  First published in 
1972. 
11 It is important to acknowledge, however, that within Aboriginal communities concerns were 
being voiced.   124
section, I analyse the way that the law has constructed Aborigines as ‘other’, and in 
the final section, I examine the way that the law, as revealed in these texts, has 
silenced Aboriginal voices within the public domain. 
 
Colonial Stories: Postcolonial Perspectives 
There are many accounts of the story of Australia’s settlement.  Until recently, 
these have been written predominantly by and about the settlers and not 
Aborigines.12  This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers that history is 
generally not written by the vanquished.  It is written by the colonisers, who often 
write out the experiences, legitimacy and, sometimes, the very existence of those 
who are colonised.13  In the Australian context, this is manifested in the celebration 
and glorification of the trials and triumphs of the settler and the pioneer who 
tamed the harsh Australian landscape and forged a new nation.  They suffered 
                                                 
12 This has been reflected in historical accounts also.  As stated by the Johnston: “Until the 1970’s 
the history taught in our schools portrayed Aboriginal people if it portrayed them at all as passive 
and backward onlookers to the achievements of non-Aboriginal people in developing the land.”  
Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody volume 2, 
1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/rciadic/national/vol2/> at 10.1.5.   
Retrieved on 30 June 2008.  See also, for example, Murdoch, W. The Making of Australia, quoted in 
Reynolds, above n.2 at xii – xiii: “When people talk about ‘the history of Australia’ they mean the 
history of the white people who have lived in Australia.  There is good reason why we should not 
stretch that term to make it include the story of the dark-skinned wandering tribes who hurled 
boomerangs and ate snakes in their native land for long ages before the arrival of the first intruders 
from Europe … He [the historian] is concerned with Australia only as the dwelling place of white 
men and women, settlers from overseas.  It is his business to tell us how these white folk found the 
land, how they settled in it, how they explored it, and how they gradually made it the Australia we 
know today.” 
13 “The most ‘obvious’ history to write is the one which celebrates the achievements of the 
powerful, using the language of the powerful.” Benterrak, K., Muecke, S. and Roe, P. Reading the 
Country (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1996 at 143.  See also Arthur, K. “Fiction and the 
Rewriting of History: A Reading of Colin Johnson” (1985) 1 Westerly 55 at 55: “White obliteration 
of Aboriginal culture in Australia has been as much the work of the pen as of physical violence.  
Aborigines have been written out of literature, out of the law, out of history.”  Note here also my 
comments in Chapter Three about literature itself being a western colonial medium.  Aboriginal 
peoples had an oral tradition.  So while the dominant history was ‘written’ by the colonisers, there 
were oral accounts of Aboriginal experiences of settlement.  These were not, however, part of the 
dominant written discourse.   125
immeasurable hardship, endured fires, floods and starvation, but ultimately 
subdued “the harshest continent on earth”.14  This version of history excludes 
Aboriginal people for whom “this “victory” means dispossession, poverty, illness 
and humiliation and often death; it means becoming strangers in their own land.”15  
It is this colonial history that has, until very recently, shaped Australia’s identity.  
As Veronica Brady comments: 
Aboriginal Australians have figured, if at all, as incidental to the on-going 
history of “civilization”, “development” and “progress”, turned into objects 
of anthropological study or for the delectation of tourists, Orientalised … 
figures at best from a prehistory we believe we have superseded and at 
worst from an evolutionary cautionary tale, figures of the “degradation” we 
left behind on our way up the evolutionary ladder: “nearest of all to the 
money [sic] or orang-outang and therefore incapable of enjoying the same 
state of intellectual existence as ourselves”, as one settler wrote, “the very 
zero of civilization”, to quote another.16 
 
In literature, as in history, there are many versions of the foundation of Australia.  
These tell us a number of things about settlement and its legal basis and 
ramifications.  They engender popular understandings about the arrival of the 
English, the taking of the land and the treatment of, and attitudes towards, 
Aboriginal people.  Many early novels parallel the dominant discourse.17  They 
replicate and thereby promote the narrative of colonialism and represent 
Aboriginal dispossession as something which either did not occur or as something 
that was a natural and inevitable consequence of the land being claimed by 
‘superior’, ‘civilised’ beings.  Ideas of extinction, death, legitimacy and the 
                                                 
14 Curthoys, A. “Expulsion, Exodus and Exile in White Australian Historical Mythology” (1999) 61 
Journal of Australian Studies 1 at 6.  This representation is apparent in texts such as Dark, above n.8. 
15 Brady, above n.1 at 42.  It also, as explained in Chapter Five, meant social and cultural dislocation 
as they were separated from their country. 
16 Ibid at 43. 
17 See, for example, Dark, above n.8.   126
superiority of the white settlers were common to colonial print culture.  In these 
stories Aborigines are either absent or represented in the image of the ‘noble 
savage.’  They are, that is, either invisible, non-existent,18 or portrayed as 
‘primitive’ people who, although having previously enjoyed an idyllic life, are now, 
in accordance with accepted social and anthropological theories central to 
colonialism and modernism, destined to become extinct.19  Such works support the 
principle of terra nullius and the legitimacy of settlement.  In other words, the 
narrative of law is played out and supported in much of this literature. 
 
Eleanor Dark’s The Timeless Land is one such novel.  It tells the story of the arrival 
of the first fleet at Sydney Cove in 1788 from the perspective of both the white 
settlers and the Aboriginal inhabitants.  We witness the transformation of the land 
from an idyllic paradise to a place filled with the death and destruction wrought by 
the white man.  In telling this story, Dark is not critical of law’s narrative.  Her 
portrayal of Aborigines as ‘noble savages’ rather serves to reinforce the narrative of 
law (and colonialism) that Aborigines were ‘primitive’, that they did not have a 
recognisable system of law and that they did not cultivate, and so did not own, the 
                                                 
18 For example, Clarke, M. For the Term of His Natural Life (Victoria: Currey O’Neil) 1984, first 
published in 1901.  This novel is set in Tasmania during the early years of settlement.  It describes 
the topography and landscape of Tasmania in sone detail and tells of many attempted escapes by 
convicts through this harsh landscape.  Yet, except for one mention of “a black tracker at his heels” 
at 235 - 236, nowhere in this story is there any mention of the Aboriginal people of Tasmania.  The 
novel is a colonial story of hardship and survival, of the brutality of both the convict system and the 
harsh Australian land.  There is no role for Aborigines in this story.  They are not mistreated, they 
are not dispossessed, they neither aid the white man nor defend their own land.  They are 
completely absent.  The land is represented as truly terra nullius. 
19 These theories included those of social Darwinism.  As explained by Haebich: “the pseudo-
scientific theory of Social Darwinism … postulated that Aborigines were the least evolved race in 
the world and as such they were doomed to pass away.  This was seen to be nobody’s fault as such, 
rather it was an inevitable part of the process of human evolution: in the struggle for survival the 
‘fittest’ survived while the less evolved became extinct.”  Haebich, A. For Their Own Good: 
Aborigines and Government in the Southwest of Western Australia (Nedlands: University of 
Western Australia Press) 1988 at 47 – 48.   127
land.  For example, the opening scene of the novel describes the idyllic life enjoyed 
by Aboriginal people: 
Bennilong and his father had come down to the cliffs again, alone.  It was 
quite a long way from the place where the tribe was camped, and they had 
set out early in the morning when the heat of the midsummer day was only 
a threat, and the spider-webs across their path were still glimmering with 
dew.  Now it was after noon, and though Bennilong was six, and expected 
to bear himself like a man, he was tired and sleepy and a little cross, and he 
sat in the shade of a rock with his copper-coloured legs thrust out in front 
of him, and his fingers idly making curly marks in the thin, hot sand.  His 
head was bent, his lower lip protruded, his dark, liquid eyes were sulky.  
And yet, although this sleepiness, this crossness, lay upon his spirit like a 
weight, he had a sense, too, of a larger contentment which included it, and 
made it trivial. He was conscious of the world, and conscious of himself as a 
part of it, fitting into it, belonging to it, drawing strength and joy and 
existence from it, like a bee in the frothing yellow opulence of the wattle. 
He was conscious of an order which had never failed him, of an 
environment which had never startled or betrayed him, of noises such as 
the chorus of the cicadas, less a sound than a vibration on his eardrums, of 
scents which he had drawn into his nostrils with his first breath, and of the 
familiar, scratchy touch against his bare skin of sand and twig, pebble and 
armoured leaf. So that his sulkiness remained isolated in a mind abandoned 
to sensation — something which, for the present, would go no farther than 
the outthrust lip and the liquid darkness of the eye, while he absorbed, in 
absent-minded voluptuousness, his secure and all-sufficient world.20 
The image created here is one of a ‘primitive’, childlike innocence, of a people 
living a carefree and happy existence in a by-gone world.  Dark repeats this theme 
throughout the work with frequent references to the Aborigines’ ‘deep’ and 
‘primitive’ wisdom21 and their childlike nature and animalistic characteristics.22  
The image clearly supports the dominant colonialist discourse of a natural racial 
hierarchy.  Importantly, it is also supportive of law’s discourse of the settlers’ right 
to the land as justified by the principle of terra nullius.  It legitimates particular 
                                                 
20 Dark, above n.8 at 3. 
21 Ibid at 11. 
22 “Bennilong was trembling all over as an animal trembles, not with fear but with excitement and 
leashed alertness.”  Ibid at 44.   128
ways of thinking and so legitimates the taking of Aboriginal land and the 
disruption of Aboriginal culture. 
 
Not all novels perpetuate this position as openly as The Timeless Land.  Doctor 
Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World and The Chant of 
Jimmie Blacksmith are more critical of law’s discourse.  Doctor Wooreddy tells a 
similar story to that of The Timeless Land, giving an account, from the perspective 
of the last Aboriginal male of Bruny Island, of the brutality of the white invasion 
and the taking of Aboriginal land.  Mudrooroo draws on the diaries of George 
Robinson, the Protector of Aborigines in Tasmania, to recount the story of the 
demise of the Tasmanian Aborigines.23  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e s e  s t o r i e s  o f  f i r s t  
settlement, Jimmie Blacksmith tells the story of a ‘half-caste’ man, searching for his 
identity and trying to make a successful life for himself in a white man’s world.  
Based on the real life events of Jimmy Governor, an Aboriginal man hanged for 
murder in 1901, the story tells of how Jimmie wanted simply to be treated as an 
equal in white society.  To this end, he marries a white woman, secures 
employment and builds them a house, but continues to suffer sustained racial slurs 
and mistreatment.  Eventually, pushed too far, Jimmie goes on a violent rampage 
committing several murders before, ultimately, being caught and hanged. 
 
These novels portray a less idealised image of Aboriginal life, and a less fatalistic 
account of dispossession than that presented in The Timeless Land.  Mudrooroo, in 
particular, “undertakes a conscious rewriting of history and thus pose[s] a direct 
                                                 
23 Brown, J. “Unlearning Dominant Modes of Representation: Mudrooroo’s Doctor Wooreddy’s 
Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World and Robert Drewe’s The Savage Crows” (1993) 3 
Westerly 71 at 71.  George Augustus Robinson was the Protector of Aborigines in Tasmania from 
1829 to 1839, when he became Chief Protector of Aborigines for Port Philip in Victoria.   129
challenge to traditional historical constructions.”24  Whereas Dark relates a story of 
the sad demise of a ‘primitive’ race, Mudrooroo tells of the conscious and brutal 
genocide of a vibrant people.  He tells of how they were either killed or forced to 
move to Flinders Island, where they were not permitted to abide by their 
traditional laws and customs, and how this separation from their country 
eventually led to their demise. 
 
In Jimmie Blacksmith, Keneally seeks to imbue white Australia with a sense of 
responsibility for its complicity in the deliberate dispossession of Aboriginal people 
and the destruction of their way of life.  For example, McCreadie, the (white) 
teacher kidnapped by the Blacksmiths, expresses his horror at the destruction of an 
Aboriginal sacred site: 
the state of the secret place disturbed him.  Many of the large stones had 
been toppled, the small glaucous ones uprooted and heaved in every 
direction by picnickers; by exhibitionizing young men of the Manning 
valley. … 
There were inanities too written on the slabs.  There were bottles broken 
and rebroken to small pieces. … 
McCreadie felt ashamed.  Such a threadbare response to a ritual gate, a 
stone-age basilica; not like Stonehenge, millennia-abandoned and a prey to 
tourists and the graffiti of corporals from Aldershot.  A used place, this.  
There were men in Purfleet who knew what the uses were. … 
It had become easy for him to believe, his mind all cross-eyed for lack of air, 
that if the Taree footballers had not fallen to celebrating their skill on the 
consecrated stones of another race, there would have been no killings at the 
Newbys’.  It seemed to him almost a principle of law, viable in a courtroom.  
He would state it when the Blacksmiths were taken.25 
Despite Keneally’s intent, however, the novel does not effectively give voice to 
Aboriginal experiences.  It was written at a time when Australia was still a colonial 
                                                 
24 Ibid at 72. 
25 Keneally, above n. 10 at 148 – 150.   130
country and terra nullius remained intact.26  Governments were still supporting 
integration and assimilation policies, the Racial Discrimination Act had not yet 
been enacted, children were still being removed from their families and land rights 
were still not receiving recognition.27  Ultimately, Jimmie Blacksmith is a colonial 
story.  It tells of what white Australians did to Aboriginal people and it creates a 
white construction of Aboriginal experiences.  Like The Timeless Land, it does not 
challenge the underlying discourse of terra nullius which supported the law’s 
treatment of Aboriginal people.  
 
Clearly, there are obvious divergences in the stories told in these novels and, 
importantly, in the way in which they are told.  As such, it may appear odd to 
discuss them together.  However, despite their differences, all of these texts recount 
a colonial story.  That is, they all tell of the demise of Aborigines at the hands of 
white settlers.  In all of these works there is no future for Aboriginal people.  While 
sympathetic to Aborigines, Eleanor Dark supports the discourse of colonialism by 
adopting the language of social Darwinism and portraying them as ‘primitive’ 
people belonging to the past.  Accordingly, the novel ends with Bennilong’s 
demise.  In Doctor Wooreddy, Mudrooroo presents the genocide of Tasmanian 
Aborigines as inevitable: 
The phrase ‘It is the times’ becomes a refrain which underlines the 
inevitability of the defeat of the Tasmanian Aborigines by the European 
invaders.  From the outset, an atmosphere of predestination is created by 
the author.28 
                                                 
26 The novel was written in 1972, twenty years before the Mabo decision. 
27 Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141 was decided only one year before the first publication of 
Jimmie Blacksmith.  This case is discussed in Chapter Five. 
28 Shoemaker, A. Black Words White Page (Canberra: ANU E Press) 2004 at 152 – 153.   131
Finally, in Jimmie Blacksmith the three main Aboriginal characters are all put to 
death.  Mort is shot as an outlaw and Jackie Smolders and Jimmie are hanged as 
murderers.  In all three novels Aborigines are portrayed as a doomed people.  There 
is no possibility of a future empowerment for them.  There is no survival.29 
 
In telling this colonial story, however, all of these texts, when read through the 
lens of postcolonialism, inform the reader about law in a number of important 
ways.  Regardless of their political or ideological premises, they all make evident 
the fact of Aboriginal dispossession, and they all make clear that it was the 
discourse of law (and terra nullius) that legitimated this taking of Aboriginal land.  
In so doing, these novels illustrate the very real impact that terra nullius had on 
Aboriginal people and highlight the power of the law to effect the everyday.  They 
also demonstrate the way in which the law constructed an image of Aborigines as 
‘other’ and denied them the right or the ability to speak within its discourse, to 
object to their dispossession and so silenced them.  These are all themes I explore 
more fully below. 
 
Beyond Terra Nullius:  The Reality of Dispossession 
One of the arguments I raised in Chapter One was that the law has considerable 
impact on the lives of its subjects beyond the purely legal.  Terra nullius is one area 
in which this argument is clearly explicated.  While the jurists and judges discussed 
in Chapter Five concerned themselves with the parameters of terra nullius as a 
                                                 
29 One of the novels discussed in Chapter Seven, Grenville, K. The Secret River (Melbourne: Text 
Publishing) 2006 also tells this colonial story of settlement.  However, her novel is written after the 
Mabo decision and is a more informed telling of this story.  Whereas the novels here portray 
Aborigines as ‘doomed’, Grenville, although describing them as in a similar position, is more 
respectful of them.  This is particularly evident when compared to Dark, above n.8.  Grenville 
revisits the colonial history from the position of an informed narrator.   132
legal principle, its real everyday effects were being experienced thousands of miles 
away by Australia’s Aboriginal peoples.  As revealed in the texts discussed here, the 
impact of the application of the principle of terra nullius spread far beyond 
questions of law.  Terra nullius was not just a legal principle about sovereignty or 
rights of occupation.  It was about the dispossession of Aboriginal people and the 
destruction of their way of life.  All of the novels discussed here comment on and 
portray dispossession as integral to Australia’s settlement. 
 
Even  The Timeless Land, with its romanticised vision and images of an idyllic 
paradise, suggests the land is wrongfully taken from the Aborigines.  Dark describes 
the anger felt by Tirrawaul as he watched the “men who came as strangers to a 
land, and yet trod its soil as if it were their own”,30 and she allows the “black men” 
to ask: 
And was it not injustice that these Bereewolgal [white men] should, with 
their great canoes and their great nets, go hauling up and down the harbour 
so that there were no fish left for the black men to spear, or for the black 
women to catch on their lines? … was it right that the Bereewolgal should 
still feast while they, to whom the land belonged came near to starving?31 
Yet, as explained above, Dark was not a critic of settlement.  She does attribute 
some of the settlers with some sense of the injustice of dispossession, as when 
Phillip reflecting upon the impossible orders with which he had been issued, 
questions: 
Am I to convince these people that it was “necessary” to steal their land 
from them?  That it is “necessary,” having stolen it, to hunt their game, to 
haul nets in their waters?  That it is “necessary” now to send an armed force 
against them?  What is this “necessity”?  The necessity for a distant jail in 
                                                 
30 Dark, above n.8 at 39. 
31 Ibid at 161.   133
which to herd our criminals!  The necessity for another colonial possession!  
The necessity for empire and dominion, for power and glory …32 
However, she accepts that this dispossession was a natural and inevitable 
consequence of white civilisation and in this Dark is supportive of colonialist 
discourse.  When read from a postcolonial perspective, ultimately this novel tells 
the story of the death and demise of its main characters, of the loss of their land 
and of the destruction of their culture. 
 
In  Doctor Wooreddy the images of dispossession created by Mudrooroo are 
devastating and total: 
They came like thieves when least expected.  They took our land; they took 
our women, and they take our lives.33 
He powerfully explicates the consequences of the application of the principle of 
terra nullius on Aboriginal people.  The novel shows how, as the settlers arrive, 
Aborigines are pushed further and further off their land to the point that, 
eventually, they are rounded up and completely removed from their land.  They 
are physically herded into other areas, where they are compelled to remain.  They 
are to be segregated and are forbidden to exercise their traditions and customs. 
 
What is important about this work is that it is made clear to the reader that 
dispossession did not only mean the loss of land, but that with this wholesale 
dispossession came the devastating disruption of the culture and way of life of the 
Tasmanian Aborigines and, in this, it clearly informs the reader of the impact of 
law beyond the legal.  This is evidenced in Mangana’s lament that: 
‘Num [white men] come; they see what they want; they take it.  It is their 
way.  They do not know Great Ancestor and his laws.  I remember when I 
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first saw their big catamarans.  I did not know what they were, or perhaps I 
did because they scared me … They killed needlessly.  They were quick to 
anger, and quick to kill with thunder flashing out from a stick they carried.  
They kill many, and many die by the sickness they bring.  Now all I have 
left is my little daughter.  Once nine shared my campfire.  Now it is hard to 
find nine members of my clan.  A sickness demon takes those that the 
ghosts leave alone.’34 
This is a theme raised a number of times throughout the novel.  The totality of 
dispossession and its impact is reiterated when Wooreddy is discussing with 
Walyer and Ummarrah whether or not to trust Mr. Robinson’s promise of leading 
them to a ‘promised land’, that is, Flinders Island: 
[Ummarrah] now declared in his strong voice: ‘They have no authority to 
make us go where they want us to.  This is our land and we have always 
been here.  We have numbered the trees and the very blades of grass.  Great 
Ancestor together with his family made everything.  Emu Ancestor made 
my land and if I were there I could take you over it and show you where he 
walked.  They can never take away our land.  I will retreat into the 
mountains.  They will never find me there.’ 
But they had taken the land; they all knew this, … 
… The good doctor noticed how many num words they spoke and suddenly 
realised that more and more num words had also entered his vocabulary.  
‘Yes, there does not seem to be much of a choice,’ he spoke into the silence.  
‘Things are so different now, right down to the words we speak.’35 
The totality of the dispossession is complete.  The Aborigines have lost their land, 
their culture, their people and their language.  Mudrooroo is echoing here 
Memmi’s assertion that: 
Finally, the colonizer denies the most precious right granted to most men: 
liberty.  Living conditions imposed on the colonized by colonization made 
no provision for it [the recognition of the colonized as an individual]; they 
ignore it.  The colonized has no way out of his state of woe – neither a legal 
outlet (naturalization) nor a religious outlet (conversion).  The colonized is 
not free to choose between being colonized or not being colonized. 
What is left of the colonized at the end of this stubborn effort to 
dehumanize him?  He is surely no longer an alter ego of the colonizer.  He is 
hardly a human being.  He tends rapidly towards becoming an object.  As an 
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end, in the colonizer’s supreme ambition, he should exist only as a function 
of the needs of the colonizer, i.e., be transformed into a pure colonized.36 
Doctor Wooreddy and the other Aboriginal characters have lost their right and 
their freedom to choose or control their lives and their fate.  They have been 
reduced to mere objects of the settlers’ colonial ambitions. 
 
In contrast to The Timeless Land and Doctor Wooreddy, Jimmie Blacksmith is set 
at the time of federation and informs the reader of the continuing, long-term 
impact of terra nullius and dispossession.  Jimmie is forced to work on the outskirts 
of white society, is unable to own his land, is treated without respect by the white 
men and women, and suffers discrimination.  Despite his efforts, he will, as an 
Aborigine, never be fully accepted into, or allowed to participate in, white society.  
At the beginning of the novel the Nevilles say to him: 
If you could ever find a nice girl off a farm to marry, your children would 
only be quarter-caste then, and your grandchildren one-eighth caste, 
scarcely black at all.37 
Jimmie does as the Nevilles suggest, but this does not enable his acceptance.   
Jimmie himself reflects: 
that although they were church-wed and had been named a family, they 
still had very little right of reply in a population that sprouted blunt 
precept.38 
Jimmie is prepared to play his own part in his own negation, literally.  Terra nullius 
had not just dispossessed him of his land.  It had dispossessed him of acceptance.39 
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Jimmie Blacksmith is a violent novel, but it is a violence of despair arising from the 
dispossession of Aboriginal people.  It contains scenes of colonialist discourse 
prophesising the demise of Aboriginal people, thus giving the settlers the 
legitimacy to take the land, as when Jimmie visits the Department of Agriculture 
Office and hears an argument over whether the colonies should federate: 
The Australian too adverted to Jimmie. 
“Jacko?” he called.  “He’s an honest poor bastard but he’s nearly extinct.”   
… 
“It’s a hard country.  Lower ways of life give way to the higher. … So poor 
bloody black Jacko’s gone.  It’s sad, but he had to go …”40 
The ultimate comment on dispossession, however, is the refusal to hang Jimmie “in 
the Federation’s early days.”41  Australia had become a nation.  The new nation 
could not be founded on the deliberate putting to death of blacks.  Not this time: 
  Then Australia became a fact. 
It was unsuitable, too indicative of what had been suppressed in the 
country’s making, to hang two black men in the Federation’s early days.   … 
People laughed in their state of grace, the old crimes done, all convict 
chains a rusted fable in the brazen Arcady and under the roar of buskers in 
temperate April 1901. 
And the other viciousness, the rape of the primitives? – it was done and past 
report.42 
The new nation’s first thought is not how to help Aboriginal people, to ensure that 
their mistreatment would be addressed.  It was to ‘move on’, to leave the “rape of 
the primitives” in the past, and to postpone the hanging of Jimmie until a more 
appropriate and convenient time.  Clearly, Keneally here is commenting on the 
taking of Aboriginal land and the failure of white Australia to accept responsibility 
for the consequent devastation wrought on Aboriginal people.  The new nation of 
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Australia was not to be founded on bloodshed.  Its new Constitution had just been 
proclaimed.43 
 
What is important here is that in highlighting the way in which white law simply 
decided to take Aboriginal land under the guise of terra nullius, and so disrupt 
Aboriginal life and culture, these novels inform, and encourage the reader to think, 
about the basis upon which Australia was founded.  They inform the reader that it 
was the law that constructed Australia as empty, and that it was law’s discourse of 
terra nullius that justified the taking of Aboriginal land and enabled the disruption 
of Aboriginal cultures and ways of life.44  In so doing, these texts exemplify the 
extent to which law is part of our everyday.  It regulates and controls many aspects 
of our social existence.45  And it is a totalising discourse that does not accommodate 
difference and plurality.  In both The Timeless Land and Doctor Wooreddy we see 
this totalising discourse reduce Aboriginal people to pawns in England’s colonial 
expansion.  They were treated by the law as different, as objects whose legal and 
social existence did not fit, and could not be accommodated, within law’s discourse.  
Similarly, in Jimmie Blacksmith we see how law’s persistence in upholding the 
rights of the settlers to Australian soil enabled and allowed for Aboriginal people to 
be marginalised, scorned by society and denied access to the dominant discourse so 
that, despite his aspirations, Jimmie was not accepted into white society. 
 
 
                                                 
43 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) excluded any mention of Aboriginal 
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Constructions of Aboriginality 
As argued in Chapter One, one of the ways in which the law is able to extend its 
reach beyond the legal is through the construction of identity and the creation of 
knowledge.  As explained there, the law imposes standards of behaviour which 
reflect, and so promote, particular constructed values and norms.  In this way, law 
is complicit in creating knowledge about, and perceptions of, certain groups of 
people within society, such as Aborigines.  From the outset of colonisation, the 
discourse of law created knowledge about Aboriginal people based on race and 
culture, constructing an image of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’, a 
remnant of the past destined to extinction.  It constructed and labelled Aborigines 
as ‘other’, and, as explained in Chapter Two, the discourse of law, in treating those 
who fall within constructed categories of non-conformity or difference as ‘other’, 
reinforces its dominant discourse and dominant power relations.  It denies those 
who are labelled ‘other’ any particular right, legitimacy or authority to be heard, 
within the dominant discourse. 
  
This characterisation and representation, by the law, of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ 
without any recognisable legal system and who neither owned nor cultivated the 
land was central to law’s discourse.  It legitimated the application of the principle 
of terra nullius to Australia and so provided the legal foundation and justification 
for settlement.  As noted by Brady: 
in the history of contact between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals, 
favourable representations have been rare.  Dampier set the tone in the 
seventeenth century with his picture of them as “the miserablest race on 
earth”, a picture which supported the conviction that their land existed to 
be colonised and that they needed to be “civilised” by us.46 
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Ultimately, it also enabled (and enables) us to justify ourselves. 
Images, of course, are usually forms of alienation from one self and reality, 
and it is this attempted separation of Aboriginal people from their history 
and culture on the one hand and on the other the cult of forgetfulness on 
our part which, writing them out of our history, inserts them into the 
fantasies by which we justify ourselves.47 
Importantly, the images and stereotypes used to legitimate and justify occupation 
informed and shaped the perceptions that many Australians had (and continue to 
have) about Aboriginal people and Aboriginality.  In this way, the construction of 
the Aboriginal ‘other’ has impacted (and impacts) on all forms of legal, social, 
political and cultural interactions.48 
 
All of the texts discussed here inform the reader about how the law constructs the 
‘other’.  Importantly, they show the reader that the law represents this colonised 
‘other’ to be inferior.  As Brady notes: 
Colonization produces the colonized, and produces them as inferior, 
subordinate to the colonizers’ purposes.  Notions of “white” superiority thus 
provided the justification for the destruction of Aboriginal resistance and 
the attempted destruction of their culture.49 
Both The Timeless Land and Doctor Wooreddy make apparent the way in which 
the law labelled Aborigines as ‘other’ from the very beginning of colonisation.  In 
The Timeless Land this dominant discourse is mirrored in Dark’s many descriptions 
of the Aborigines as ‘primitive’ or ‘childlike’:50 
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They were the children of the human family, having the gaiety, the 
monkey-like inquisitiveness, the monkey-like lack of application of the very 
young.  They had, as children have, a deeply rooted sense of justice; like 
children they were generous, devoid of rancour or suspicion, driven by the 
impulse of the moment, vain, inveterate actors and mimics.51 
Dark draws heavily on Aboriginalism in telling this story.  As explained in Chapter 
Four, Aboriginalism is a way of representing Aborigines as noble savages, as 
mystical, primitive, and wise.  It gives the colonisers the power and the right to 
represent Aboriginal people within the dominant discourse and thereby serves to 
publicly silence Aboriginal voices and stories.  It denies Aboriginal people the right 
to tell their account of Australia’s settlement and its consequences.  By adopting 
this technique, Dark constructs an identity of Aborigines that allows the reader to 
ignore the dispossession and violence shown towards them or, more accurately, 
discard it as sad, tragic even, but of no particular consequence, for they were a 
people of the past.  She is content to view the plight of the Aborigines with some 
nostalgia and sympathy and presents a romanticised image of their way of life.  
However, as noted by Hodge and Mishra, she: 
in effect removes [the Aborigines] from history.  However positive she is 
about the value and validity of Aboriginal beliefs, she has situated them in a 
kind of ‘dreamtime’ which exists outside the material world and physical 
space and time.52 
The image presented remains the romanticised one of a ‘primitive’ people living in 
an idyllic past. 
 
This construction of Aboriginality begins to be challenged in Doctor Wooreddy 
and Jimmie Blacksmith.  In Doctor Wooreddy Mudrooroo “calls into question the 
validity of white Australia’s cultural and historical constructions of aboriginality 
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and suggests a far less palatable version of history.”53  As a postcolonial writer, he 
comments on and critiques the Aboriginalist premise used to support colonialist 
discourse.  He tells an Aboriginal story from the perspective of Aboriginal 
characters, and comments on the constructed white knowledge of Aborigines by 
turning it on its head.54  He presents the white men as primitive, describing them as 
‘ghosts’ and hideously ugly, and unable to survive on the Aborigines’ land.  They 
are not the “brave and daring pioneers”55 of earlier tales, such as The Timeless Land.  
Rather, virtually “all white characters are physically deformed, have some kind of 
speech impediment and are renowned for their cannibalistic tendencies.”56  For 
example: 
They explained that although they had volunteered to meet the num, they 
had not realised just how ugly he would be.  Wooreddy tried to put their 
minds at rest by saying that the ghost looked hideous because he had a skin 
disease and that under the ointment he had smeared on his skin, he was 
quite handsome.  They were not entirely convinced.  ‘But apart from his 
ugliness and bad smell, he even acts like a demon.  He ran out of the jungle 
as if he meant to devour us all!  And don’t tell us that the num doesn’t eat 
humans, they eat each other and who knows what they would do if they 
caught one of us.’57 
Aborigines, in contrast, are described as ‘humans’ and as having a highly complex 
society and law.  Gone are Dark’s romanticised images of the ‘noble savage’ living 
in a forgotten paradise.  Mudrooroo constructs a positive image of Aborigines.  He: 
rehumanises [them] by celebrating their culture and their dignity, so 
legitimises an Aboriginal history. … By using an Aboriginal history which 
has been neglected and excluded from most Australian history books, 
Doctor Wooreddy attempts to reshape white Australia’s historical 
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consciousness by offering a revised and positive reading of Aboriginal 
history and culture.58 
In rehumanising the Aboriginal ‘other’, Mudrooroo clearly exposes the way in 
which the discourse of law and its constructions of Aboriginality, which underpin 
the foundation of this country, legitimate, and are legitimated by, racism and 
prejudice. 
  
Thomas Keneally is also critical of the way in which constructions of Aboriginality 
have informed public perceptions of Aboriginal people: 
‘We Europeans are so poor in spirit that the best we can do is laugh at 
primitive people who, in my experience, always have something.  God 
knows what it is, but something.’ 
The girl sniffed at the word something.  Wayward girl that she was, 
she still thought that she had a heritage and that she surpassed Jimmie.59 
Jimmie Blacksmith is set a hundred years after settlement and it is not only these 
images of the ‘primitive’ that Keneally addresses here, but also those of Aborigines 
as unable to look after themselves and their families, and as ‘lazy’ and ‘alcoholic’.  
Jimmie is described as having “drunk a lot of bad sherry early in the afternoon”,60 
and Wongee Tom is portrayed as a ‘bad influence’, discouraging Jimmie from 
looking for work: 
Don’t git a job in the open-cut.  Come round to the Caledonian Sat’dee 
night.  Is all a poor black bastard got left.61 
What is of concern to Keneally here is the way in which these images of a mystical, 
‘primitive’, ‘other’ and the ‘degenerate’, ‘lazy’, ‘alcoholic’, legitimise and perpetuate 
racism.  As exemplified throughout his work, it is this perception of Aborigines 
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that justifies and renders acceptable the discrimination and lack of respect with 
which Aborigines are treated.  If they were indeed as the law, and popular imagery, 
represented them there was nothing that the white population could do for them 
anyway.  They were a people who were (justifiably) destined to extinction, in 
accordance with principles of social Darwinism.  
 
Mudrooroo and Keneally’s novels are, however, also problematic in some ways.  
Hodge and Mishra, in particular, contend that Jimmie Blacksmith draws heavily on 
Aboriginalism, arguing that, in this novel, “the Aboriginal perspective comes not 
from any Aboriginal voice, but from Aboriginalism and its myths”.62  They cite as 
an example of this the scene describing Jimmie’s birth: 
Half-breed Jimmie had resulted from a visit some white man had made to 
Brentwood blacks’ camp in 1878.  The missionaries – who had never been 
told the higher things of Wibbera – had made it clear that if you had pale 
children it was because you’d been rolled by white men.  They had not been 
told that it was Emu-Wren, the tribal totem, who quickened the womb. 
  Mrs. Dulcie Blacksmith believed the missionaries more or less.  They 
took such a low view of lying in other people that they were unlikely to lie 
themselves.  And certainly, Mrs. Blacksmith had been rolled by white men.  
For warmth in winter, she once said.  For warmth in winter and for comfort 
in summer.  But the deep truth was that Emu-Wren had quickened Jimmie 
Blacksmith (pale or not) in the womb and that Mungara owed him a 
woman.63 
For Hodge and Mishra there are two important points raised in this passage.   
Firstly, it portrays biological facts as beyond the comprehension of Aborigines.   
They require the white missionaries to give them this knowledge.  As Hodge and 
Mishra comment: 
This ‘knowledge’ … turns out to be a hoary myth straight out of 
Aboriginalism, that Aboriginals did not understand the basic facts of human 
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biology before the coming of White science, that they had only a childlike 
grasp of human sexuality and the role of the father.64 
Secondly, it shows that, conversely, the missionaries have no understanding of 
Aboriginal beliefs, “which are, however, so well-known to Keneally’s narrator, 
who it seems has been ‘told’ them.”65  They go on to argue: 
Keneally’s Aboriginalism is … structural.  His label for Jimmie, ‘half-breed’, 
neither one thing nor the other comes not out of anthropological or 
scientific nor even missionary discourse, but out of the popular racism 
which delegitimated any departure from an abstract form of pure 
Aboriginality. 
  Keneally’s narrative endorses the Aboriginalist premise: in his 
account Jimmie is excluded in important ways from Aboriginality, to which 
only his fully Aboriginal half-brother, Mort, and his uncle Jackie Smolders 
have access.66 
For them, Jimmie Blacksmith is another example of white constructions of 
Aboriginality “that still leaves Aborigines as the dispossessed, in a White-
dominated status quo.”67  Hodge and Mishra are right in their criticisms of this 
work.68  As stated above, Jimmie Blacksmith is still a colonial story that creates a 
white construction of Aboriginal experiences.  In contrast, Doctor Wooreddy does 
allow for the Aboriginal story to be told from the perspective of Aboriginal 
characters.  As such, although his work has been subject to some criticism, it 
cannot be criticised for being Aboriginalist.69 
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No Right to Speak: Silencing Aboriginal Voices 
One of the consequences of creating this image and knowledge of Aborigines as 
‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’ was that the law silenced Aboriginal voices and 
excluded Aboriginal stories from the dominant discursive domain.70  That is, the 
law’s inability or unwillingness to recognise Aboriginal points of view created a 
différend.  As explained in Part One, the différend refers to an inability to speak, or 
more specifically, to be heard within the dominant discourse.71  It arises because of 
the incommensurabilities that occur when one of the parties does not, or cannot, 
speak in the idiom of the other, and its existence is manifested in a silencing of the 
marginalised.  Until very recently, the dominant culture and discourse in this 
country did not hear the voices of Aboriginal people. 
 
The consequences of this silencing were (and are) considerable.  Firstly, as 
Shoemaker notes: 
the near-invisibility of blacks in Australian historiography masked for so 
long the fact that Aborigines and Europeans held radically different views of 
what actually happened in black / white interracial history.72 
Their side of the story was simply not heard.  By constructing Aborigines as ‘other’ 
the law already judged them and denied them the right and ability to tell their side 
of the story.  Secondly, silencing Aboriginal voices allowed white Australia to 
maintain control over constructions of, and knowledge about, Aboriginal people.  
Denying them the right and ability to represent themselves meant that they could 
be represented by others, “who know more about them than they know about 
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themselves.”73  As discussed above, they were often represented as the noble savage, 
as ‘primitive’ and ‘childlike’.  This representation: 
justified our speaking for them, excluding them from power and 
subordinating them to our purposes and values.  In this way … Aboriginal 
people have been held as hostages to images of our creation.74 
It allowed for the perpetuation and legitimation of authorised (white) ‘truths’ about 
Australia’s settlement, and about the place of Aboriginal people within Australian 
society. 
 
All of the novels discussed in this chapter inform the reader that the law denied 
Aborigines a right and ability to argue against the injustices which they suffered.  
They all inform about how the discourse of law gave rise to a différend and about 
how Aborigines were silenced within this discourse.  None of the texts allow for 
the possibility of the empowerment of Aboriginal people, or for Aboriginal people 
to be given a voice.75  There is no opportunity for the différend to be overcome.  In 
The Timeless Land the reader is presented with the romanticised image of a 
‘primitive’ race that belongs to the past.  In Doctor Wooreddy the image is one of 
genocide, and in Jimmie Blacksmith it is one of a violent, drunken reprobate who is 
(deservedly) put to death.  These novels show how the law would not allow 
Aborigines to remain on their land and continue with their ways.  It would not 
allow them to object to the way they were treated.  It could not, and would not, 
hear Aboriginal voices. 
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In The Timeless Land, for example, the reader sees how the English were unable to 
conceive of any way of being other than their own, and that they could only see 
Bennilong as the exotic ‘other’.  Governor Phillip takes him to England and 
attempts to ‘civilise’ him, however, he is unable to fit within, and engage with the 
niceties of, English society.  The two parties were not speaking in the same idiom.  
Consequently, it is the marginalised, that is, Bennilong’s voice that is silenced.  He 
was silenced by being removed from his own people and he was silenced when he 
was not able to be heard by the English.  Ultimately, the novel ends with his 
demise once these attempts to ‘civilise’ him have failed. 
 
In Doctor Wooreddy, Aborigines are silenced by being killed, and taken away from 
their land and herded onto Flinders Island.  The white law forcibly removed 
Aborigines from their land and denied them the right, under that law, to challenge 
white ownership of the land.  They have no-one to appeal to, no-one who will 
listen to their voice.  They are unable to object, within the white discourse, to the 
destruction of their way of life: 
‘When first we came we had hopes and there were still youths to be made 
men.  We made a ground and then the commandant told us not to dance at 
night.  We agreed in our way and tried to continue, but he stopped our food 
until we really gave up our ceremonies.  If he caught anyone even talking 
about them, he was put in gaol.  Our ground used to be where that field is.  
H e  m a d e  u s  d i g  i t  u p .  H e  s a i d  t h a t  w e  w e r e  C h r i s t i a n s  a n d  t h a t  i f  w e  
wanted to sing we had to sing in that chapel shelter there.  We sing there 
every evening, and that is now our ceremony.’76 
Two of the main characters in the text comment on the way in which the law’s 
constructions of Aboriginality resulted in a différend.  Wooreddy remarks that, 
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“‘they don’t even believe that we can speak like this or choose our own destiny’”,77 
and Trugernanna explains to Robinson: 
‘We did nothing wrong; we were only trying to get back home! That man 
that was killed.  Long ago he raped me.  Black women can be raped too!  We 
can feel pain and we do not kill without reason.  We are not savages.  This is 
only your excuse for not listening to us.’78 
Eventually, in Doctor Wooreddy most of the Aboriginal characters die, until there 
is only one Aboriginal woman left and no-one is listening to her. 
 
Finally, in The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith, Jimmie is silenced because he wants to 
be accepted, and successful, in white society but the white men won’t let him.  He 
is, for example, unable to acquire any land.  All the landowners in the novel are 
white and it is these white characters who retain the power to determine when and 
where Aborigines may enter upon the land.  This eventually results in Jimmie 
expressing his frustration by killing these “obelisks to white virtue.”79  W h e n  
Jimmie goes to court he is, therefore, tried as a murderer.  The law would not listen 
to Jimmie’s voice.  It would not listen to why it was that Jimmie felt compelled to 
take the action that he had.  His real story of dispossession is silenced.  And, of 
course, his ultimate silencing is in being hanged. 
 
This public silencing of Aboriginal voices served to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
dominant discourse.  If Aborigines were unable to tell their story and be heard, 
within this discourse, then white legitimacy was assured.  It also brought about the 
exclusion of Aboriginal people from many aspects of white law and white society.  
While Aborigines were included within the law for many purposes, they were 
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excluded for many others.  Formally, Aborigines were deemed to be British 
subjects, and, as such, were required to comply with the prescriptions of the white 
law.  As will be discussed further in Chapter Nine, their lives were also the subject 
of considerable restrictive legislation with which they were required to comply.  
Yet, despite these apparent inclusions, the law excluded Aboriginal people from 
many of its benefits and protections, and it denied them the right, ability or 
legitimacy to speak within its discourse.  These anomalies are detailed in the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: 
While theoretically Aboriginal people were to be treated as British subjects, 
they ‘suffered severe disabilities in t h e  c o u r t s ’ .   T h e y  w e r e  n o t  g i v e n  
equality of legal status, yet were perceived as law-breakers.  Because they 
were not Christians, they often could not testify in court … 
Many legal impediments existed to Aboriginal people giving evidence and 
exercising their rights as individuals.  In some colonies they could not press 
charges, were held corporately guilty for the crimes of others, and were not 
permitted to give evidence because they were pagans. … The justice system 
was especially alienating for people who were not familiar with this facet of 
Western culture.80 
 
One area where Aborigines were excluded was in the ‘ownership’ of land.  The 
introduced English common law would not recognise Aboriginal rights to land.  It 
could not conceive of any way of owning land other than as defined by its law of 
property.81  The way in which the law constructed the Aboriginal ‘other’ meant 
that Aborigines had no right to the land.  Their way of viewing ownership of land 
and the relationship which they had with the land was excluded from the 
colonialist, positivist law that arrived with the first settlers.  This is something 
clearly exemplified in the texts discussed here.  In The Timeless Land and Doctor 
Wooreddy it is apparent in the settlers’ assumption of the lack of need to negotiate 
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with or compensate Aborigines for the loss of their land.  It is also apparent, 
particularly in Doctor Wooreddy, in the way in which the settlers physically and 
forcibly removed Aborigines from their land and herded them into areas of land, 
‘generously’ set aside by its new owners, where they were compelled to remain.  In 
Jimmie Blacksmith, the exclusion is perhaps more stark.  Jimmie is not simply 
dispossessed of his land here.  He is unable, because of his Aboriginality, to acquire 
and own any land.  All of the landowners in this novel are white. 
 
As stated above, Aborigines were also, despite being subject to law’s prescriptions, 
excluded from its protections.  And so, in the texts discussed here, the reader is 
shown how Aboriginal people were, on the one hand, subjected to physical attacks, 
for which they had no recourse, and, on the other, severely punished if deemed to 
be the perpetrator of any illegal act.  In Doctor Wooreddy, for example, Robinson 
rebukes a shepherd for killing some Aborigines.  The shepherd’s response is telling: 
‘Yes, sir,’ the shepherd replied without conviction or care.  What did it 
matter to him!  They were just a bloody pack of crows, better off dead.  He 
decided to agree with what the governor said no matter how silly it was.  
That was the best way of handling this.  And no one had been hanged for 
killing a crow yet.82 
There is no such leniency when it is white men who are killed.  The novel ends 
with Ummarrah’s standing trial in a white court for the murder of white men.  It is 
determined that he “should feel the full weight of the law”83 and he is condemned 
to death, even though he felt he was only acting in self-defence.  As he states: 
‘Just about all my people have been killed or murdered.  We only killed in 
self-defence or for the injuries inflicted on us.  Lalla Rookh killed that man 
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for raping her when she was a young girl.  He was an ugly brute.  The other 
was killed when he came to his assistance.  This is all that I have to say.’84 
Aborigines were excluded from the protection of the white law yet subject to its 
punishment.  Aboriginal stories were excluded from the courtroom and from the 
white law. 
 
Perhaps the most poignant example of the power of law’s discourse to exclude is in 
The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith.  As detailed above, this story is set at the time of 
federation.  Yet the document which would enable this federation, the 
Constitution of Australia, did not include Aborigines within its ambit.  In this, the 
novel exemplifies the extent of the law’s power to define, exclude and silence that 
which it deemed unworthy of inclusion.  Aborigines were considered to be a ‘dying 
race’.  There was no need to include them as citizens of the new nation of 
Australia.85  They were defined as an obsolete ‘other’ and silenced and excluded.  
The white law determined that there was no Aboriginal law which it had to 
recognise or to negotiate with. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the three novels discussed here inform the 
reader about law in a number of ways.  They show the impact that the law can 
have on the lives of it subjects, by explicating that the discourse of terra nullius did 
not simply enable the English to claim sovereignty over Australia, but that the 
application of this principle dispossessed Aboriginal people and destroyed their way 
of life.  Beyond this, they inform the reader about the way in which the law 
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produces knowledge and constructed an image of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ and 
‘uncivilised’.  That is, I have argued that these novels illustrate that our law is 
unable and unwilling to accommodate difference, and that, in failing to recognise 
Aboriginal points of view, and constructing Aborigines as ‘other’, it has created a 
différend.  Consequently, Aboriginal voices have been silenced and Aboriginal 
stories excluded from the dominant discursive domain. 
 
In the next chapter, I argue that novels written after the 1992 Mabo decision begin 
to address these issues of silencing and exclusion.  They re-tell stories of 
dispossession, re-examine constructions of Aboriginality and, most importantly, 
allow for Aboriginal voices to be heard.  They allow for alternative histories to be 
constructed, retrieving “an Aboriginal past from white histories”,86 and allow for 
alternative stories to be told. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 




‘… then the High Court led the way with the Mabo judgment.  It recognised 
finally that terra nullius was always a lie, … This country was Aboriginal 
land and it was stolen from them without compensation.  That was unfair.’1 
In Chapter Six, I argued that stories of dispossession written prior to the Mabo 
decision clearly inform the reader about the role of the law in the deliberate 
dispossession and mistreatment of Aboriginal people.  They highlight the 
complicity of the law in the construction of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ and 
‘uncivilised’, which was essential in justifying the application of terra nullius to 
Australia, and expose how the law created a différend in its failure (and 
unwillingness) to recognise Aboriginal perspectives.  This law silenced Aboriginal 
people and denied them the ability to challenge the settlers’ taking of their land 
and disruption of their culture.  That is, the texts discussed there reveal that the 
English law introduced into this country at the time of settlement was colonialist, 
discriminatory and inflexible and could not and would not listen to the people who 
already inhabited this land. 
 
As explained in Chapter Five, it was not until 1992, when the High Court handed 
down its Mabo decision, that the common law began to address Aboriginal 
dispossession.  In this case, the High Court declared that “[t]he common law of this 
country would perpetuate an injustice if it were to continue to embrace the 
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enlarged notion of terra nullius.”2  It recognised that Aboriginal people had been 
dispossessed because of the inappropriate application of a principle of law and, 
importantly, that native title did form part of the common law of Australia.  And 
so, for the first time since settlement, the colonial law was beginning to listen to 
Aboriginal people.  It heard that the Meriam people marked out plots of land 
which they cultivated and that these plots were passed down through the 
generations.  In other words, the Meriam people were able to present their case in 
a way which could be understood by the western law.  In this, Mabo marks the 
beginning of the dismantling of the conditions that gave rise to the différend.  The 
two parties were finally beginning to speak in the same idiom and the dominant 
culture was beginning to hear the voice of the marginalised.3 
 
Following the Mabo decision we begin to see an increased awareness of Aboriginal 
stories in many areas, including literature, as evidenced by the numerous literary 
prizes awarded to those telling these stories.4  In this chapter, I analyse texts 
written after Mabo which retell stories of dispossession.  Like the texts discussed in 
Chapter Six, they inform the reader about the impact of the law on the everyday 
and highlight the way in which the law includes, excludes and silences.  However, 
the texts I analyse here tell alternative stories and expose alternative histories to 
those in Chapter Six.  They tell the reader about a changing law, one which 
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recognises the erroneousness and the inappropriateness of terra nullius.5  T h e y  
show that the law is not immutable, and that it can be flexible to accommodate 
changing community standards. 
 
The texts I discuss in this chapter are The Secret River,  The White Earth and 
Journey to the Stone Country.6  I argue that these are all postcolonial novels in 
that, even if not written from an Aboriginal perspective, they present alternative 
accounts of Australian history and society, which accord a space for Aboriginal 
peoples’ experiences.  In particular, I argue that these texts inform the reader about 
the role of the law in changing constructions of Aboriginality and in addressing the 
différend.  In doing this, these novels imagine a more just future, one borne out of 
the law beginning to dismantle the conditions that foster the différend.  These 
texts engage with the change in the law introduced in Mabo and show that 
Aboriginal people have become more empowered.  That is, I argue that the texts 
discussed in this chapter reveal how there is now a way for Aboriginal people to 
speak and be heard within the public domain. 
 
I begin with a discussion of Kate Grenville’s The Secret River.  This novel retells 
the story of settlement told in The Timeless Land and Doctor Wooreddy.7  
However, Grenville tells the story differently, using an informed narrator to tell 
the reader that Aboriginal people were not ‘primitive’, that terra nullius was not an 
appropriate legal principle to apply to Australia, and that at the time of settlement 
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7 Dark, E. The Timeless Land (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2002; Mudrooroo, Doctor Wooreddy’s 
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white settlers and Aborigines were not speaking in the same idiom.  In the 
remainder of this chapter, I discuss The White Earth and Journey to the Stone 
Country.  In the second section, I show how these novels inform the reader about 
changing constructions of Aboriginality, and in the final section I examine the way 
in which these texts reveal how the law has started to break down the 
incommensurabilities that give rise to the différend and hear what Aboriginal 
people have to say. 
 
Re-writing the Past:  Kate Grenville’s The Secret River 
Kate Grenville’s The Secret River has caused considerable controversy since its 
2005 publication.  It began life as an exercise into Grenville’s family history and 
eventually evolved into the fictional story of emancipist William Thornhill.  It 
follows the fortunes of Thornhill from his conviction and transportation to New 
South Wales in 1806 to wealthy landowner after ‘taking up’ land on the 
Hawkesbury River.  It is a story of colonisation and dispossession that tells of the 
struggle for land between white settlers and Aboriginal people.  It is, however, a 
white story that is told from Thornhill’s perspective.  It is not a story of the 
Aboriginal response to, or experience of, settlement.  As Grenville puts it: 
the subject of this book is actually the white settlers, it’s the white settler 
response to the fact that the Aboriginal people were on the land they 
wanted to settle on.  It’s not actually about the Aboriginal response to the 
white settlers.8 
Ultimately the story Grenville tells is that the white settlers’ response to the 
Aboriginal presence was simply to take the land that they wanted. 
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Although fictional, Grenville has claimed that the novel is “solidly based on 
history” and that “[m]ost of the events in the book “really happened” and much of 
the dialogue is what people really said or wrote.”9  She has also stated that: “I 
wanted the book to be based at every point on whatever historical veracity I could 
find.  I haven’t made it up” and “that this book is probably as close as we are going 
to get to what it was actually like.”10  Unsurprisingly, such claims have sparked 
considerable debate over the accuracy of the work and, more widely, the role of 
the novelist as historian.  Mark McKenna, in particular, is opposed to “the new 
authority of fictive history”11 and argues that we must “remember the distinction 
between history and fiction.”12  He objects to The Secret River being presented as 
history and to the claims made by Grenville about its veracity, pointing out that the 
accuracy of the novel is questionable, with events and dialogue being shuffled 
around from different periods and places.13  Others, notably Inga Clendinnen, 
further object to Grenville’s assertions that she is able to place herself in the 
position of a settler two hundred years ago and understand the events which 
surrounded them, and then present her results as history.14 
 
I agree with McKenna and Clendinnen’s point that there is a danger in assuming 
the historical accuracy of what remains essentially a work of fiction.  As 
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Clendinnen states, “[t]housands of people will read The Secret River and get some 
knowledge of their past.  That’s great – as long as it’s kept in the fiction section.”15  I 
would add to these criticisms a further rider that the novel should not be read as a 
“salve [to] the conscience”.16  Grenville dedicates the work “to the Aboriginal 
people of Australia: past, present and future.”  This would seem to suggest that by 
writing and reading the novel we are able to acknowledge the past and, 
importantly, move on.17  However, there are dangers in adopting such a simple 
stance.  As Mark McKenna notes: 
the cliché that we’ll move on when we acknowledge the way this land was 
won is so hollow and such a forlorn hope.  Moving on may only be a 
journey to a new kind of forgetting.18 
 
This is not to say, however, that writers of fiction cannot inform their readers of 
historical events, or that they cannot draw on history in the telling of their stories.  
Despite the above criticisms, The Secret River is a useful work, especially in the 
context of my argument about how novels written after the Mabo decision inform 
the reader about the law.  In the context of the legal, it is an important work.  It is a 
self-consciously postcolonial novel which reflects on the colonial process and the 
acquisition of land by challenging primitivist representations of Aboriginal people 
in colonial texts such as The Timeless Land and the heterogeneity of ‘settler’ 
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move on.”  These kinds of comments are somewhat self congratulatory given that the novel was 
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responses to Aboriginal people.  It brings to the attention of the reader the way the 
law permitted and legitimated the dispossession of Aboriginal people and, in so 
doing, it gives the reader access to the history of the law that was challenged in 
Mabo. 
 
As well as writing from the perspective of Thornhill, Grenville also writes in the 
third person.  This enables her to provide the reader with information about 
Australia’s settlement.  As she puts it, “what I had to try to do was to let the reader 
know what was happening, even though Thornhill sometimes didn’t.”19  B y  
adopting this technique of the informed narrator, Grenville is able to revisit the 
legal basis of the settlement of Australia, informing the reader about the law, and 
tell a narrative of dispossession in which the “lie of terra nullius conveniently 
enables the clearing of land and setting up of borders and boundaries that signal 
European ownership.”20  Even Thornhill has the occasional insight to know that 
this terra nullius is a lie: 
It came to him that this might look like an empty place, but … [it] was no 
more empty than a parlour in London, from which the master of the house 
had just stepped into the bedroom.  He might not be seen, but he was 
there.21 
Nevertheless, as Grenville explains, upon settlement, in accordance with the 
principle of terra nullius, “King George owned this whole place of New South 
Wales”.22  She goes on to explain the consequences of this: 
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what was the point of King George owning it, if it was still wild, trodden 
only by black men?  The more civilised folk set themselves up on their 
pieces of land, the more those other ones could be squeezed out.23 
Accordingly Will ‘takes up’ his land on the Hawkesbury and squeezes the 
Aborigines out.  Instructing the Aborigines to “bugger off”24 he: 
bent down and with a twig drew marks on the dust; a curving line that was 
the river, and a tidy square representing his own hundred acres.  This mine 
now.  Thornhill’s Place.25 
 
It is with this ‘taking up’ of land that Grenville takes exception.  She understands, 
“unlike her fictional family, … [that] the land that has brought it such riches was 
… acquired through an act of stealing.”26  She tells us about the privilege of the 
colonisers, which makes what they do possible.  She shows that this is the case 
regardless of whether the coloniser was initially a free settler or not.  When the 
novel begins the reader has hope that because Thornhill has experienced injustice 
himself he will be a more just man.  However, when he is in the colony and then 
when he has his freedom, he takes up the part of the coloniser and dispossesses.  He 
does this knowingly, for his own benefit.  Grenville does not excuse Thornhill by 
keeping this from the reader.  Thornhill’s action, in this way, is consistent with 
Memmi’s point that regardless of whether the European living in a colony wishes it 
or not (and Thornhill does): 
he is received as a privileged person by the institutions, customs and people.  
From the time he lands or is born, he finds himself in a factual position 
which is common to all Europeans living in a colony, a position which turns 
him into a colonizer. … He could not, of course, have sought a colonial 
experience, but as soon as the venture is begun, it is not open to him to 
refute its conditions.27 
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Thornhill adopts the position of the coloniser and he takes up land as justified by 
terra nullius.  He is able, that is, to dispossess Aboriginal people in the same way 
that the other settlers have.  Memmi goes on: 
The fundamental questions are directed to the colonizer at another level.  
Once he has discovered the import of colonization and is conscious of his 
own position (and that of the colonized and their necessary relationship), is 
he going to accept them?  Will he agree to be a privileged man, and to 
underscore the distress of the colonized?  Will he be a usurper and affirm 
the oppression and injustice to the true inhabitants of the colony?  Will he 
accept being a colonizer under the constant gaze of the usurped?  Will he 
adjust to this position and his inevitable self censure?28 
In Thornhill’s case he builds his mansion over an Aboriginal rock carving, he has a 
portrait of himself painted so that he can be reminded “of the person he had 
become”,29 and he builds a wall around it all to protect himself and his family.  He 
accepts, and benefits from, the privilege of being a coloniser. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, one of the ways in which the law justified the 
application of terra nullius to Australia and legitimated the taking of Aboriginal 
land was through its representations of Aboriginal people as ‘primitive’, 
‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’.  This is something commented on extensively by 
Grenville in The Secret River.  As Will reflects, for example: 
everyone knew the blacks did not plant things.  They wandered about, 
taking food as it came under their hand.  They might grub things out of the 
dirt if they happened on them, or pick something off a bush as they passed.  
But, like children, they did not plant today so that they could eat tomorrow. 
    It was why they were called savages.30 
This lack of cultivation that equated with savagery absolved Thornhill of the need 
to recognise the Aborigines’ prior claim to the land, or to negotiate with them.  
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Grenville, however, tells us that Aborigines were not ‘primitive’.  From the 
beginning, she depicts them as sophisticated, with their own area of country and 
systems of law and society, and shows that they did ‘cultivate’ or ‘manage’ the 
land.31  We see, for example, how they deliberately burn the land, and wait for the 
rain to transform the blackened earth with new growth.  This, in turn attracts 
kangaroos on which the Aborigines feed.32  Here, the narrator tells the reader that 
the justification for the dispossession of Aboriginal people was wrong, that they did 
manage the land on which they lived.  They simply did so in a manner different to 
that understood by the English law and the white settlers. 
 
In this way, Grenville’s novel highlights the existence of the différend and the way 
that the settlers’ law silenced and excluded Aboriginal people, rendering them 
unable, within this discourse, to defend their interest in their land.  Grenville 
explains how this différend occurred.  She informs the reader that Aboriginal 
people and the settlers were not able to understand each other because they did not 
speak in the same idiom.  This, as she points out, is not just about language: 
but a complete inability to communicate.  It wasn’t just language that the 
settlers and the Aboriginal people didn’t share. … it was … a world view.  
The Aborigines, for example, had a culture in which individual competition, 
individual striving, individual ownership were not part of their world view, 
and they were unable to understand the way settlers marked out a bit of 
land for themselves individually, put a fence around it and called it theirs.  
The settlers, likewise, just couldn’t understand that the Aborigines had just 
as great a sense of territory as they themselves did but they didn’t need to 
build a fence or a house or a road to have that.33 
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Thornhill is only ever working from the western legal perspective that does not 
accommodate difference or pluralism.  Grenville’s narrator explains to the reader 
Thornhill’s (and the law’s) inability (and unwillingness) to hear the voice of the 
Aborigines, thus giving rise to the différend.34  At the end of the novel, for 
example, we hear Will talking to Long Jack, the only survivor of the massacre of his 
people.  Thornhill tries to render assistance, by offering Long Jack charity; a 
blanket and food, but it is rejected.  Thornhill doesn’t understand that Jack wants 
to be left alone, in his place.  He does not understand the impact or enormity of 
what has occurred.  The reader here is clearly shown a clash of idioms; white 
paternalism on the one hand, and Aboriginal self determination on the other.35  It is 
Thornhill, as part of the dominant western discourse, who prevails.36  He retreats to 
his house and his “piece of paper to prove it was all his,”37 and turns his back on 
Long Jack. 
 
The Secret River, like the texts discussed in Chapter Six, doesn’t go beyond 
settlement and does not offer much hope for its Aboriginal characters.  The 
importance of the work and its point of difference from those discussed in Chapter 
Six, however, is that the narrator stands post-Mabo and revisits the story to show 
us what happened legally.  Thus, while the Aboriginal characters in the novel still 
have no voice that is heard within the dominant colonial / settler discourse, the 
novel does enable current day readers to understand the history of dispossession 
and how it was legitimated in the minds of the people who took the land.  It tells us 
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why Aboriginal people should be recognised and so, unlike the novels in Chapter 
Six, leaves open the possibility of change for the future.38  It is because Grenville is 
presenting this post-Mabo perspective that she is able to revisit this story of 
settlement and dispossession and show that there was always another story that the 
law was not acknowledging.  And so, when she writes: 
There were no signs that the blacks felt the place belonged to them.  They 
had no fences that said this is mine.  No house that said, this is our home.  
There were no fields or flocks that said, we have put the labour of our hands 
into this place,39 
she is reflecting on, and conveying to the reader, the rigidity and inappropriateness 
of the principle of terra nullius.  Her post-Mabo perspective allows her to show 
that Aborigines had boundaries of land but that this was simply not recognised by 
the settlers or their law. 
 
Mark McKenna says of fiction, “it tries constantly to break [the] distance [of 
history] down, to create the illusion that the reader is there and therefore knows 
what the past is like.”40  This goes some way to explaining why I find The Secret 
River a useful novel.  In taking the reader into the life of Thornhill, Grenville 
allows us to revisit the legal issues surrounding the claiming of land and the 
dispossession of Aboriginal people.  For me, doing this provides a summary of the 
key legal assumptions of terra nullius and provides a key to understanding Mabo.  
Once we recognise the way that the law operated at the time of settlement we can 
have a greater appreciation of later stories which are set in a more contemporary 
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and acknowledges Aboriginal peoples’ perspectives and experiences. 
39 Grenville, above n.4 at 93. 
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context and, in particular, the way that these later stories reconstruct Aboriginality 
and begin to address the différend. 
 
Re-examining Aboriginality 
Andrew McGahan and Alex Miller write in a more contemporary context.  Like 
Kate Grenville, they stand post-Mabo and challenge the appropriateness of terra 
nullius.  Both of these writers embrace the changing law to inform readers about 
how this law is responding to, and assisting in, changing constructions of 
Aboriginality.  In their novels, terra nullius is depicted as a lie, dispossession as 
unjust, and, importantly, the legitimating myth of Aborigines being ‘primitive’, 
‘savage’ and ‘uncivilised’ is dispelled. 
  
Andrew McGahan’s The White Earth is set in the post-Mabo ferment of the early 
1990’s and centres on the introduction of the Native Title Act.41  It is a story about 
the reaction of Queensland landowners to Mabo and the proposed legislation, and 
the fear that Aborigines will take their land.  It is not a novel written from an 
Aboriginal perspective.  However, underlying the story is the presence of 
Aborigines, their dispossession and the violence with which the white settlers 
treated them.  Ultimately, it is a story of dispossession that tells of William’s 
discovery of genocide and theft of land,42 and in telling the story of John McIvor 
and his nephew William, who John has selected to inherit Kuran Station, McGahan 
tells us much about dispossession and constructions of Aboriginality. 
 
                                                 
41 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). 
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In relation to dispossession, John McIvor tells William, for example, that “[t]he 
Kuran people are long gone – shot, or killed by disease, or carted away”,43 and that 
“[t]his is my land now, … Whoever might have lived here once, they’re gone.”44  
There is imbued in these statements a sense of John’s right to the land.  As Potter 
notes, McGahan here “depicts a history of white occupation and indigenous 
dispossession as ideologically justified.”45  It is this sense of an absolute entitlement 
to the land which also underlies John’s response to William’s questions about 
native title: 
‘Well, one of the things it means is that someone like me won’t have a say 
any more about what happens on my own property. … But that’s not all.  
The worst of it is that I might not even own the land any more.  Not 
outright.  Other people would come along and say they owned it as well.  
People who haven’t had anything to do with the place for centuries.  And I 
wouldn’t be able to do a thing without their say-so.’  He leant forward 
again.  ‘There are lots of aspects to it and you’ll hear all sorts of rubbish 
about this and that, but don’t fall for it.  Deep down, it’s purely a question of 
property rights.’46 
The irony here is clear.  It makes apparent (if not always to some of the main 
characters) the dispossession upon which these ‘property rights’ are based; that 
white property rights are themselves founded on an act of theft.47  The ultimate 
depiction of the dispossession of the Kuran people, however, is their massacre by 
John’s father.  Despite having been forcibly removed from their land, every two 
                                                 
43 McGahan, above n.1 at 163. 
44 Ibid at 180.  See also McIvor’s address to the anti native title rally at 209: “‘The Aborigines are 
gone.  And that’s the point.  This is my property now.  This is all your properties, your farms, your 
houses, your yards – this hill represents them all.  We must be prepared to defend what we own.’ … 
‘Australia – every square inch of it – is our sacred site.’” 
45 Potter, E. “Andrew McGahan’s The White Earth and the Ecological Poetics of Memory” (2006) 
20(2) Antipodes 177 at 177. 
46 McGahan, above n.1 at 135. 
47 This is also made evident in the opening quote of this chapter:  “‘… then the High Court led the 
way with the Mabo judgment.  It recognised finally that terra nullius was always a lie, and now the 
government is responding to historical reality with the Native Title legislation.  This country was 
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years all the remaining men and boys of the tribe returned for a specific, yet 
unknown purpose.48  Each time they returned they were removed and told that this 
was not their land and that they were trespassing.  They continued to return, 
however, until, finally, John’s father shot them all.49 
 
In Journey to the Stone Country dispossession is, once again, a central theme.  In 
this novel, Alex Miller tells the story of Annabelle Beck and Bo Rennie.  Annabelle 
leaves her husband and Melbourne, to return to her family home in Northern 
Queensland, where she assists a friend conducting cultural surveys.  It is here that 
she meets Bo, one of the Jangga people.  Together, Bo and Annabelle are to report 
on the cultural significance of an area of land that will become a reservoir if the 
proposed damming of the Ranna Creek proceeds.  The area to be flooded includes 
Ranna Station, once owned by the wealthy (white) Bigges family.  The station is 
now deserted, but intact, and Annabelle wants it preserved as a place of cultural 
significance, as “a unique record of early colonial life.”50  Bo disagrees.  To him the 
Bigges homestead is not important.  It is against this backdrop that Miller weaves 
his compelling commentary on terra nullius, dispossession and the “co-existence of 
conflicting histories.”51 
 
Throughout his novel Miller comments extensively on the fiction of terra nullius.  
From the outset the reader is informed that terra nullius was a lie, and that this 
                                                 
48 Under section 9 of the Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (Qld) 
all Aboriginal people under the Act were to be removed from their land and to be “removed to, and 
kept within the limits of, any reserve.” 
49 McGahan, above n.1 at 347 – 351.  From a postcolonial perspective, readers can appreciate that 
Aboriginal people would necessarily return to a place for law and other ceremonies. 
50 Vogler, A. “Forging heritage for the tourist gaze: Australian history and contemporary 
representation reviewed” (2007) 91 Journal of Australian Studies 93 at 101. 
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land was not empty.  We are told, for example, that, “[b]efore the conquest by the 
white man, all of Australia was owned under Aboriginal terms by Aboriginal 
people.”52  We are also told of the violence with which this supposedly empty land 
was claimed and Aboriginal people dispossessed: 
She could see her fierce grandfather’s bronze stirrup catch the cold glint of 
moonlight as he swung it over the head of the terrified boy running for the 
shelter of the scrub, the triumphant yell of the hunter on horseback.  The 
child’s thin bleached cry of terror cut short.  The flash and smack of the hit.  
Dispute settled!  My land now!53 
This sense of loss is further represented in Annabelle’s discovery of a cyclon, a 
“stone artefact of unknown purpose.”54  She removes it from where she finds it so 
that it won’t get lost.  Later, she questions Dougald, an Aboriginal elder about it, 
stating, “‘Susan thought we’d better take it, in case it got damaged … Or maybe got 
lost.’”55  To this Dougald sardonically responds, “‘Lost?’ … ‘Well I think it’s been 
lost.’”56  As in The White Earth, it is clear what is being depicted here.  The law, 
through the fiction of terra nullius, enabled white settlers to take Aboriginal land 
and destroy Aboriginal culture without negotiation or compensation.  The injustice 
of this dispossession is expressed in Bo’s feelings about the Bigges family and their 
loss of the land: 
‘The Bigges didn’t do too bad when you think what the old people who had 
it before them got shifted to.’  He fell silent, his feelings of injustice aroused, 
… 
‘If you and I knew the truth about them people, John, I don’t reckon they 
could ever have been easy in themselves about holding that country.’ … 
                                                 
52 Miller, above n.4 at 16.  Likewise in The White Earth, above n.1 at 276 Ruth says to William: 
“‘You know, no one really found Kuran.  And it wasn’t empty.  Other people were already here.’” 
53 Ibid at 347.  He also describes Annabelle and Bo looking at the river Isaac:  “… the riverbed a level 
stretch of golden sand cutting through the sunlit timber like an abandoned highway from some 
unnamed metropolis of antiquity whose population had been dispersed and murdered long ago, the 
scattered survivors dreaming their time would come again …” Ibid at 46. 
54 Ibid at 57. 
55 Ibid at 71. 
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‘Dying out on themselves,’ Bo said then, … ‘That might have been their way 
of dealing with not being easy about holding the country.’57 
Miller is telling the reader, in these passages, that Australia was not empty land and 
that the white settlers deliberately and brutally dispossessed Aboriginal people.58 
 
As explained in Chapter Six, one of the justifications promulgated by the law for 
labelling Australia terra nullius was that its existing inhabitants were ‘primitive’ 
and ‘uncivilised’, and that they did not cultivate the land.  In informing the reader 
about terra nullius and dispossession, both McGahan and Miller tell us that this 
construction of Aboriginality was wrong and that, importantly, the law post-Mabo 
is beginning to recognise and acknowledge this.  Andrew McGahan, for example, 
directly tells the reader that the justification underlying terra nullius is 
questionable: 
‘so let me tell you about terra nullius.  Part of the theory is that the 
Aborigines didn’t work the land, that they just left it as they found it, and so 
therefore they had no rights of ownership.  But that isn’t quite true.’59 
This passage conveys two important points.  Firstly, that terra nullius is a lie and, 
secondly, that Aborigines did manage and care for the land.  Although there are no 
specific Aboriginal characters in the novel, the image that is presented of the Kuran 
people by McGahan is of a people who lived in ordered communities, who had a 
strong sense of place and who looked after and managed the land.  We hear Ruth, 
John’s daughter, telling William about the Kuran people.  She tells him, for 
example, of the tools and implements constructed by them that now lay discarded 
                                                 
57 Ibid at 232 – 233. 
58 Ibid at 348 – 349: “For in truth there were no other means than murder by which they might have 
acquired their land.” 
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on the plains,60 and about the way that they managed the land to ensure a 
sustainable food source: 
‘Every summer apparently they burned the plains clean through.  That way 
they had fresh green grass every year, and so more animals would come 
down from the hills for them to hunt.  The Aborigines never let any trees 
grow.  The last thing they wanted was for the plains to be covered in scrub.  
The problem was, they did too good a job.  A hundred and fifty years ago, 
the squatters came along and saw all that beautiful grass.  And they thought, 
wow, won’t this be perfect for cattle and sheep.  And aren’t we lucky that 
all this pasture is just sitting here, with no one using it.  So they marched on 
in.’61 
 
Similarly, Alex Miller conveys an image of the Murris as a sophisticated people 
who lived in ordered societies and who had their own area of country and knew 
how to manage and look after it.  Like McGahan, he directly critiques the way that 
Aboriginal people were constructed in order to legitimate the taking of their land.  
He is particularly contemptuous of the conception of them as a ‘dying race’.  This is 
seen, for example, when Bo, discussing the fate of the Bigges family states, “‘[t]hem 
Bigges turned out to be a vanishing race’”62 and, later, “[t]he Bigges of Ranna 
Station.  A vanished race, Bo had said, slipping the irony in … .”63  The irony is 
clear.64  Miller is informing the reader here that Aborigines did not lose their land 
because they were ‘primitive’, or because they were a ‘vanishing race’, but because 
of an unfair and ill-founded application of terra nullius.  He describes, for example, 
                                                 
60 Ibid at 282 – 283. 
61 Ibid at 277. 
62 Miller, above n.4 at 141. 
63 Ibid at 171. 
64 There are many other examples in relation to the Bigges.  For example: “Them Bigges never knew 
they was gonna die out so quickly.  They thought they was founding a whole new civilization.”  Ibid 
at 174; “‘The Ranna won’t fail you, Tom.  Them old folk had it the springs held good right through 
the biggest droughts.’ .. ‘When you say the old folk, Bo, you mean ... ?’  ‘I mean the Bigges!  Them 
Bigges!  They seen the nineteen-twenty-three drought.  The thirty-five drought.  These springs held 
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how Grandma Rennie, “a traditional Jangga woman”,65 looked after her country 
and taught Bo and the other children to do the same: 
‘They’re still there,’ he said, ‘them highways of the old people.  Grandma 
walked us over them when we was kids. … Up into that wild country, till 
we come out at them stone playgrounds of the old people.  Way up there 
below Bulgonunna mountain.  We was out in the scrubs a week but we 
didn’t take no supplies or swags.  We took nothing.  She showed us how to 
live off the country.  And when we was hungry and complaining she told 
us, This country is your mother.  You wouldn’t even be here if it wasn’t for 
her.  You treat her with respect.  If she got a reason to starve you, you just 
starve and don’t think nothing about it.’66 
In telling their stories, both McGahan and Miller represent Aboriginal people as 
sophisticated people who were unfairly treated by the white law. 
 
This construction of Aboriginality that is presented by McGahan, Miller (and 
Grenville) is important for a number of reasons.  Firstly, these authors are clearly 
informing the reader that in determining that Australia was ‘empty land’, the law 
as it operated at the time of settlement was ill-founded.  Secondly, they tell us that 
the construction of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ that justified the application of terra 
nullius to Australia was wrong.  This is important, because it was this justification 
that conferred legitimacy on white Australia.  As Potter states: 
In order to justify their presence in the land, non-indigenous Australians 
had to imagine their arrival as a “Year Zero” upon which, materially and 
metaphysically, the nation was to be built.67 
The writers discussed here expose the myths that underlie this supposed legitimacy.  
The representation of Aboriginal people presented in Chapter Six show how the 
law supported terra nullus.  In contrast, what we see here is a construction of 
Aboriginality that does not support terra nullius.  That is, these novels inform the 
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reader about a changing law, one which is beginning to acknowledge that the basis 
for Aboriginal dispossession was unjust and inaccurate. 
 
Hearing Aboriginal Voices 
As explained in Chapter Six, one of the consequences of the law’s construction of 
Aboriginal people as ‘primitive’ was that, from the outset of settlement, the law was 
able to marginalise and silence them within the dominant discourse.  As explained 
in Chapter One, this silence is a key indicator of the existence of a différend.  It 
signifies the incommensurabilities that occur when one of the parties does not, or 
cannot, speak in the language of the other.  In the context of stories about 
dispossession, it was the law’s inability or unwillingness to recognise Aboriginal 
perspectives that gave rise to a différend.  The western law was unable to conceive 
of any way of being other than itself.  And so, it could not hear the Aboriginal 
voices that were saying this is our land and this is our culture.  As a positivist, 
totalising institution, it could not accommodate or understand pluralism or 
difference.  This resulted in the silencing of Aboriginal accounts of settlement and 
its consequences, and the legitimation of authorised versions of the founding of 
Australia. 
 
As discussed above, Kate Grenville comments extensively on the history of this 
différend, highlighting that at the time of settlement Aborigines and settlers were 
not speaking in the same idiom, so that they were unable to understand each other.  
Andrew McGahan and Alex Miller also critique the existence of the différend.  In 
The White Earth, for example, it is represented by William looking at an old 
painting in his uncle’s study.  He is able to discern that it is of Kuran House.  But:   173
off in one corner of the painting, so faded as to be almost invisible, was a 
collection of shapes recognisable as people only because of their white eyes 
and teeth.  Black men, looking on from the shadows, their expressions 
impossible to read.  Hostile?  Fearful? 
Phantoms.68 
Black men, unable to speak and unable to be heard by the white men, whose 
“[h]orses grazed on long grass nearby, their riders leaning easily upon their 
backs.”69  The message that McGahan is conveying here is clearly that Aborigines 
are (to the settlers and their law) mere ‘phantoms’; invisible and impossible to 
understand.  Kuran House itself can also be seen as an illustration of the différend.  
Although dilapidated, it is representative of authorised histories that legitimate 
white settlement, and narratives that marginalise and silence difference.  It remains 
a solid structure, a clear, material reminder (in the eyes of the settlers) of a white 
right to the land.  In contrast to the house, there is no material Aboriginal presence 
on the land, just remnants of stone axes, “lying all over the plains, as if they were 
just thrown away like Coke cans.”70  To the settlers they are disposable and 
insignificant, their uses and origins a mystery. 
 
In  Journey to the Stone Country, Alex Miller exposes the différend when 
Annabelle and Bo argue about the importance of preserving Ranna Station.   
Annabelle tells Bo it is “enormously significant”,71 and that “the Burra Charter rates 
early European remains as just as significant as Indigenous remains.”72  Bo disagrees.  
He doesn’t think that the Station is worth preserving.  Annabelle explains that it is 
no different from Bo wanting to preserve “the stone labyrinths at the head of 
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Verbena Creek … The playgrounds of the old people”,73 to which Bo replies, “It’s 
different and you know it’s different.”74  They are unable to understand each other 
at this point.75  As Annabelle reflects: 
Such scraps of knowledge would be utterly foreign to Bo’s mind.  He would 
see no value in them.  If she were pressed, she would not be able to explain 
their value to him for herself.  But the value was there all the same.  She was 
sure of it. … What might there be, she wondered, in Bo’s mind that would 
be just as foreign to her …76 
The scene tells the reader of the conflicting histories of black and white Australia 
and that still we are not fully able to understand each other, that there remain 
things that cannot be explained, and those that should not be explained.  Colonial 
practice such as anthropology, for example, would record aspects of Aboriginal life 
that were not meant to be public.  From a postcolonial perspective we can now 
respect that we are excluded from some Aboriginal knowledge.77  Importantly, 
Miller highlights that this history has led not just to a lack of understanding, but 
also to a silencing of Aboriginal people.  He tells us, through Panya, that “[t]he 
white man never wanna hear nothin about what’s different from him.”78  He also 
describes Annabelle’s visits to: 
country town museums … where there was never any mention of the 
Murris.  And whenever she asked the attendant why this was so he would 
tell her with a fatuous sincerity, Why, Miss, didn’t you know? there were 
no Murris in this part of the country.79 
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76 Ibid at 179 – 180. 
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These works do more, however, than simply highlight the existence of the 
différend.  They inform the reader that it is beginning to be addressed.  This is a 
point of important difference from the works discussed in Chapter Six, in which 
there was no possibility of empowerment, or of a future, for any of the Aboriginal 
characters.  In contrast, in the novels discussed in this chapter there is a possibility 
of a future, in which Aboriginal peoples’ voices, experiences and stories can be 
heard.  In The White Earth, for example, the reader hears these Aboriginal stories 
through Ruth, as she informs us of the way that the Kuran people were 
dispossessed and forcibly removed from their land and taken to Cherbourg.80  We 
are also told through William of an alternative history to the white settler triumph 
told by his uncle.81  While journeying to the water hole he hears voices, telling him 
“Old things still wait. In special places.”82  He senses blood and death and sees 
“deranged things, wrong things” that hail from an Aboriginal past.83  And he   
discovers Aboriginal bones in the dry bed of the water hole.  McGahan is allowing 
here for an Aboriginal account of the brutality of dispossession to be told. 
 
In Journey to the Stone Country we are told of the brutal treatment of Aboriginal 
people by Panya.  She tells how Annabelle’s family murdered the Murris: 
‘They gotta have everything before they’re satisfied.  They leave you with 
nothin.  I know them. … That grandfather of hers hunted us in the 
moonlight.  Louis Beck and his mate George Bigges.’84 
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Beyond the violence, however, she also tells of how Aboriginal people have been 
silenced and treated unjustly, and of how, even now, they are expected to forget 
their past: 
‘All they wanna do is forget.  They want us to believe the bad times is over 
and we all gotta be friends now.  Only they got everything for themselves 
and they not giving it back.  That’s what the white man want now.  Peace 
for himself. … 
… Do they forget their own dead?  Well they don’t do they?  Look at that 
Gallipoli stuff they go on about.  They don’t forget.  So what makes them 
think we’re gonna forget?’85 
Like McGahan, Miller is allowing for an Aboriginal voice to be heard, and is 
reflecting on the way that white discourses of history and law have silenced 
Aboriginal people. 
 
By allowing Aboriginal perspectives to be heard, both of these novels inform the 
reader that the law post-Mabo is beginning to break down the conditions that gave 
rise to the différend.  While change is slow, and the past cannot be recovered, there 
is the possibility of a different future.  In The White Earth the Aboriginal women 
at Cherbourg who have been hidden and silenced for so long can now place a land 
claim over Kuran Station.86  I n  Journey to the Stone Country B o  i s  a b l e  t o  
contemplate reclaiming Verbena Station, once owned by his grandmother.87  Both 
Bo and the women at Cherbourg know that there is now a possibility for them to 
be heard and that they can now embrace a future in which they have legal access to 
their land.  This possibility of a future is seen particularly in The White Earth with 
the property ultimately being left in limbo once, after John McIvor’s death, it 
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passes to William who is unsure what to do with it.  As Ashcroft explains, “William 
leaves the land, the absence of title on the property suggesting that it will revert to 
Aboriginal ownership.”88 
 
The telling of these stories is important.  In allowing Aboriginal perspectives to be 
heard within the dominant discourse there is the possibility for “the wrong to find 
an expression and for the plaintiff to cease being a victim.”89  That is, it is possible 
for the différend to be put into words.  As Trees puts it, it allows “Aboriginal people 
to testify to the wrongs perpetrated against them while they were divested of the 
means to argue.”90  And, in allowing for this testimony to be heard, the “grand 
narratives, which have the goal of legitimating social and political institutions and 
practices, laws, ethics, ways of thinking”91 are challenged.  These novels show that 
western law can now acknowledge that Aboriginal people had their own legal 
system, and that, in previously excluding this possibility, Aborigines were, from the 
outset of settlement, treated unfairly by this law.  In this way, these writers are 
showing how the law can potentially accommodate difference and pluralism.92  The 
possibility of pluralism is a big step forward for a law which, as explained in 
Chapter Two, accommodates and promotes only one unified single law.93 
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Importantly, however, these novels also highlight that listening to Aboriginal 
people is not going to eliminate disagreements and divergences in modern 
Australia.  While the Native Title Act is a mechanism by which Aboriginal people 
can place a land claim, it does not mean that they will always succeed in reclaiming 
land, as shown in Yorta Yorta, for example, where Olney J. declared native title 
was extinguished.94  This reflects the fact that it still requires Aboriginal claims for 
land to be couched within the language and rules of the western legal system.   
Aboriginal people need to speak the language of the Native Title Tribunal in order 
to have their claims heard.  Furthermore, as Miller makes clear in Journey to the 
Stone Country, it does not mean that people will be united in what they want, and 
it does not translate into immediate positive changes.  Disagreement remains, both 
between black and white, and within Aboriginal communities, as evidenced in the 
disagreement between Bo and Les Marra over the damming of the Ranna,95 and 
social marginalisation continues.  Just because the dominant discourse can hear the 
voice of the marginalised does not mean that they cease to be marginalised.  As 
Panya expresses it: 
‘Let’s all be friends, [the white man] says, as if nothing never happened.  
And if some of us don’t wanna be friends we’re in trouble to him and in the 
wrong again.’  She was silent a moment.  ‘There’s gonna be no peace for 
him.  I’m used to being in the wrong so it don’t matter to me.  I give him the 
slip a long time ago and he’s not catchin me now.  We’re different from 
them, boy, and we always gonna be different from them, and you know 
that, Bo Rennie.’96 
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Conclusion 
In Chapters Six and Seven I have focused on stories of dispossession to demonstrate 
how literature can inform the reader about the law.  In particular, the novels 
examined in these chapters show a transition from a pre-Mabo law, that was 
introduced at the time of settlement, which constructed an image of Aborigines as 
‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’ in order to legitimate the white taking of Aboriginal 
land, to a post-Mabo law, which recognises that the application of terra nullius to 
Australia was ill-founded.  Whereas the law pre-Mabo could not acknowledge or 
accommodate difference or pluralism, and so created a différend and silenced those 
who did not conform to its standards, the post-Mabo law has begun to hear these 
voices.  I have argued, in this chapter, that novels written after the Mabo decision 
engage with this change in the law to inform the reader about the way that it has 
acknowledged that Aborigines are not ‘primitive’ or ‘uncivilised’, and that their 
dispossession, without negotiation or compensation, was unjustified.  They further 
demonstrate how the différend is beginning to be addressed, and the injustices 
suffered by Aboriginal people expressed.  And, importantly, they show that 
western law, when challenged, can change.  It is not immutable. 
 
In Part Three I move away from stories of dispossession and focus on some of the 
wider consequences of the application of terra nullius.  In particular, I examine 
how literary texts inform the reader about the discriminatory and restrictive 
legislative regimes to which Aboriginal people were subjected in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and how these regimes show that the law does not treat 
everyone equally.   180
PART THREE 
THE RULE OF LAW 
PREFACE 
Let our laws and policies treat equally all who live in this land, accepting 
difference and fostering tolerance.  Let there be respect for the rule of law 
and the jurisdiction of our courts to administer it.  Those are guarantees of 
Australian values.1 
 
One of the foundations of the modern Australian legal system is the rule of law.  
When England occupied Australia in 1788 the principle of terra nullius mandated 
the introduction of the English legal system and English laws into the fledgling 
colony, to the exclusion of any other pre-existing (Aboriginal) legal systems and 
any other pre-existing (Aboriginal) laws.  One of the pillars of England’s common 
law system was (and is) the rule of law.  And so, with the introduction of the 
English legal system into Australia, the rule of law also became the basis upon 
which this country’s legal system was built.  As a guiding principle, the rule of law 
has many meanings and manifestations, from E.P. Thompson’s “unqualified human 
good”2 to A.V. Dicey’s condemnation of the exercise of discretionary powers.3  
Essentially, however, the rule of law embodies the ideal that the law is an impartial 
and objective arbiter and that everyone is equal before the law.  In this part, I focus 
on this ideal of equality for all before the law. 
 
‘Equality before the law’ is a commonly used phrase.  It represents that no-one is 
above the law, that everyone is subject to the same law and that the law does not 
                                                 
1 Brennan, G. “Australian Values – Some Reflections” (2007) 79(4) Australian Quarterly 7 at 10. 
2 Thompson, E.P. Whigs and Hunters – The Origins of the Black Act (New York: Pantheon) 1975 at 
266. 
3 Dicey, A.V Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10th ed. (London: Macmillan) 
1960.  First published in 1885.  Dicey’s theory of the rule of law is discussed in Chapter Eight.   181
discriminate between those who come before it.  Many critical theorists, however, 
would argue that this is not the case.  They contend that issues of gender, race or 
culture, for example, mean that not all people are treated equally by the law, that 
the law is neither impartial nor objective, and that it is this unequal operation of 
the law that leads to the marginalisation of particular groups, such as Aborigines, 
refugees and other cultural minorities, by the law and by society generally.4  That 
is, those who are perceived as different, or constructed as ‘other’, do not always 
benefit from this ideal of equality.  As Sir Gerard Brennan has noted, for example, 
the White Australia policy, which operated in this country until the late 1960’s, 
prevented: 
people of Asian or African ethnicity [from becoming] the beneficiaries of 
Australian egalitarianism.  And the original Australians were not even 
counted in reckoning the numbers of people of the Commonwealth before 
the 1967 referendum. … 
These exclusions were symptomatic of a negative Australian value: fear of 
the other, the different, the unfamiliar.5 
 
I argue in this part that the law is neither objective nor impartial, and that it does 
not treat everyone equally.  Rather, by representing itself as such, the law 
reinforces its boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and, in so doing, it continues to 
silence, within the dominant domain, the voices of those who are not treated 
equally by it.  I have chosen the law’s treatment of Australia’s Indigenous peoples 
as the specific site for analysing what literature tells us about the rule of law and 
the ideals of objectivity and equality.  In particular, I argue that the texts discussed 
here show how the law has constructed and defined Aborigines in ways that deny 
them equality.  On the settlement of Australia, Aborigines were accorded the status 
                                                 
4 Some of these critical approaches are discussed in Chapter Eight. 
5 Above n.1 at 7 – 8.   182
of British subjects.  Despite this, the law constructed them as ‘other’, and excluded 
them from full and equal access to its benefits and protections, yet included them 
within its controls and restrictions.  It effectively denied them a voice, within the 
dominant discourse, with which to challenge the injustices, discrimination and 
inequalities to which they were subjected.  In Part Two of this work, these issues 
were examined in relation to terra nullius and the dispossession of Aboriginal 
people.  In Part Three, I focus on the deliberate discrimination of Aboriginal people 
as contained in successive government policies and legislation.  As highlighted in 
the texts discussed, the law’s failure to treat Aboriginal Australians equally with 
non-Aboriginal Australians and the law’s systematic discrimination of Aboriginal 
people has contributed to their continued marginalisation, exclusion and 
discrimination at the level of both the legal and the social. 
 
The texts on which I focus in this part are Kim Scott’s Benang, Sally Morgan’s My 
Place, Alex Miller’s Landscape of Farewell and Gail Jones’s Sorry.6  These texts 
provide crucial insight into the operation of the rule of law.  They reveal not only 
the way that successive governments enacted discriminatory laws that had (and 
continue to have) considerable (negative) impact on the lives of Aboriginal people, 
but that the law constructed Aboriginality in a way which enabled it to treat 
Aborigines differently to non-indigenous Australians.  They expose how it 
excluded Aborigines from many of its rights and protections, and, importantly, that 
it created a différend in denying those treated unequally by it the ability or the 
right to challenge it within the dominant discourse.  Importantly, however, these 
                                                 
6 Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000; Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: 
Fremantle Arts Centres Press) 1988; Miller, A. Landscape of Farewell (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & 
Unwin) 2007; Jones, G. Sorry (NSW: Vintage Books) 2007.   183
texts also hold out a hope for the future and for a law that does treat Aboriginal 
people equally with non-indigenous Australians. 
 
In Chapter Eight, I provide a discussion of the rule of law.  I explain what the rule 
of law means, how it is incorporated into Australian law and how it is perceived as 
fundamental to the Australian legal system.  I also analyse in more depth the ideal 
of equality before the law.  In Chapter Nine, I examine the legislative restrictions 
that have been imposed on the lives of Aboriginal people since settlement.  In 
particular, I critique the operation of the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA) and the impact 
that this legislation and its underlying policies has had (and continues to have) on 
the lives of Aboriginal people living in Western Australia.  In Chapter Ten, I focus 
on the importance of apologising to Aboriginal people for the way that our law has 
(mis)treated them, and on reconciliation and the acceptance of difference, or 
‘otherness’, as a precursor to the realisation of equality for Aboriginal people.   184
CHAPTER EIGHT 
“ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL 
THAN OTHERS”
1: EQUALITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Introduction 
There is currently a lot of discussion in Australia about Australian values.  A new 
citizenship test requires those wishing to become Australian to subscribe to the 
‘core values’ of our society,2 and to demonstrate knowledge of these values before 
being granted citizenship.3  Naturally, this has led to considerable debate about 
what these values are and what they encompass.  They seem to refer variously to 
such vague notions as ‘fair go’ and ‘mateship’, through to more specific concepts 
such as the rule of law.  Members of both the High Court and the Federal Court of 
Australia have emphasised the latter, commenting that it is the rule of law that is 
the core value in a liberal democracy.4  The implication is a sense of egalitarianism, 
equality for all.  Whether or not those such as Dr. Haneef or Robert Jovicic would 
believe this rhetoric is perhaps questionable.  They did not seem to be treated 
impartially by the law, nor did they appear to be accorded the benefit of being 
given a ‘fair go’.  For Jovicic, at least, this was despite having lived in Australia his 
                                                 
1 Orwell, G. Animal Farm (London: Folio Society) 1984 at 99. 
2 Gleeson, M. “A Core Value”.  Speech delivered at the Judicial Conference of Australia Annual 
Colloquium, Canberra, 6 October 2006, <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_6oct06.pdf> at 2. 
Retrieved on 2 July 2008. 
3 One of the practice citizenship test multiple choice questions, for example, is “Which one of these 
values is important to modern Australia?”  The answer is “Everyone has equality of opportunity.”  
<http://www.citizenship.gov.au/test/preparing/index.htm#d> Retrieved on 2 July 2008. 
4 “It may be said that the core value in the citizenship pledge is acceptance of the Rule of Law in a 
liberal democracy.”  Mansfield, J. “How Balanced are the Scales of Justice? The Rule of Law in 
Australia” (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 1 at 2; “The core value … is the rule of law in a 
liberal democracy.” Gleeson, above n.2 at 2.   185
entire life.5  Similarly, Aboriginal Australians have not always enjoyed the benefits 
of these ‘core values’.  They have been castigated as ‘inferior’ by the law, subjected 
to policies of deliberate discrimination and assimilation and denied opportunities 
available to many non-Aboriginal Australians.  As Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, has 
recently stated, for many Aboriginal people “there was no fair go at all.”6 
 
Yet, it is the ideal of equality, as embedded in the rule of law, which underpins our 
society.  It is reiterated in everyday statements such as ‘no-one is above the law’ 
and ‘everyone is subject to the same law’.7  Law in practice, however, does not 
always function ideally.  It does not operate in a social vacuum.  Rather, the law is 
peopled.  It is peopled by judges, lawyers, defendants, plaintiffs, the police and so 
on.  And all of these people come to the law from varying socio-political, economic, 
ethnic and gendered backgrounds, bringing with them differing perspectives, 
attitudes, experiences and skills.  Some will have greater access to lawyers and the 
                                                 
5 Dr. Haneef is an Indian man who was living in Australia on a work visa when he was linked 
(tenuously) to the London bomb attacks on July 7, 2005.  He was detained and deported and had his 
visa revoked by Kevin Andrews, the then Minister for Immigration.  The charges against Dr. Haneef 
were, however, held to be unfounded.  Kevin Andrews nevertheless refused to reinstate Dr. 
Haneef’s visa, a decision which Dr. Haneef successfully challenged in the Federal Court in Minister 
for Immigration and Citizenship v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203.  Earlier this year Senator Chris Evans, 
the current Minister for Immigration announced that he would not be appealing this decision.  
Robert Jovicic has lived in Australia since the age of two.  However, in June 2004 he was deported 
to Serbia on character grounds after being jailed for burglary.  He had never lived in Serbia, could 
not speak the language and ended up living on the streets.  He has now been granted a permanent 
visa to live in Australia.  Neither Haneef nor Jovicic were given the opportunity to present their 
case before being deported. 
6 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 February 2008 at 170   
(Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister). 
7 It is this rhetoric that is used as justification for such activities as invading those countries that are 
deemed not to live by the rule of law, notably Iraq.  As Iain Stewart states: “One thinks: ‘When my 
side wins, the rule of law has prevailed’; this ‘move’ has the same form as an appeal to ‘God’.  Appeal 
to the ‘rule of law’ then becomes a menace in both domestic and foreign (or imperialist) affairs.  The 
very suggestion that there could be an alternative is already defined as irrational.  And whoever 
proposes an alternative is not a friend but an enemy of society.” Stewart, I. “Men of Class: Aristotle, 
Montesquieu and Dicey on ‘Separation of Powers’ and ‘The Rule of Law’.” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law 
Journal 187 at 223.   186
courts, including the language of the law, than others, whose lack of education, 
skills, language and other resources, may restrict such access.  This effects how they 
approach the law, negotiate with the law and, importantly, are treated by the law.  
Despite this, the law nevertheless maintains that it acts without favour.  It 
maintains that it treats everyone equally.8 
 
In this chapter, I examine the ideal of equality that is enshrined in the rule of law.  
In the first section of this chapter, I explain what is meant by the rule of law, 
focusing specifically on A.V. Dicey’s formulation of it, as it is his vision that has 
been the most influential in shaping the (Anglo) Australian legal system, and which 
most clearly embodies the ideal of equality before the law.  In the second section, I 
explore this concept of equality in more depth, focusing particularly on the way 
that the law, while endorsing principles of formal equality, does not always treat 
everyone with substantive equality. 
 
Dicey and the Rule of Law 
The problem with the idea of the rule of law is that it seems to be a juristic 
chocolate factory, a category with no definite content apart from law itself 
and hence open to almost any content.9 
The rule of law is a somewhat elusive concept.  It has been variously described as 
“the bedrock of civilised society”,10 an “assumption that underlies the political 
                                                 
8 Although, as noted below at n.42, it was recommended in the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody that the judiciary undertake cross cultural training as a way of being fairer to 
Aboriginal people in the court system.  This is some acknowledgement that the law, despite its 
insistence that it is impartial and that everyone is treated equally by it, does not always act fairly.  
Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, volume 5, 
1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/rciadic/national/vol5/1.html> at 
1.4.2.  Retrieved on 30 June 2008. 
9 Stewart, above n.7 at 189. 
10 Justice Keith Mason quoted in Mansfield, above n.4 at 2.   187
process that makes our system of government work in practice”,11 “a universal legal 
principle”,12 and the basis of “our freedom to think, to express, to be and to do: … 
[It] is the underlying and underpinning value of our society.”13  While all of these 
statements convey a clear sense that the rule of law is somehow fundamental to the 
operation of our society, none of them actually make clear what is meant by the 
concept.  It means different things to different people and, as noted by Creyke and 
McMillan, its definition will be “influenced by changing political and social 
values.”14  For some, for example, it may literally mean rule of law, as opposed to 
rule of men.  That is, it ensures that our government does not exercise power 
arbitrarily.  In this context, the rule of law has a certain minimum content, one 
which dictates that “all authority is subject to and constrained by law.”15  For 
others, it may emphasise the need to protect individual rights from bureaucratic 
injustice.16  And, for others, it is an assurance that the law will treat all of its 
subjects with objectivity and equality.  Whichever definition is preferred, however, 
it is clear that the rule of law does embody certain revered core values, and that it 
holds universal appeal as the basis of our western legal system.  As Justice French 
expresses it, “[t]he Australian legal system operates on the assumed application of 
the rather numinous concept of the rule of law.”17 
 
                                                 
11 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson quoted in ibid at 2. 
12 Creyke, R. and McMillan, J. Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary 
(Chatswood NSW: Butterworths) 2005 at 234. 
13 Brennan, G. “Australian Values – Some Reflections” (2007) 79(4) Australian Quarterly 7 at 9. 
14 Creyke and McMillan, above n.12 at 237. 
15 Gleeson, M. “Courts and the Rule of Law”.  Speech delivered in the Rule of Law Series at 
Melbourne University on 7 November 2001, <www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm> 
Retrieved on 2 July 2008. 
16 Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10th ed. (London: Macmillan) 
1960. 
17 French, R. “Administrative Law in Australia: Themes and Values” in Groves, M. and Lee, H.P. 
Australian Administrative Law (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press) 2007 at 17.   188
The rule of law underlies not only the Australian legal system but also that of 
England, the United States and Canada.  Dicey, referring to England, where the 
constitution is unwritten, stated that the rule of law is “a characteristic of the 
English constitution.”18  Bryden, writing in the Canadian context, states: 
Dicey’s conception of the rule of law … contained enough of a germ of 
truth to sustain its powerful popular appeal.  There is, after all, something 
rather stirring about the idea that even Prime Minister Mulroney stands on 
no higher legal footing than any of the rest of us. … We didn’t go so far as 
to put Dicey’s name into our Constitution in 1982, but we did state in the 
preamble to the Charter that Canada was founded upon principles that 
recognise the rule of law, right after the part where we recognised the 
supremacy of God.19 
In Australia, the rule of law is not written into our Constitution.  It is, however, 
deemed to underlie its operation.  In Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth Sir Owen Dixon CJ. famously stated that the Australian system of 
government: 
is government under the Constitution and that is an instrument framed in 
accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives 
effect, … others of which are simply assumed.  Among these I think that it 
may fairly be said that the rule of law forms an assumption.20 
Approval of this sentiment has been voiced in a number of judicial decisions; most 
recently in Plaintiff S157 where the High Court stated that “the Australian 
Constitution is framed upon the assumption of the rule of law.”21 
 
One of the best known formulations of the rule of law, and that which has had the 
most influence on the foundation of the Australian state and its constitution, is that 
                                                 
18 Dicey, above n.16 at 187. 
19 Bryden P “Canadian Administrative Law in Transition 1963 – 1988” (1988) University of British 
Columbia Law Review 147 at 159. 
20 (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193. 
21 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 201 CLR 323 at 492 per Gleeson CJ.  See also at 513 
per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ.   189
of A.V. Dicey.22  Demanding governmental compliance with general, objective 
rules designed to limit the scope for discrimination and to safeguard an individual’s 
rights against the arbitrariness of those who govern, Dicey’s rule of law provides a 
reference point or standard against which to assess and measure the legitimacy of 
government decision making and rule making.23  Stipulating that all power has 
legal limits within which it must be exercised, it further provides the basis for 
reviewing discretionary decision making and containing its misuse, by mandating 
the courts to ensure that all decisions comply with these limits.  As such, Dicey’s 
rule of law is an expression of the need to protect individuals from bureaucratic 
injustice, and to uphold democratic legitimacy by ensuring administrative 
compliance with the will of the democratically elected and representative 
parliament. 
 
The principles of Dicey’s rule of law are simple and straightforward.   Its essence is 
that ‘regular law’ as administered by the ‘regular courts’ is supreme and that no 
individual can be subject to the arbitrary exercise of power.  In particular, Dicey 
stipulated three discrete propositions.  Firstly: 
no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods 
except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner 
before the ordinary courts of the land.24 
Secondly, Dicey stated that the rule of law means: 
not only … that no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that 
… every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary 
law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.25 
                                                 
22 Above n.16. 
23 Allen, T.R.S. “Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism” 
(1985) 44(1) Cambridge Law Journal 111. 
24 Dicey, above n.16 at 188. 
25 Ibid at 193.   190
That is, administrative officials are equally as amenable to this regular law as are 
private individuals.  They cannot be exempt from the supervision of the ordinary 
law.  As Dicey explains it: 
In England the idea of legal equality, or of the universal subjection of all 
classes to one law administered by the ordinary courts, has been pushed to 
its utmost limit.  With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a 
constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every 
act done without legal justification as any other citizen.26 
The final principle of Dicey’s rule of law is not so much concerned with content as 
process.  He expresses it as: 
the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the 
general principles of the constitution (as for example the right to personal 
liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us the result of judicial 
decisions determining the rights of private persons, in particular cases 
brought before the courts.27 
That is, it is the courts that are entrusted with maintaining adherence to the 
principles of the rule of law.28 
 
These three principles of Dicey’s rule of law combine to underpin our 
constitutional system in a number of important ways.  Firstly, they encompass the 
theory of the separation of powers.  The separation of powers simply stipulates that 
there are three branches of government, each with its own distinct function, and 
that one institution cannot encroach upon the tasks of another.  It is a system of 
checks and balances designed to ensure that one branch of government does not 
acquire too much power.  Thus, the legislature enacts the law, the executive 
implements these laws and the judiciary interprets or declares the law.29  T h e  
                                                 
26 Ibid at 193. 
27 Ibid at 195. 
28 See Stewart, above n.7 for a discussion of Dicey’s principles. 
29 For a discussion of the separation of powers see Creyke and McMillan, above n.12 at 237 – 239.   191
importance of the separation of powers in the context of Dicey’s rule of law is that 
it provides the basis for judicial review of governmental decision making.30  That is, 
it endorses the role of the judiciary in ensuring that administrative or executive 
decision makers, from government ministers to local councils, do not exceed the 
power which they have been granted and do not make decisions that illegally 
impact on the rights of those individuals subject to their decisions.  In this way, 
Dicey’s rule of law has provided the foundation upon  which much administrative 
law theory has been built.31 
 
More important in the present context, however, than the contribution that Dicey 
has made to administrative law jurisprudence, is the influence that he has exerted 
in shaping general conceptions of the law as objective and impartial, and that 
everyone is equal before the law.  That is, the principles of Dicey’s rule of law 
combine to ensure “equality before the law, so that all members of the community 
… are subject to the same laws and the same judicial tribunals as other citizens.”32  
More specifically, it is the second of Dicey’s principles with its emphasis on all 
classes being equally subject to the same ‘ordinary’ or ‘regular’ law that gives rise to 
conceptions of equality before the law.  As Stewart reiterates: 
                                                 
30 Dicey condemned, for example, the French system of separate courts by which administrative 
decision makers were judged.  The importance of the concept of the supremacy of ordinary law as 
administered by the ordinary courts was, for him, paramount.  He was very distrustful of 
bureaucracy and discretionary decision making.  He viewed the rule of law as a necessary “bridle for 
Leviathan”.  See Arthurs, H. “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1. 
31 This discussion of Dicey draws on research undertaken for Sidebotham, N. Jurisdictional Review: 
An Error of Jurisdiction or Jurisprudence? (Master of Laws Thesis: University of British Columbia) 
1994. 
32 Mansfield, above n.4 at 2.   192
The second meaning or appearance is ‘equality before the law, or the equal 
subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land, administered by the 
ordinary law courts’.33 
It is this understanding, or spirit, of the rule of law that is of most concern to me 
here. 
 
Equality Before the Law? 
Two important questions emerge from this discussion of Dicey’s rule of law.   
Firstly, what is meant by this ideal of equality before the law?  Is it merely rhetoric, 
or is it a standard that is generally achieved in practice?  That is, is equality merely 
something to which the law pays lip service by stating that all people are treated 
equally, or is it a protection that is actively pursued and enforced?  Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, does equality really exist for all people?  Does someone 
who is less educated, has fewer resources and is, for example, Aboriginal or from a 
non-English speaking background, enjoy the same level of ‘equality’ as someone 
who is white, well educated and well resourced?  The policies of assimilation and 
discrimination pursued by the law against Aboriginal people in Australia and the 
continuing consequences of these measures would suggest not.  As explained 
earlier,34 the rule of law became part of Australian law at the time of settlement.  As 
such, it was something which all British subjects enjoyed the benefits of.  This 
should have included Aboriginal people who, on settlement, were deemed to be 
British subjects.  They were not, however, treated equally by or before the law.  
Rather, they were singled out for deliberately discriminatory treatment.  They 
were subjected to policies of protection, assimilation and absorption, which sought 
to ensure that all traces of Aboriginality (both physical and cultural) would 
                                                 
33 Stewart, above n.7 at 205. 
34 See Preface to Part Three.   193
ultimately be removed from the population.  They were denied, for example, equal 
rights of employment, freedom of movement, and access to education.35  Law (and 
society) treated them as undeserving of equality with non-Aboriginal Australians. 
 
Equality, like the rule of law itself, is an elusive concept that can prove difficult to 
define.  It can be interpreted in a variety of ways and measured against a variety of 
standards.  Formally, at least, Australia is a country in which everyone is deemed to 
be equal.  Anti-discrimination legislation at state and federal levels, aimed at 
protecting individuals from discrimination and unequal treatment, mandates that 
no-one can be discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, culture, age, 
disability and so on.36  These measures combine to provide formal guarantees of an 
individual’s rights.  If I am denied employment because I am a woman I can seek 
redress via the relevant provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act.  If someone is 
denied opportunities because they have a disability they can appeal to the 
Disability Discrimination Commissioner. 
 
Standards of formal equality do not, however, always ensure that people are, in 
substance, treated equally.  They create a legal level playing field and place 
                                                 
35 These issues are highlighted in Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 
1988 and Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000.  These novels are 
discussed in Chapter Nine. 
36 These protections are contained in, for example, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); the  
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).  The Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) sets up the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission which protects equality by acting against discrimination, which is defined 
in s3(1) as “any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction or social origin that has the effect of nullifying or impairing 
equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation.”  There are similar enactments  
at state level.  For example, the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT); the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW); the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld); the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA); the Equal 
Opportunity Act 1985 (Vic); the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT); the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).   194
everyone at the same starting position making everyone “formally equal by 
definition and standardisation.”37  Yet, people are not the same, and in insisting 
“that people are essentially the same, [formal equality] does not give sufficient 
recognition to actually existing differences.”38  There are two points of importance 
here.  Firstly, equality, in this sense, fails to recognise that we do not all start from 
the same position.  Indigenous Australians, for example, living in remote areas of 
Australia are not in the same position as wealthy, non-indigenous Australians 
living in affluent areas of the city.39  They begin from a different position 
economically, culturally, educationally, and so on.  As Davies explains: 
many [indigenous people] suffer social, political and economic disadvantage.  
The attempt to see all people as ideally equal masks the fact that people are 
not equal in their material conditions.40 
These are differences that the law neither recognises nor accommodates, and 
notions of formal equality will not resolve these differences, or ensure that equality 
is achieved in a substantive sense.  As Davies states: 
Merely enshrining a principle of equality in the law will not solve the much 
more profound inequalities entrenched in cultural perceptions, economic 
status, and biological difference.41 
Sandra Berns makes a similar point: 
If we are to guarantee to individuals the equal protection of the law we 
must ensure that individuals are equally placed before it, not simply in a 
formal sense, but in the context of their lives as a whole.42 
                                                 
37 Stewart, above n.7 at 221. 
38 Davies, M. Asking the Law Question 2nd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002 at 287. 
39 Neither are they equal, of course, to wealthy or well resourced Indigenous people or those who 
are well educated such as lawyers, academics and other professionals. 
40 Above n.38 at 287. 
41 Ibid at 219. 
42 Berns, S. Concise Jurisprudence (New South Wales: Federation Press) 1993 at 16.  Some attempt to 
address this in relation to the treatment of Aboriginal people is evidenced in recommendations 96, 
97, 104 and 107 of Johnston, above n.8.  These recommendations suggest that magistrates and judges 
need to do cross cultural training so that they are more aware of the position of Aboriginal people 
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Secondly, in defining and identifying everyone to be the same, the law denies 
‘otherness’.  That is, it neither recognises, nor accommodates, difference, not in the 
sense of material conditions that may prevent the realisation of equality, but in 
terms of differing ways of understanding and relating to the law and to society.  As 
explained in Chapter Two, Australia is a plural society.  There exist, in this country, 
(at least) two different conceptions of law, understandings of law, and legal 
systems.  Yet only one of these, that of the colonisers, is accorded full recognition 
and priority, and this law, as explained in Chapter Two, does not accommodate 
difference.  Rather, it promotes singularity and unity.  It has, accordingly, sought to 
make everyone the same, and so has denied people’s differences.  It is this emphasis 
on uniformity and sameness that has led to such brutal and inhumane practices as 
the forced removal of Aboriginal children from their families.  In this way, the 
denial of ‘otherness’ causes the lack of equality some Aboriginal people 
experience.43 
 
The difficulties in defining, understanding and measuring equality are particularly 
highlighted by a number of critical theorists.  Feminist theorists, for example, have 
argued that our legal system is a masculine system, so that equality, as a standard 
defined and interpreted within this masculine system, will not necessarily achieve 
equality for women.  As Davies explains: 
if women are expected to be like men in order to be treated equally, if 
women will only be treated equally insofar as we are like men, equality 
itself can be seen to be a repressive ideal.  An “equality” defined according 
to male standards will only benefit women who can or do conform to that 
standard.44 
                                                 
43 This is discussed more fully in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
44 Above n.38 at 219.  See, for example, Graycar, R and Morgan, J. The Hidden Gender of Law 
(Sydney: Federation Press) 1990.   196
Similarly, our legal system is a western (colonial) system.  Within this system 
equality is linked to the notions of racial superiority that underpinned colonial 
expansion.45  T h a t  i s ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  s o c i al Darwinism which postulated that 
“stronger races would inevitably exterminate weaker races”,46 meant that colonised 
people were, by definition, unequal.  Equality was (and is) defined, and interpreted, 
according to the standards of the dominant (colonial) culture, and so does not 
always benefit the colonised who do not conform to these standards. 
 
In the context of this work, these deficiencies and shortcomings are clearly 
exposed.  In Part Two, one of the issues that I discussed was the recognition of 
native title rights in Mabo.47  While this case does recognise Aboriginal rights to 
land, and so appears to accord equality to Aboriginal peoples’ interests, it is not 
about equality.  It does not recognise Aboriginal ownership of land.  It simply 
allows for some (limited) rights to exist within the common law system, and these 
limited rights are not accorded the same status, or level of protection, as non-native 
title rights.  They are susceptible to extinguishment and are subject to a raft of 
regulations and restrictions contained in the Native Title Act, which are not 
imposed on non-native title interests.  As stated by Davies: 
Under current law in Australia property in land derived from white law is 
legally recognised and protected far more extensively than “native title”.  
There is no equal property where one type is valued far above another.48 
 
In this part, I argue that the discourse of equality has legitimated and justified the 
law’s mistreatment and discrimination of Aboriginal people.  This discourse has 
                                                 
45 Racial superiority as a justification for colonial expansion was discussed in Chapter Four. 
46 Davies, above n.38 at 263. 
47 Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
48 Above n.38 at 286.   197
been used by the law to construct Aborigines as ‘other’ and ‘inferior’, and, under 
the guise of making them the same as non-Aboriginal Australians and ensuring that 
they ultimately received the same opportunities and privileges, it has sought to 
assimilate them into dominant, mainstream Australia.  The reality of this supposed 
equality was that Aboriginal people were subject to numerous restrictions on their 
rights and freedoms,49 and suffered the forced removal of their children in ways 
that “would have rarely, if ever, happened to Anglo-Australian children.”50  As 
McRae et al. summarise: 
In the assimilation / integration period … the pursuit of equality was 
understood to mean identical treatment for all.  This approach … 
perpetuated devastating inequalities and suffering … It led, for example, to 
the removal of Aboriginal children.51 
 
This lack of equality experienced by Aboriginal people has been further 
exacerbated by their inability to challenge these injustices.  That is, the lack of 
equality was an incommensurability within the law that gave rise to a différend.  
Aboriginal people were not heard within the dominant discourse.  They were 
denied the opportunity to challenge their mistreatment.  They were silenced.  As 
Rodan explains: 
the notion that everyone is equal in the eyes of the law … is legitimated by 
the fact that every citizen has access to the law through private law firms or 
                                                 
49 Some of these restrictions are discussed in Chapter Nine. 
50 Rodan, D. Identity and Justice: Conflicts, Contradictions and Contingencies (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter 
Lang) 2004 at 88. 
51 McRae, H., Nettheim, G., Beacroft, L. and McNamara, L. Indigenous Legal Issues: Commentary 
and Materials 3rd ed. (New South Wales: Lawbook Co.) 2003 at 437.  Duncan Ivison makes a similar 
point.  “the Aboriginal peoples of … Australia have been treated as less than equal citizens, however 
e q u a l  c i t i z e n s h i p  i s  d e f i n e d .   B u t  t h e y  h a v e  a l so often experienced injustice at the hands of 
apparently well-intentioned policies and programs justified in the name of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination.  Ideas of equal citizenship, for example, have been used to justify forms of 
coercive assimilation.”  Ivison, D. Postcolonial Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
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legal aid.  Yet, if citizens do not speak the language that is party to legal 
discourse within the courts, they cannot be heard.52 
Equality in this sense operates to exclude.  And, as explained in Chapter One, these 
exclusions carry through to the social, impacting on the everyday and reinforcing 
the very positioning that led to the exclusions in the first place.  I argue in this part 
that the law needs to focus on substantive rather than formal equality.  That is, it 
needs to acknowledge and accommodate people’s differences, and so focus on 
achieving actual equality.  As stated by Cameron Stewart: 
the rule of law has … been said to encompass a wider notion of equality, 
such as equality of concern and respect.  Viewed in this fashion legal 
equality requires not only that like cases should be treated alike but that 
different cases should be treated differently.53 
These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that one of the fundamental ‘values’ of Australian law 
is equality under the rule of law.  This is not a purely theoretical or academic 
concern.  Whether or not someone enjoys such equality has considerable impact on 
them at many levels, not just the legal.  It can determine their educational, 
employment and other such opportunities, and impact on their health, life 
expectancy and so on.  Yet despite this, and despite the apparent importance of 
equality as a principle in our system of law, equality is not something which has 
been experienced by Aboriginal Australians.  Rather, the law has singled them out 
for discriminatory treatment, and denied them many rights, opportunities and 
privileges, enjoyed by non-Aboriginal people.  In the following chapters, I focus 
                                                 
52 Above n.50 at 89. 
53 Stewart, C. “The Rule of Law and the Tinkerbell Effect: Theoretical Considerations, Criticisms 
and Justifications for the Rule of Law” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 135 at 137.   199
specifically on the ways in which the law has denied Aboriginal people equality, 
and on how this can potentially be addressed, and equality realised.   200
CHAPTER NINE 
“THESE STORIES CRY OUT TO BE HEARD”
1: MY PLACE, BENANG AND 
THE 1905 ABORIGINES ACT 
 
Introduction 
‘It made such a difference,’ he said, ‘that legislation.’ … ‘You could be 
moved anywhere, told who to marry, where to live, had to get a permit to 
work, not allowed to drink or vote …’  Uncle Will was on a roll.  ‘It 
separated us all.’2 
When the English occupied Australia in 1788, bringing with them their own legal 
system and their own laws, to the exclusion of all others, they conferred upon 
themselves the right to legislate about every aspect of life in the new colony.   
Subsequent legislation did not only regulate the lives of the settlers, however.   
Much of it related to Aborigines.  A variety of policies from segregation and 
protection, to integration and assimilation, motivated the enactment of a raft of 
legislative measures aimed at controlling the movement and activities of Aboriginal 
people.  Arguably Aborigines, as British subjects, if not yet Australian citizens,3 
became the most legislated about people in the country.4  And much of this 
legislation was discriminatory, denying them the rights and protections enjoyed by 
non-indigenous Australians. 
 
In this chapter, I analyse stories about the legislative regulation of the lives of 
Aboriginal people.  In particular, I examine how these stories expose the way that 
                                                 
1 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 February 2008 at 169   
(Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister). 
2 Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000 at 217 – 218.  First published in 
1999. 
3 Aboriginal people were not included within the Australian Constitution until 1967. 
4 Trees, K. Narrative and Co-existence: Mediating Between Indigenous and Non-indigenous Stories 
(Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch University) 1998 at 177.   201
the law does not treat everyone equally.  As explained in Chapter Eight, one of the 
principles of English law introduced into Australia at the time of settlement was 
the rule of law, and its assertion that everyone is equal before the law.  I argue that 
from the beginning of colonisation Aboriginal people did not benefit from this 
equality.  Rather, the discourse of equality was used by the law to justify the 
deliberate discrimination of Aboriginal people. 
 
The texts I focus on in this chapter are Kim Scott’s Benang and Sally Morgan’s My 
Place.5  These are both postcolonial works that allow for Aboriginal stories and 
perspectives to be told, and inform about the continuing long-term consequences 
of the law’s discriminatory treatment of Aboriginal people.  Both novels critique 
the way in which the law defined and constructed Aboriginality, denied Aboriginal 
people equality and silenced Aboriginal voices within the public domain. 
 
I begin this chapter by providing an overview of the legislation governing the lives 
of Aboriginal people in Western Australia.  While legislation regulating Aboriginal 
life was introduced into all states in Australia, my focus in this chapter is on 
Western Australia, and the 1905 Aborigines Act.6  This Act restricted and 
controlled the lives of Aboriginal people in Western Australia until 1963, when all 
Aboriginal and Native Welfare Acts were finally repealed.7  This discussion is not 
intended as a comprehensive analysis of the legislation, but as providing sufficient 
                                                 
5 S c o t t ,  a b o v e  n . 2 ;  M o r g a n  S .  My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1988.  First 
published 1987. 
6 Other legislation includes the Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 
(Qld);  Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW); Northern Territory Aboriginals Act 1910 (SA); 
Aborigines Act 1911 (SA); Cape Barron Island Reserve Act 1912 (Tas); Aborigines Protection Act 
1886 (Vic); Aborigines Act 1890 (Vic). 
7 They were repealed by the Native Welfare Act 1963 (WA).   202
background against which the two novels discussed here can be read.8  I n  t h e  
second section of this chapter, I examine how Benang and My Place expose the 
way in which this legislation constructed Aboriginality, and in the third section, I 
discuss the way in which it denied Aboriginal people equality.  I examine the way 
in which Aboriginal people were silenced and denied the right or the ability to 
object, within the dominant discourse, to the injustices imposed upon them by the 
legislation, and the impact that this has had (and continues to have) on Aboriginal 
people in Western Australia. 
  
The 1905 Aborigines Act (WA): An Overview 
Legislative control of the lives of Aboriginal people in Western Australia began in 
the 1840’s with the introduction of laws concerned primarily with restricting the 
presence of Aborigines in townships and limiting their access to alcohol.9  More far 
reaching regulation began to be introduced in the latter part of the century with 
the enactment of the 1886 Aborigines Protection Act and the 1897 Aborigines 
Act.10  It was, however, the 1905 Aborigines Act which initiated the repressive and 
discriminatory regime which continues to impact on Aboriginal people in Western 
Australia today.11  The ambit of this Act was extensive.  It regulated virtually every 
                                                 
8 For a comprehensive discussion of the legislation see Haebich, A. For Their Own Good: Aborigines 
and Government in the Southwest of Western Australia (Nedlands: University of Western Australia 
Press) 1988. 
9 Ibid at 47.  Aborigines were first mentioned in 1841 legislation establishing a prison for Aboriginal 
people on Rottnest Island.  Trees, above n.4 at 178. 
10 The 1886 Act imposed restrictions on, for example, the employment of Aborigines, and stipulated 
that the Aborigines Protection Board, established under the Act, ensure the protection and welfare 
of all Aboriginal people.  The 1897 Act granted the Western Australian government the power to 
regulate Aboriginal affairs.  Previously this power had resided in the United Kingdom.  The Act 
established the Aborigines Department and instructed it to “distribute relief (rations, blankets and 
clothing) and medical care to needy Aborigines; manage Aboriginal reserves; provide for the 
education and maintenance of Aboriginal children; protect Aborigines from injustice and fraud; and 
exercise a general supervision over all matters affecting Aborigines in the state.”  Ibid at 53. 
11 This Act was to some extent modelled on the Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of 
Opium Act 1897 (Qld).  This Act is referred to McGahan, A. The White Earth (Crow’s Nest NSW:   203
aspect of the lives of Aboriginal people, and conferred sweeping powers on 
government officials to secure its implementation.  It authorised the removal of 
Aboriginal people from their land to reserves, and restricted their right of 
movement from these reserves.  It made the Chief Protector of Aborigines the legal 
guardian of all Aboriginal and ‘half-caste’ children to the age of sixteen, and 
authorised the removal of Aboriginal children from their families to missions or 
Aboriginal institutions where they were to be trained as ‘useful citizens’.12  I t  
further provided for the Chief Protector to manage the finances or property of 
Aborigines, either with or without their permission, controlled the employment of 
Aborigines, their access to firearms, who they could marry, and allowed for their 
arrest without a warrant.13  It defined who was, and was not, Aboriginal and 
controlled all contact that Aboriginal people had with the wider community.  As 
summarised by Haebich, it: 
laid the basis for the development of repressive and coercive state control 
over the state’s Aboriginal population.  It lumped a broad range of disparate 
persons together in a special legal category based on vague notions of 
Aboriginal ancestry and lifestyle.  It set up the necessary bureaucratic and 
legal mechanisms to control all their contacts with the wider community, to 
enforce the assimilation of their children and to determine the most 
personal aspects of their lives.14 
Unless exempt from the provisions of the Act, an exemption which was subject to 
revocation by the Minister, Aboriginal people required permission to do virtually 
anything. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Allen & Unwin) 2005 and Miller, A. Journey to the Stone Country (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & 
Unwin) 2003.  These works are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
12 Although initially the Act did not permit for the removal of children without the permission of 
their parents.  This was to come later with amendments in the Aborigines Act Amendment Act 
1911 (WA), section 3. 
13 Haebich, above n.8 at 83 – 89. 
14 Ibid at 83.   204
The enactment of these measures was motivated by paternalistic and colonialist 
policies of protection, assimilation and absorption.  Protection policies were, as 
explained by Haebich: 
predicated on the pseudo-scientific theory of Social Darwinism which 
dominated settler attitudes to Aborigines from the 1870’s and well into [the 
twentieth] century.  Social Darwinism postulated that Aborigines were the 
least evolved race in the world and as such they were doomed to pass away. 
… Such beliefs absolved the colonists from taking firm action to halt the 
decline in the Aboriginal population; instead, Aborigines were simply given 
enough to make their ‘passing’ as ‘comfortable’ as possible.15 
Protection simply meant easing “the plight of the dwindling Aboriginal population 
in settled areas.”16  They were to be segregated from the rest of the population and 
protected and cared for until their inexorable demise.  It soon became apparent, 
however, that the theories of social Darwinism that justified protection policies 
were unfounded.    Aboriginal people were not ‘dying out’ and the number of ‘half-
castes’ was increasing.  And so a new concern emerged.  That of how to manage the 
threat to the white population posed by this increasing number of people of mixed 
origin.  The response was a policy shift from protection to assimilation.   
Assimilation meant the integration of Aboriginal people into white society.  Or, 
more accurately, it sought to make everyone the same, denying Aboriginal people 
their identity and their difference.  It was both social and biological.  Social 
integration would ensure that white culture would predominate, eliminating that 
of the Indigenous population, while biological absorption would secure the 
disappearance of all physical traces of Aboriginality. 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid at 47 – 48.  The influence of theories of social Darwinism on colonialism is discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
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The 1905 Act reflected both of these policies.  It advocated segregation, satisfying 
those who disliked the visible presence of Aborigines and allowing for their ‘care’ 
and ‘protection’ while they ‘died out’.17  At the same time, it promoted the 
assimilation and integration of those Aborigines with sufficient non-Aboriginal 
(white) blood into mainstream society, through the removal of Aboriginal children 
from their families, ensuring that ultimately the Aboriginal ‘race’ would be 
absorbed into the white population and disappear.  It was this policy of assimilation 
that gained precedence throughout the first half of the twentieth century.   
Amendments to the 1905 Act conferred on the Chief Protector the right to remove 
illegitimate and ‘half-caste’ children from their families “to the exclusion of the 
rights of the mother”.18  Further amendments enacted in 1936 widened the 
definition of persons falling under the Act, extended the guardianship powers of 
the Commissioner, who replaced the Chief Protector, to every child to the age of 
twenty-one, made sexual contact between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people 
unlawful, and empowered the Commissioner to authorise any person to examine a 
‘native’, and to stop traditional Aboriginal practices.19  The focus of these 
amendments was to ensure that ‘half-caste’ children would be absorbed into 
mainstream society.  As A.O. Neville, the Chief Protector of Aborigines in Western 
Australia from 1915 to 1940, stated: 
The opinion held by Western Australian authorities is that the problem of 
the native race, including half-castes, should be dealt with in a long range 
plan. … Western Australia has gone further in the development of such a 
long range policy than any other State, by accepting the view that 
                                                 
17 For example, the Preamble to the Act states that it is “An Act to make provision for the better 
protection and care of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Western Australia.” 
18 Aborigines Act Amendment Act 1911 (WA) section 3. 
19 Trees, above n.4 at 192.  These amendments were contained in the Native Administration Act 
1936 (WA) sections 16 and 66.   206
ultimately the natives must be absorbed into the white population of 
Australia.20 
By 1951 there was consensus between all states that assimilation was the best 
policy to be pursued.  The federal Minister of Territories, Paul Hasluck, stated that 
this would allow Aboriginal people to: 
attain the same manner of living as other Australians and live as members of 
a single Australian community enjoying the same rights and privileges, 
accepting the same responsibilities, observing the same customs and 
influenced by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties as other Australians.21 
Not until 1963 did the legislative regime in Western Australia begin to be 
dismantled, when the Commissioner ceased to be the guardian of Aboriginal 
children and their removal without compliance with general child welfare laws 
was no longer allowed.22 
 
As reflected in Hasluck’s statement, there was, underlying assimilation and 
integration policies, a conception that all Australians should be treated equally and 
enjoy the same rights and opportunities.  However, assimilation did not achieve 
equality for Aboriginal people.  Rather, it instituted a discriminatory regime that 
ensured they were not treated equally with non-Aboriginal Australians and, at the 
hands of those such as A.O. Neville, it became nothing more than a tool of social 
engineering, a mechanism by which biological absorption could be pursued.23  
People were defined by reference to the colour of their skin and the degree of their 
                                                 
20 Quoted in ibid at 193. 
21 Quoted in ibid at 196. 
22 Ibid at 200.  The removal of children then had to comply with the provisions of the Child Welfare 
Act 1 9 4 7  ( W A ) ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e s e  c h i l d  w e l f a r e  l a w s  w e r e  o f t e n  u s e d  m o r e  f r e e l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
Aboriginal children.  Also as Kevin Rudd stated in the apology, “let us remember the fact that the 
forced removal of Aboriginal children was happening as late as the early 1970’s.  The 1970’s is not 
exactly a point in remote antiquity.  There are still serving members of this parliament who were 
first elected to this place in the early 1970’s.  It is well within the adult memory span of many of us.”  
Above n.1 at 169 – 170. 
23 Jacobs, P. Mister Neville, a biography (Fremantle: Fremantle Art Centre Press) 1990 writes of the 
good that Neville did, such as keeping good records.   207
Aboriginal ancestry.  In this way, the discourses of equality and assimilation 
enabled and justified the unequal and discriminatory treatment of Aboriginal 
people under the 1905 Act and resulted in such inhumane practices as the removal 
of Aboriginal children from their families.  The consequences of such measures are 
devastating.  As recounted in Telling Our Story and Bringing Them Home,24 the 
legislative regulation of the lives of Aboriginal people had consequences far beyond 
the legal, and these consequences continue to be felt by Aboriginal people in 
Western Australia today. 
 
“Tell them you’re Indian”
 25: Defining Aboriginality 
In My Place, Gladys instructs Sally to tell the children at school that she’s Indian: 
‘Come on, Mum, what are we?’ 
  ‘What do the kids at school say?’ 
  ‘Anything.  Italian, Greek, Indian.’ 
  ‘Tell them you’re Indian.’ 
I got really excited, then.  ‘Are we really?  Indian!’  It sounded so exotic.  
‘When did we come here?’ I added. 
‘A long time ago,’ Mum replied.  ‘Now, no more questions.  You just tell 
them you’re Indian.’26 
Gladys is scared of being Aboriginal, at least within the public domain, and Sally 
and her siblings are kept unaware of their Aboriginality.  Gladys’s fear and shame 
at being Aboriginal is reinforced by her mother, Daisy, who also insists that they 
not tell anyone that they are Aboriginal.27  Later, Sally’s sister Jill says to her: 
                                                 
24  B r i n g i n g  T h e m  H o m e :  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  I n quiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission) 1997; Telling Our Story: A Report by the Aboriginal Legal Service of WA (Inc) on the 
Removal of Aboriginal Children from their Families in WA (Perth: Aboriginal Legal Service of WA 
(Inc)) 1995. 
25 Morgan, above n.5 at 45. 
26 Ibid at 45. 
27 “Mum … told me I must never tell anyone what I was.  She made me really frightened.  I think 
that was when I started wishing I was something different.”  Ibid at 349.   208
  ‘You know what we are, don’t you?’ 
 ‘No,  what?’ 
  ‘Boongs, we’re boongs!’  I could see Jill was unhappy with the idea. 
It took a few minutes before I summoned up enough courage to say, ‘What’s 
a boong?’ 
‘A boong.  You know, Aboriginal.  God, of all things, we’re Aboriginal!’ 
‘Oh.’  I suddenly understood.  There was a great deal of social stigma 
attached to being Aboriginal at our school. 
‘I can’t believe you’ve never heard the word boong,’ she muttered in disgust.  
‘Haven’t you ever listened to the kids at school?  If they want to run you 
down, they say, “Aah, ya just a boong.”’28 
Daisy and Gladys’s fear and shame, and the stereotyping and denigration of 
Aborigines as ‘boongs’ recounted by Jill, result from the reality of being Aboriginal 
under the 1905 Act, and, perhaps more importantly, the knowledge of 
Aboriginality constructed and promoted by this legislation.29 
 
It was explained in Chapter One how narratives are a means of producing 
knowledge.  They may be personal, as in autobiographical texts or reports such as 
Bringing Them Home and Telling Our Story,30 literary, such as the texts discussed 
in this work, or official, such as the law.  Legislation is part of the official narrative 
of law.  It provides an official story, or framework, which structures perspectives 
of, and creates knowledge about, the subject matter of the legislation.  The 1905 
Act is part of this official narrative of law.  It contributed to the creation of 
knowledge about Aboriginal people, by constructing them as ‘primitive’, 
‘uncivilised’ and ‘a dying race’.  This official representation shaped the way in 
which Aboriginal people were (and are) perceived and portrayed by the wider, 
non-indigenous, community.  As Trees explains: 
                                                 
28 Ibid at 121. 
29 This shame is also evident in Scott, above n.2. 
30 Above n.24.  See also, for example, Nannup, A., Marsh, L. and Kinnane, S. When the Pelican 
Laughed (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1992 and Ward, G.Wandering Girl (Broome: 
Magabala Books) 1987.   209
While England, the State and then the Commonwealth were regulating the 
lives of Aboriginal people, to the point of determining who was Aboriginal, 
public ‘knowledge’ about Aborigines was being constructed.  This 
knowledge paralleled government regulation.  Aboriginal people were 
constructed as ‘primitive’, ‘uneducated’, ‘without law or religion’, 
‘promiscuous’, ‘unfit parents’, and ‘needing to be constrained’.  Legislation 
… and public opinion correlated to the objectification, subjugation and 
construction of Aboriginal identity.31 
In this way, the 1905 Act is part of the discourse of Aboriginalism discussed in 
Chapter Four.  Aboriginalism, as explained there, is a way of informing our 
knowledge about Aboriginal people.  In regulating the lives of Aboriginal people, 
this Act created ‘truths’ about them and constructed an Aboriginal identity, which 
shaped the community’s knowledge of Aboriginality. 
 
One of the ways in which the legislation created this knowledge and identity was 
through its various definitions of ‘Aboriginal’ and designation of those who fell 
within its jurisdiction.  The Act applied to all ‘Aboriginal natives’, defined as “all 
persons of the full descent and those with one Aboriginal parent and who lived 
with Aborigines”.32  It also applied to “any ‘half-caste’ child or any ‘half-caste’ adult 
married to an ‘Aboriginal native’.”33  Under this regime people were classified as 
‘full blood’, ‘half-caste’, ‘quadroon’ and ‘octoroon’, and, depending on how they 
were defined and categorised, were denied or granted various rights, freedoms and 
opportunities.34  Not only did the Act categorise people according to the degree of 
their Aboriginal ancestry, it also defined Aboriginal people to the exclusion of their 
tribal names and identities.  They were not identified as Yinjibarndi, or Bunjima, or 
                                                 
31 Trees, above n.4 at 177. 
32 Haebich, above n.8 at 88. 
33 Ibid at 88. 
34 They were denied such rights as welfare, invalid and old age pensions and maternity allowance.  
These had been introduced by the federal government in 1908 and 1912 respectively.  Ibid at 98.   210
Nyoongar, for example.35  They were labelled simply as ‘Aboriginal natives’.  In this 
way, the official narrative of law denied the identity of specific Aboriginal groups, 
creating, in their place, a generic, homogenous and homogenising category of 
‘Aboriginal’.  That is, it appropriated Aboriginal identity and, purporting to “know 
more about them than they know about themselves”,36 it constructed and 
represented them as ‘other’.  Through its definitions of ‘full-blood’, ‘half-caste’ and 
the like, the law told Aboriginal people who, and what, they were.37  Initially it 
told them that ‘half-castes’, being half white, were capable of being educated and 
assimilated.  Later, however, as Trees points out, this representation changed.   
‘Half-castes’ “became ‘the problem’ – they were re-identified as ‘lazy’, ‘failed to 
attend school or work’ and were ‘alcoholics’.”38  These images informed the way 
that white people perceived Aboriginal people.39  By contributing to the creation of 
these images and this knowledge, the legislation thereby promoted prejudice and 
discrimination towards Aboriginal people at the level of the legal and the social. 
 
Benang and My Place are both works which inform readers about the knowledge 
created by the 1905 Act, the inequalities that it imposed on Aboriginal people and 
the impact that it had (and continues to have) on them.  Benang tells the story of 
Harley, “the first white man born”,40 and his reconnection with his Aboriginal 
heritage.  Harley is the grandson of Ernest Solomon Scat, a Scotsman who 
emigrates to Australia in the 1920’s and embraces the eugenics project advocated by 
                                                 
35 Trees, above n.4 at 178. 
36 Hodge, B. and Mishra, V. Dark Side of the Dream: Australian literature and the postcolonial mind 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin) 1990 at 27. 
37 The law also told Aboriginal people in Western Australia who they were by including them 
within the portfolio of the Minister for Flora and Fauna until as late as 1984. 
38 Trees, above n.4 at 173. 
39 As discussed below this contributed not just to the definition of Aboriginal but also to the 
exclusion and silencing of Aboriginal people. 
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his cousin Auber Neville.41  Like Neville, Ern believes absolutely in biological 
assimilation and that ultimately all traces of Aboriginality can be bred out of the 
population.  Wishing to “make something of himself”,42 and “leave his mark on 
history”,43 Ern embarks on a personal eugenics project.  He is determined, through 
“a controlled breeding program amongst Nyoongar women … to produce a white 
son.”44  Harley is the result.  Unfortunately for Ern, Harley is, however, determined 
not to lose his Aboriginality, and sets out (successfully) to rediscover his family 
history and revive his Aboriginal ancestry.  He “traces his Nyoongar family … and 
rewrites and differentiates the people that Ern attempted to reduce to the generic 
categories of “half-caste” and “quadroon”.”45 
 
In recounting this “most local of histories”,46 Scott compellingly informs about the 
operation of the 1905 Act.  He powerfully exposes the way that Aboriginal people 
were defined and treated under the Act, the inhumanity of the assimilationist 
knowledge and policies which underlay it and the way in which the law 
“systematic[ally] attempt[ed] to breed out a race” as it sought to transform 
Aboriginality into whiteness.47  The reader is told, for example, of Neville’s “expert 
opinions on the need for both social and biological absorption of the Native Race”48 
and of Ern’s belief in the need to “[u]plift a despised race”49 and “[d]ilute the 
                                                 
41 This relationship between Neville and Scat is only fictional. 
42 Slater, L. “Benang, This “Most Local of Histories”: Annexing Colonial Records into a World 
without End” (2006) 41(1) Journal of Commonwealth Literature 51 at 52. 
43 Ibid at 52. 
44 Ibid at 52. 
45 Ibid at 53. 
46 Scott, above n.2 at 12. 
47 Uhlmann, A. “Law Translating Life and Life Translating Law Through Stories: Bringing Them 
Home and Benang by Kim Scott” (2001) 15 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 41 at 49. 
48 Scott, above n.2 at 45. 
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strain”.50  This is to be achieved through “careful breeding”51 so that “after two or 
three generations the advance should be so great that families should be living like 
the rest of the community.”52  To facilitate this program of “careful breeding”, of 
“animal husbandry”,53 it was essential that Aborigines be clearly identified as ‘half-
caste’, ‘quadroon’, ‘octoroon’ and so on.54  Harley finds his family so labelled and 
defined when he discovers some photographs in his grandfather’s study, in which 
“each individual was designated by a fraction”:55 
Captions to the photographs; full-blood, half-caste (first cross), quadroon, 
octoroon.  There was a page of various fractions, possible permutations 
growing more and more convoluted.  Of course, in the language of such 
mathematics it is simple; from the whole to the partial and back again.  This 
much was clear; I was a fraction of what I might have been. 
A caption beneath my father’s photograph: 
Octoroon grandson (mother quarter caste [No. 2], father Scottish).  Freckles 
on the face are the only trace of colour apparent.56 
And Harley, the “intended product of a long and considered process”,57 is identified 
as “the first white man born”. 
 
As “the first white man born”, Harley has a “propensity for elevation”.58  When he 
relaxes and lets his “mind go blank”59 he floats above the ground: 
                                                 
50 Ibid at 29. 
51 Ibid at 28. 
52 Ibid at 28. 
53 Ibid at 76. 
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to the 1905 Act: “The central clause in the 1936 Act was the definition of persons to be deemed 
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55 Ibid at 28. 
56 Ibid at 28.  The arbitrariness of these definitions is made apparent when Harley is talking about 
his father, Tommy and Tommy’s sister, Ellen.  Ellen was born on 30 January 1936 and so, legally, 
was exempt from the definition of ‘native’ under the Act.  Tommy, however, born later, although of 
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I know I make people feel uncomfortable, and embarrass even those who 
come to hear me sing.  I regret that, but not how all the talk and nervous 
laughter fades as I rise from the ground and, hovering in the campfire 
smoke, slowly turn to consider this small circle of which I am the centre.60 
It is only his anger that brings him back to ground.  The irony here is clear.  Scott is 
exposing, and commenting on, the racist ideologies that informed assimilationist 
and eugenicist practices.  Harley is “quite literally ‘uplifted’ and ‘elevated’” as only 
someone with white blood can be.61  The barbarity of these assimilationist beliefs 
and practices is conveyed more starkly by Harley’s Uncle Jack: 
‘It’s another sort of murdering.  What the law was doing.  And helping 
people do.  Killing Nyoongars really, making ‘em white, making ‘em hate 
‘emselves and pretend they’re something else, keeping ‘em apart.’62 
Scott is similarly critical about the way the knowledge created by these 
constructions of Aboriginality perpetuated the image of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ 
and ‘uncivilised’.  Sergeant Hall, for example, was “proud that there was no nigger 
problem in his town”,63 and one of the white school children laments that: 
they shouldn’t be going to the same school together.  They were like 
monkeys they were, and filthy.  His dad talked of a White Australia, about 
the dangers of contamination and infection.  It made him passionate, even 
in this dull schoolroom.64 
As Sandy One states, however, in response to suggestions that his children should 
not attend the same school as the white children, “‘They’re not savages, they’re my 
kids.  They’re people.’”65  Again the irony is clear. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
59 Ibid at 14.  Lisa Slater suggests that Scott likens blankness to whiteness, and that “[t]hroughout 
Benang he suggests that to desire a limited and prescriptive white nation is to be imaginatively, 
intellectually and ethically bereft.”  Above n.42 at 58. 
60 Ibid at 9. 
61 Scott, K. “Covered up with Sand” (2007) 66(2) Meanjin 120 at 123. 
62 Scott, above n.2 at 339 – 340. 
63 Ibid at 74. 
64 Ibid at 295. 
65 Ibid at 267.   214
Benang is a local history, a family history that “contests the interpretation of white 
history and law.”66  T h a t  i s ,  Benang presents a counter narrative that tells a 
different story and a different history to the authorised white colonial history.  In 
Chapter Six, I explained how history has been written by the colonisers, not the 
colonised, and that this has resulted in a privileging of an official history that has 
subjugated the history and knowledge of colonised (Aboriginal) peoples.  As Trees 
explains: 
Official history has served to marginalise ‘Aboriginal’ knowledges, customs 
and beliefs and further ensures a privileged place for ‘white’ knowledges, 
customs and beliefs as the foundation of Australian society.67 
Benang challenges this official history.  It tells of: 
Australia’s heroic pioneering history from the perspective of those who 
suffered at the hands of the colonizers.  It tells the stories of different heroes 
– Harley’s Nyoongar ancestors and family who survived and resisted 
colonialism.68 
In order to reconnect with his Aboriginal past, Harley travels through Nyoongar 
country with his uncles.  They tell him of the history of their people and of the 
impact that colonisation had on them, so that through “the deafening and 
deadening roar of colonial contact”69 Harley is able to hear and tell the story of his 
ancestors.  In so doing, he comes to understand that “his own history and 
experiences, at the hands of Ern, [are] part of the much larger project of 
colonialism.”70  In response, he seeks to redefine himself and rejects the white 
‘truth’ of Scat.  He presents an alternative story of his identity, one which rejects 
and defies the law’s description of Aborigines as needing to be ‘uplifted’ or as a 
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‘despised race’.  Harley creates an identity that is neither promoted nor endorsed by 
the law.  As Slater states: 
In Benang, Scott forces the monologue of eugenicist discourse to answer to, 
and enter into dialogue with, Indigenous people.  Benang is a hybrid history 
that gathers together the quiet voices and littler histories of Nyoongar 
people to contest and protest against colonial ideology.71 
 
Ultimately, what Benang tells the reader is that the racist, colonial ideology that 
underlay the 1905 Act justified the unequal and discriminatory treatment of 
Aborigines.  Their construction as ‘inferior’, ‘primitive’ or ‘different’ was essential 
to the colonial project.  As Scott’s narrator reflects: 
These new people, they were growing a community like they grew their 
crops.  They focused on money and time, on cause and effect, and knew 
they would have to modify what was around them if they were to grow as 
they wished.  They were not of this country, but, looking outward, believed 
they understood its potential.  It was necessary to believe that the land’s 
people were inferior, and to ensure that there was proof of that.72 
Scott challenges this.  He disrupts colonial logic and the eugenicist discourse by 
writing an alternative story, and presenting alternative perspectives that have been 
suppressed by the discourses of colonialism, paternalism and assimilation. 
 
Like  Benang,  My Place is a journey of discovery and reconnection with an 
Aboriginal heritage.  In this work, Sally Morgan recounts her life growing up in 
suburban Perth, initially unaware of her Aboriginality, but later uncovering the 
truth.  She embraces her Aboriginal past and begins to research into her family 
history.  Eventually she is able to convince her mother Gladys, her great uncle 
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Arthur and her grandmother Daisy to tell their stories.73  Like Scott, she weaves a 
compelling account of the realities of life under the 1905 Act and its assimilationist 
policies, and of the continuing long-term impact of its measures.  The reader is 
informed of Daisy and Arthur’s removal from their mother as ‘half-castes’ so that 
they could be assimilated into white society and, particularly for Daisy, of the 
consequent fear and shame associated with being Aboriginal.  We learn of Daisy’s 
life as a servant to the Drake-Brockman family, the lack of equality and fairness 
with which she was treated by them, the implication that Howden Drake-
Brockman was her father and the removal of her daughter Gladys, also potentially 
fathered by Howden, to Parkerville children’s home.  Such is the difficulty and 
stigma of being Aboriginal that Daisy denies and suppresses her Aboriginality and 
encourages Gladys to do the same.  Only after Sally’s persistent questioning do 
mother and daughter begin to acknowledge and embrace their Aboriginality.  And, 
despite Sally’s best efforts, there remain secrets of which Daisy will not speak. 
 
In telling the stories of three generations of Sally’s family, My Place exposes the 
way in which Aborigines were defined as ‘full-blood’ and ‘half-caste’ and critiques 
the way that this constructed identity determined how Aboriginal people were 
treated, and what rights and freedoms they had (or did not have).  Arthur Corunna, 
for example, tells of how he wished he was ‘full-blood’ so that he could stay with 
                                                 
73 Morgan has been subjected to some criticism for the way that she has constructed her 
Aboriginality.  See, for example, Attwood, B. “Portrait of an Aboriginal as an Artist: Sally Morgan 
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his family, and of the way that ‘half-caste’ children were brutally removed from 
their Aboriginal mothers so that they could be assimilated: 
Aah, I wish I’d never left there.  It was my home.  Sometimes, I wish I’d 
been born black as the ace of spades, then they’d never have took me.  They 
only took half-castes. …  
When I left, Lily cried and cried.  She was only little but she ran away and 
hid, no one could find her.  I was her favourite.  She was full blood, real 
black, so they didn’t want to take her. … 
They told my mother and the others we’d be back soon.  We wouldn’t be 
gone for long, they said. … They didn’t realise they wouldn’t be seein’ us no 
more.  I thought they wanted us educated so we could help run the station 
some day, I was wrong.74 
And, once removed from their families the fairer children were further separated 
from the darker ones, in the belief that they were more capable of being educated 
and assimilated: 
we was all in there together, white ones, black ones.  We liked sharing … 
Governor Bedford didn’t like it one bit.  He separated us all out. … they put 
Freddie Lockyer in with the white kids.  He had fair hair and fair skin, but 
really, he was a white blackfella.  He didn’t want to go, he wanted to stay 
with us blackies, he belonged to us, but they made him go.  I said to him, 
‘You’re not black enough to stay with us, you have to go.’  I felt sorry for 
him.  He was really one of us.75 
But assimilation, as explained by Arthur, was not about education or protection.  It 
was, under Neville, nothing more than a policy of genocide.  Aboriginal people 
were not even permitted to use their own language but were forced to speak that of 
the colonisers.  As Arthur concludes, “Neville … wasn’t protectin’ the Aborigines, 
he was destroyin’ them!”76 
 
The impact of these measures was considerable, extending far beyond the legal into 
the social, informing the way that Aborigines were perceived and treated by non-
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indigenous Australians.  We see, for example, how white authorities question 
Aboriginal people’s integrity and honesty,77 and Gladys tells of one particularly 
revealing encounter with a woman at a bus stop: 
I remember one Sunday waiting at a bus stop for a bus to my girlfriend’s 
house, when a lady came along.  She was catching the same bus as me, so we 
started to chat. 
‘You’re very beautiful, dear,’ she said, ‘what nationality are you, Indian?’ 
‘No,’ I smiled, ‘I’m Aboriginal.’ 
She looked at me in shock.  ‘You can’t be,’ she said. 
‘I am.’ 
‘Oh, you poor thing,’ she said, putting her arm around me, ‘what on earth 
are you going to do?’78 
What is made evident here, and throughout the text, is that Aborigines were 
defined and identified as being ‘different’.  They were not constructed or perceived 
as equal to non-Aboriginal Australians.  They were inferior, to be cared for, in 
some cases pitied, but ultimately they were to be absorbed.  This was the 
construction adopted by the law, and by society, and, in accordance with Said’s 
Orientalism and Hodge and Mishra’s Aboriginalism, one which Aboriginal people 
themselves were forced to believe.  As Trees notes, “Daisy, Arthur and Gladys 
Corunna were coerced into accepting white assessment of themselves as ‘inferior’ 
and therefore as subordinate.”79 
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Morgan challenges this imagery and, in so doing, like Scott, writes a counter 
history.  She tells an Aboriginal history and documents Aboriginal experiences of 
the way Aboriginal people were treated under the 1905 Act.  That is, she presents 
an alternative truth and an alternative history, one which challenges and critiques 
the official histories and “undermines the authority of assimilationist discourses.”80  
Such critiques and histories are important.  As Trees explains, they: 
provide some understanding of the experiences of Aboriginal people post-
1788.  They act as a counter-memory, as a record of displacement and 
deculturation, as opposed to official Australian accounts of settlement and 
civilisation.81 
Sidonie Smith makes a similar point: 
Detecting Aboriginality, confessing Aboriginality, battling for Aboriginality, 
educating oneself in Aboriginality, all these generic practices are counter 
normative.  Here the confession of Aboriginality is posited as something 
good; and the act of confessing it publicly becomes a political gesture in 
resistance to discourses of assimilation.82 
Or, as Sally puts it in My Place: 
I want to write the story of my own family … there’s almost nothing 
written from a personal point of view about Aboriginal people.  All our 
history is about the white man.  No one knows what it’s like for us.  A lot of 
our history has been lost, people have been too frightened to say anything.  
There’s a lot of our history we can’t even get at, Arthur.  There are all sorts 
of files about Aboriginals that go way back, and the government won’t 
release them. … our own government had terrible policies for Aboriginal 
people.  Thousands of families in Australia were destroyed by the 
government policy of taking children away.  None of that happened to 
white people.83 
My Place was one of the first accounts written from an Aboriginal perspective of 
the brutality of the measures contained in the 1905 Act and of the impact that they 
                                                 
80 Smith, S. “Re-Citing, Re-Siting, and Re-Sighting Likeness: Reading the Family Archive in Drucilla 
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had on Aboriginal people.  By highlighting such issues as the paternalism and 
injustice of government policies and actions, and the denial of family relationships 
and language rights, for example, Morgan reveals a story that has hitherto largely 
been suppressed.84 
 
What is made clear in both Benang and My Place is that the production of 
knowledge is both important and powerful.  The 1905 Act, as part of the official 
narrative of law, produced a particular knowledge of Aboriginal people.  It defined 
who was, and was not, Aboriginal, and to what extent.  This determined not only 
what rights, freedoms and opportunities those under the Act were permitted or 
denied, but contributed to the perception that the non-indigenous community had 
of Aboriginal people and of Aboriginality.  It justified the inhumane and 
discriminatory treatment of Aboriginal people in Western Australia, ensuring that, 
at the level of both the legal and the social, they were not accorded equality with 
non-Aboriginal Australians.  That is, the law was (and is) complicit in the creation 
of an Aboriginal identity which then justified their unequal treatment.  They were 
‘inferior’, ‘primitive’, ‘sub human’, and, as such, they neither needed nor deserved 
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e q u a l  t r e a t m e n t .   T h i s  l a c k  o f  e q u a l i t y  i s  e x a m i n e d  i n  m o r e  d e p t h  i n  t h e  n e x t  
section of this chapter. 
 
“Well Jack … you’ve got no rights according to the laws of this 
country”
85: ‘Equality’ Under the 1905 Act 
‘The law?  The law?  How long’s there been this law?  That says that I’m a 
lesser man than any of you?’ 
… ‘Oh, ages Harry.  Nearly ten years now.  The 1905 Aboriginal Protection 
Act.  A new amendment, just a few years ago.’ 
‘Protection Act?  I don’t need it, I don’t need that.  Just fair treatment same 
as anyone.  That’s what I want from a law, any law, new one or old one just 
the same.’86 
Despite its stated aim of ensuring that all Australians would enjoy the same rights, 
privileges and opportunities, assimilation did not achieve equality for Aboriginal 
people.  Far from enjoying the benefits of the rule of law, Aboriginal people were 
actively and deliberately denied equality.  Two points need to be emphasised here.  
Firstly, the law was not merely implicated in this.  It was actively complicit in its 
denial of equality to Aboriginal people.  Secondly, the impact of these inequalities 
persists today in various forms.87  As Scott has noted: 
The power relationship characteristic of colonial societies still exists in 
Australia.  The benefits of colonisation haven’t been equally shared with the 
prior societies.  No matter what statistics you choose – life expectancy, 
employment, education, income, infant mortality – Australia’s indigenous 
communities remain at a disadvantage compared to the rest of the 
population.88 
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In Benang this lack of equality is manifest in the many scenes in which the narrator 
informs us about the treatment of Harley and his ancestors.  They are not, for 
example, permitted to enter pubs or clubs without permission,89 or to work without 
special permits.90  They are not free to live where they wish,91 or to raise their own 
children.92  They are not allowed to own property,93 or entitled to control their 
own finances.94  Uncle Jack, for example, despite being ‘half-caste’ and “work[ing] 
Hard and Earn[ing] a living the same as a white man would”,95 is denied an 
exemption under the Act, and Uncle Will is denied financial assistance because of 
his Aboriginality.96  Even the children were ‘discouraged’ from attending the same 
school as the white children.97  Such examples indicate the extent of the 
discrimination to which Aboriginal people w e r e  s u b j e c t .   I t  w a s  a  f o r m  o f  
apartheid.98  These were not restrictions to which white people had to adhere.  The 
law denied Aboriginal people a range of rights and privileges and imposed on them 
numerous burdens, and society followed suit.  Aboriginal people were denied 
equality, scorned and treated as less than human.  As Lisa Slater writes: 
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[Ern] and his fellow eugenicists do not consider Indigenous people to be 
part of the civic body.  Therefore they do not have to treat them justly and 
as respected, fellow citizens.  Indigenous people are answerable to the 
settlers, but the settlers are under no obligation to reciprocate.99 
As Harley, talking of his ancestor Sandy One Mason, summarises, “Sandy Mason … 
was not – whatever his own beliefs – the equal of any white man.”100 
 
Likewise, in My Place Morgan informs about how the main characters do not enjoy 
respect or equality.  We are told, for example, of how Daisy is exploited by the 
Drake-Brockman family.  Despite their assertions that she is one of the family they 
removed her from her own family and exploited her as an unpaid servant.  They 
denied her fair pay,101 refused to give her holidays, did not permit her time off to 
visit her daughter and would not allow her daughter to stay with her.102  She tells of 
the difficulties faced by Aboriginal people in obtaining housing, jobs and the like.  
They needed permission to go anywhere.103  They were not citizens and were not 
allowed to vote.104  And, worst of all, they endured the forced removal of their 
children because they were not deemed, by white law, to be fit parents.105  White 
people did not live in fear of having their children removed just because of the 
colour of their skin.  Gladys recounts how she was threatened by her (white) 
husband: 
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‘Nobody will let someone like you bring up kids and you know it.  I’m the 
one that’ll get custody.  I’ll give them to my parents.’106 
As Gladys explains, “Aboriginal women weren’t allowed to keep their children 
fathered by a white man.”107 
 
It is, however, Daisy who comments most particularly on the lack of equality 
experienced by Aboriginal people.  She explains how: 
 ‘’Cause you’re black, they treat you like dirt.  You see, in those days, we 
was owned, like a cow or a horse.  I even heard some people say we not the 
same as whites.  That’s not true, we all God’s children.’108 
So extensive was this discrimination against Aboriginal people that Daisy and 
Gladys determine never to tell Gladys’s children of their Aboriginality: 
Mum said she didn’t want the children growing up with people looking 
down on them.  I understood what she meant.  Aboriginals were treated the 
lowest of the low.  It was like they were the race on earth that had nothing 
to offer.109 
Morgan’s revelations of such discrimination and inequality are important.  As she 
says of My Place: 
I think probably what it – My Place – did was make people reassess their 
view of Australia as a nation, because our motto as Australians is “a fair-go,” 
everyone should have “a fair-go.”  It was very clear that Aboriginal people 
have never had that “fair-go.110 
 
Both novels are replete with such examples of this lack of “a fair-go”.  What they 
make abundantly clear is that the discourse of assimilation denied Aboriginal 
people the right to be treated equally, and that the rule of law was a privilege 
                                                 
106 Ibid at 377. 
107 Ibid at 377. 
108 Ibid at 419. 
109 Ibid at 279. 
110 Ben-Messahel, S. “Speaking with Sally Morgan” (2000) 14(2) Antipodes 99 at 100.  This lack of a 
fair go is also noted by Kevin Rudd: “There is a deep and abiding belief in the Australian community 
that, for the stolen generations, there was no fair go at all.” Above, n.1 at 170.   225
enjoyed only by white Australians.  The law defined and categorised Aboriginal 
people on a scale of black to white, and determined the rights, privileges and 
opportunities to which they were accordingly entitled or were denied.  In Benang, 
Sandy Two Mason meets with Neville seeking permission for his family to come 
and live with him.  Neville replies: 
‘This is no affair of yours.  The department is running the children’s affairs, 
and you have no business here.’  The Chief Protector looked up from his 
desk, from his papers and his card indexes.  ‘Sandy you have to come under 
my laws, you can’t get away from them.’ 
‘I’m not an Aboriginal.  I defy you to call me one.’ 
… 
‘What do you call your common-law wife?’ 
‘A white woman.’ 
The undeniably white man shook his head, and tut-tutted softly.  ‘No.  She 
is a half-caste.’ 
Uncle Sandy Mason would not be denied.  ‘Her father was a white man, her 
grandfather was a white man.’ 
… 
He knew the law.  ‘I am not an Aboriginal but I am treated as if I am one.  I 
want to be exempted.  My family and myself not being Aboriginals should 
not be pauperised and kept under the act.’ 
The Chief Protector held his hands in front of him with their palms up.  
‘The proof is to the contrary, Sandy.  And it is I, or my representatives, who 
decide who is or is not Aboriginal.  I’m thinking of your family, Sandy.’111 
Identity is important.  It is “a site of conflict and negotiation: a discursive 
practice”112 that impacts directly on the lives of Aboriginal people.  Those who 
were identified as falling under the jurisdiction of the Act were not permitted to 
behave equally, to be treated equally, or to be perceived equally, with white 
Australians.  These laws ensured that Aboriginal people remained firmly within 
state control, as some of the most legislated about people in the country.  At the 
same time, however, they ensured that they remained excluded from the benefits 
                                                 
111 Scott, above n.2 at 124 – 125.  My emphasis. 
112 Slater, L. “Benang: From the Heart: ‘I Found Myself Among Paper’” (2001) 16(1) Southerly 220 at 
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and protections of the law enjoyed by those fortunate enough not to fall within the 
ambit of the 1905 Act. 
 
These exclusions and inequalities were further perpetuated by the inability of 
Aboriginal people to contest them.  That is, the discourse of assimilation and the 
way in which the law constructed Aboriginal identity denied Aboriginal people the 
right to object to the discrimination to which they were subjected by the 
legislation.  Assimilation “sought to reduce their otherness to the same of white 
Australia”,113 and in seeking to make them the same, it denied Aboriginal people 
“an authoritative speaking position.”114  They were silenced within the dominant 
discourse.  In other words, the discourses of assimilation and equality created a 
différend in silencing Aboriginal voices, within the public sphere, and denying 
Aboriginal people the ability to challenge the injustices and inequalities to which 
they were subjected. 
 
Morgan and Scott both comment on and critique this silencing.  In My Place, for 
example, Daisy is unable to challenge the way the Drake-Brockmans treat her.  She 
is silenced by and within the dominant discourse and so is unable to argue that she 
has been exploited financially and physically.  She does not have the resources, the 
language or even the right to challenge the way in which she has been treated.  
There were no measures in the law that protected her from such mistreatment: 
there was no mechanism for her to protect her personal rights.  She was invisible.  
White society and white law would not hear her claims. 
 
                                                 
113 Uhlmann, above n.47 at 46. 
114 Slater, above n.42 at 62.   227
In Benang, Scott emphasises the power of language, and how it can either empower 
or silence.  Ern, for example, reflects that “[t]o be able to speak … in such a 
controlled manner made [him] feel deliciously superior.”115  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  J a c k  
Chatalong is silenced by the dominant discourse.  As a child, Jack speaks all the 
time, but when he is sent to school he is prevented from speaking: 
Chatalong had been struck dumb.  What happened to that easy way with 
words, the easy launching of them, the unthinking way he could set them 
into flight?116 
He is denied the right to speak and the ability to be heard within the public 
domain.  Scott is particularly critical of the way that Aboriginal voices have been 
literally silenced within the dominant discourse.  He exposes how the colonisers 
denied Aboriginal people their language and their voice, forcing them to adopt the 
language of the colonisers: 
I had inherited his language, the voices of others, his stories.  That history 
whose descendants write: 
There was never any trouble.  Never blood spilled, or a gun raised in 
anger.117 
In this way, Aboriginal history, Aboriginal identity and Aboriginal voices were 
literally silenced, so that there was no language left that could speak of the pain 
and injustice suffered.  As Slater writes, when Harley goes into his grandfather’s 
study he: 
is overwhelmed by written records, a deluge of oral histories, fragments of 
stories, half forgotten memories, pain that has never been spoken and 
cannot find a language by which to be released, hybrid tales, stories long 
buried under colonial representation and stories lying quiet, waiting to be 
reactivated and to re-enter the world.118 
                                                 
115 Scott, above n.2 at 136. 
116 Ibid at 101. 
117 Ibid at 185. 
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But Harley has no knowledge of his own “language in which he can generate a 
counter-narrative.”119  His only choice is to use the language of the colonisers: 
I have written this story wanting to embrace all of you, and it is the best I 
can do in this language we share.  Of course, there is an older tongue which 
also tells it.120 
 
Importantly, however, these novels do not only highlight the way that Aboriginal 
people were silenced by the dominant discourse.  They allow for Aboriginal stories 
to be told.  In My Place, for Sally the silence and the invisibility have continued for 
too long and she is determined for an Aboriginal story to be told.  Her mother, at 
least initially, remains unconvinced of the worth of her project.  She implores Sally 
to “just leave the past buried” because it “won’t hurt anyone then.”121  As Sally 
replies, however, “‘Mum’ … ‘it’s already hurt people.  It’s hurt you and me and 
Nan, all of us.’”122  Arthur also emphasises the necessity of allowing for Aboriginal 
stories to be told: 
I want my story finished.  I want everyone to read it.  Arthur Corunna’s 
story!  I might be famous.  You see, it’s important, because maybe then 
they’ll understand how hard it’s been for the blackfella to live the way he 
wants.  I’m part of history, that’s how I look on it.  Some people read 
history, don’t they?123 
Only when Sally started to listen to the untold stories of her family’s history did 
the truth begin to be told.  In this way, these novels do more than simply tell a 
story.  They allow for a voice to be heard within the dominant discourse that 
                                                 
119 Ibid at 153. 
120 Scott, above n.2 at 497. 
121 Morgan, above n.5 at 194. 
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challenges and critiques the law and the inequality that it has imposed upon 
Aboriginal people.124  As Trees writes about My Place:: 
The Arthur Corunna section of the text is a powerful expression of an 
oppositional viewpoint that challenges this situation of inequality.125 
They also create a space for other account s  a n d  c r i t i q u e s  t o  b e  t o l d .   A s  S a l l y  
Morgan states: 
My Place helped to trigger other people to write and to share their stories.  
That was a great thing that people were encouraged and felt that they could 
start sharing their stories.126 
And it is through the telling of such stories that the injustices and inequalities to 
which Aboriginal people have been subjected can be acknowledged and addressed. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that My Place and Benang inform the reader that the 
rule of law, introduced into Australia at the time of settlement, did not, despite its 
assertion that everyone is equal before the law, result in the equal treatment of all 
Australians.  They demonstrate that, rather, the discourses of equality and 
a s s i m i l a t i o n  w e r e  u s e d  b y  t h e  l a w  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  A b o r i g i n a l  p e o p l e  w e r e  n o t  
treated equally with non-Aboriginal Australians.  They were constructed by the 
law as ‘other’, as ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’ and, under the guise of ensuring that 
all Australians would enjoy the same rights, privileges and opportunities, were 
subjected to a repressive and inhumane regime of discrimination and mistreatment, 
against which they were denied the right or the ability to object.  These novels 
                                                 
124 Both works are also readily available.  My Place, in particular, is written in an idiom easily 
understood by Anglo-Australians.  It has enjoyed wide appeal within non-Aboriginal circles and has 
sold over 500 000 copies.  Benang is a more difficult work.  It is still, however, part of the dominant, 
mainstream, arena, as evidenced by its award of the Miles Franklin Award. 
125 Trees, above n.67 at 73 – 74. 
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illustrate and critique the way in which the law defined Aboriginality and then 
subjugated Aboriginal people by denying them their identity and their equality and 
by silencing them, within the dominant discourse. 
 
In the next chapter, I examine how novels such as Benang suggest that these issues 
of silencing and inequality can be addressed.  In telling Aboriginal stories, and 
allowing Aboriginal voices and perspectives to be heard within the public domain, 
they can dismantle the conditions that give rise to the différend.  And they can 
begin to tell stories of reconciliation, recognition and acceptance of difference, and 





On February 13, 2008 the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, apologised to Australia’s 
Aboriginal people “for the laws and policies of successive parliaments and 
governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our 
fellow Australians.”1  He acknowledged that previous policies and laws, particularly 
those authorising the removal of Aboriginal children from their families, were 
unjust and inhumane, and subjected Aboriginal people to repressive and 
discriminatory measures, the long-term consequences of which are still being felt 
today.2 
 
In Chapter Nine, I argued that stories about the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA) clearly 
inform the reader about the complicity of the law in the deliberate discrimination 
of Aboriginal people.  They highlight the way in which the law defined 
Aboriginality, denied Aboriginal people their identity and ignored their equality, 
and they expose how, under the guise of equality, the law created a différend in its 
refusal to recognise or acknowledge Aboriginal perspectives and experiences.  They 
reveal how Aboriginal people were systematically discriminated against by the 
colonial law and denied the benefits of the rule of law introduced into Australia at 
the time of settlement. 
                                                 
1 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 February 2008 at 167   
(Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister). 
2 These consequences are felt in a range of areas such as higher infant mortality rates, higher 
representation of indigenous people in the criminal justice system, lower life expectancy rates and 
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In this chapter, I argue that Kevin Rudd’s apology is an essential precursor in 
achieving equality for Aboriginal people.3  I argue that it is important for the law to 
say ‘sorry’ and to acknowledge the injustices and inequalities that it has inflicted on 
Aboriginal people.  As Aden Ridgeway has stated: 
We cannot turn a blind eye to the Nation’s faults, or be deaf to what we do 
not want to hear, or even continue to den y that wrongs continue to be 
done.  The beauty and splendour of this great Nation conceals the legacies of 
past policies and the symptoms of rottenness, decay and idleness.4 
It is also necessary for the law to be more pluralistic in its treatment and perception 
of, and relationship with, Aboriginal people.5  That is, it needs to acknowledge and 
respect Aboriginal peoples’ ‘otherness’ without trying to assimilate it or absorb it 
into itself.  Such an approach would encourage reconciliation, foster mutual respect 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians and allow for Aboriginal 
people to be accorded equality at the level of both the legal and the social. 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted, however, that Rudd’s apology is not necessarily the first step.  There have been 
many other steps along the way to reconciliation.  These include the 1965 “Freedom Ride”, which 
exposed the segregation between black and white Australia; the 1967 referendum, which granted 
the Commonwealth the power to legislate for Aboriginal people and allowed for Aboriginal people 
to be counted in the national census; the establishment of the Tent Embassy in front of Parliament 
House in 1972 and the Whitlam government’s enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act in 1975; 
the statutory recognition of some land rights; Prime Minister Paul Keating’s 1992 Redfern Park 
address and the 1992 decision in Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
4 Ridgeway, A. “Millennium Dreaming: Indigenous Peoples in Australia in the Era of Reconciliation.  
How Far Have We Come?  How Far Have We Got to Go?” (2000) 1(1) Balayi: Culture, Law and 
Colonialism 229 at 238. 
5 After Mabo, there was some attempt to do this in relation to land rights with the introduction of 
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).  This legislation was, however, significantly amended in the Native 
Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) enacted by the newly elected Howard Liberal-Coalition 
government.  This Act arguably significantly curtailed native title rights, ignored the Racial 
Discrimination Act and further eroded Aboriginal peoples’ equality.  For a discussion of these issues 
see Bartlett, R. Native Title in Australia 2nd ed. (Australia: Butterworths) 2004 at 52 – 55.   233
The texts on which I focus in this chapter are Kim Scott’s Benang, Alex Miller’s 
Landscape of Farewell and Gail Jones’s Sorry.6  I also briefly discuss Sally Morgan’s 
My Place.7  I argue that these works not only expose the inequalities and injustices 
to which Aboriginal people have been subjected by the law, but they imagine a 
future in which there is a possibility of reconciliation, recognition and acceptance 
of difference and, most importantly, equality.  I appreciate that this does not equate 
with societal change.  However texts provide a frame for imagining what is 
possible.  They give individuals the opportunity to do this, which is part of a 
process of change. 
 
In the first half of this chapter, I provide an overview of Kevin Rudd’s apology and 
discuss the importance of saying ‘sorry’.  In the second half, I examine how the 
novels discussed here highlight the importance of reconciliation between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people and emphasise the need for the recognition 




In 1997, the Bringing Them Home report, detailing the experiences of Aboriginal 
people removed from their families as children, was tabled in federal parliament.8  
The then Prime Minister, John Howard, infamously refused to take responsibility 
for its contents or to apologise to those who suffered under the policy of forced 
                                                 
6 Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000; Miller, A. Landscape of Farewell 
(Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2007; Jones, G. Sorry (NSW: Vintage Books) 2007.  Both 
Landscape of Farewell and Sorry were shortlisted for the 2008 Miles Franklin Award. 
7 Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1988. 
8 Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Children from their Families (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission) 1997.   234
removal.9  Eleven years later, Kevin Rudd offered an apology to Australia’s 
Aboriginal peoples for the “pain … [t]he hurt, the humiliation, the degradation and 
the sheer brutality” inflicted on them by numerous policies and laws enacted by 
Australia’s parliaments.10  He acknowledged that the mistreatment experienced by 
Aboriginal people was “the product of the deliberate, calculated policies of the state 
as reflected in the explicit powers given to them under statute”,11 and accepted that 
“[w]e, the parliament of the nation, are ultimately responsible”12 for the injustices 
which they suffered: 
The uncomfortable truth for us all is that the parliaments of the nation, 
individually and collectively, enacted statutes and delegated authority under 
those statutes that made the forced removal of children on racial grounds 
fully lawful.13 
Importantly, he makes absolutely clear the active complicity of the law in the 
authorisation and implementation of these deliberately discriminatory measures. 
 
                                                 
9 In an explanatory note to her novel Sorry, Gail Jones explains the importance to Aboriginal people 
of saying sorry and the impact of John Howard’s refusal to do so: “The word ‘sorry’ has dense and 
complicated meanings in Australia. … At an Australian Reconciliation Convention held in 
Melbourne in May 1997, Prime Minister John Howard refused to say ‘sorry’ to Aboriginal 
Australians for past government policies of mistreatment.  The audience at the convention rose and 
turned their backs to the prime minister, shaming him in a silent protest with their bodies.  Prime 
Minister Howard has since refused on many occasions to say ‘sorry’. … One of the 
recommendations of the ‘Bringing them Home’ report was that a National Sorry Day should be 
declared.  On 26 May 1998, one year after the tabling of the report, the first ‘National Sorry Day’ 
was held.  It offered the community the opportunity to be involved in activities to acknowledge the 
impact of the policies of forcible removal on Australia’s indigenous populations. … Sorry Day was 
an annual event between 1998 and 2004 and was renamed in 2005 as the National Day of Healing 
for all Australians.  For Aboriginal people, ‘sorry business’ is the term given broadly to matters of 
death and mourning.  It refers to rituals, feelings and community loss.  ‘Sorry Day’ was meant to 
connote the restoration of hope for indigenous people.”  Jones, above n.6 at 215 – 216. 
10 Rudd, above n.1 at 169.  He expressly states “we say sorry” to the Aboriginal people at 167.  He 
uses the word sorry a number of times throughout the speech. 
11 Ibid at 169. 
12 Ibid at 170. 
13 Ibid at 170.   235
There are three themes, in particular, that recur throughout the Prime Minister’s 
speech which are important in the context of this work: namely, reconciliation, 
mutual respect and equality.  Reconciliation is posited by Rudd as an 
acknowledgement of, and acceptance of responsibility for, the way that the law 
treated Aboriginal people.  It is a necessary first step in the “healing of the 
nation.”14  He states that: 
Until we fully confront [the] truth, there will always be a shadow hanging 
over us and our future as a fully united and fully reconciled people.  It is 
time to reconcile.  It is time to recognise the injustices of the past.  It is time 
to say sorry.  It is time to move forward together.15 
Reconciliation does not, however, occur in isolation.  It is not a single moment in 
time that remedies the injustices of the past.  Rather, it envisages “[a] future based 
on mutual respect, mutual resolve and mutual responsibility.”16  It must, that is, 
acknowledge ‘otherness’.  It must accept that differences exist within our 
community and that these differences deserve to be accommodated, not assimilated 
or absorbed into the mainstream, or denied or ignored altogether.  They deserve 
equality of respect and equality of treatment.  In other words, reconciliation and 
mutual respect are a precursor to equality.  As Rudd puts it: 
reconciliation is in fact an expression of a core value of our nation – and that 
value is a fair go for all.  There is a deep and abiding belief in the Australian 
community that, for the stolen generations, there was no fair go at all.17 
The importance of these themes should not be underestimated.  Together, they 
offer hope for a more just future for Aboriginal people, one in which “the injustices 
                                                 
14 Ibid at 167. 
15 Ibid at 170. 
16 Ibid at 167. 
17 Ibid at 170..  As noted in Chapter Nine, this lack of a fair go is also commented on by Sally 
Morgan in her discussion of My Place.  Ben-Messahel, S. “Speaking with Sally Morgan” (2000) 14(2) 
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of the past must never, never happen again.”18  That is, they envisage a future of 
equality. 
 
This vision is one which is also played out in literature.  Sorry,  Landscape of 
Farewell and Benang all explore the need for reconciliation and acceptance of 
‘otherness’.  Sorry and Landscape of Farewell, in particular, also emphasise the 
importance of apologising as a necessary starting point in this process.  Sorry tells 
the story of Perdita, a child of English immigrants, who befriends Mary, an 
Aboriginal girl, and member of the stolen generation, who is sent to live with 
Perdita and her family in Western Australia.  Mary and Perdita become very close, 
to the extent that when Perdita murders her father, and represses the memory, 
Mary takes the blame for the crime and is incarcerated for it.  It is, after all, 
assumed that Mary, an Aboriginal girl covered in the blood of a white man, was 
guilty.  The truth that she was raped by Perdita’s father and that this was why 
Perdita murdered him is unspoken.  Once she recovers her repressed memory, 
Perdita feels terrible guilt for the injustice that her actions have wrought upon 
Mary.  She does not, however, say sorry, and she comes to feel the full weight of 
this failure to apologise: 
She carried the burden of such vast wrongdoing.  There was no honour here 
to know Mary was blameless and imprisoned by something unspoken. 
… there was no atonement.  There was no reparation. 
That was the point, Perdita would realise much later, at which, in humility, 
she should have said ‘sorry’.  She should have imagined what kind of 
imprisonment this was, to be closed against the rustle of leaves and the feel 
of wind and of rain, to be taken from her place, her own place, where her 
mother had died, to be sealed in the forgetfulness of someone else’s crime.  
Perdita should have been otherwise.  She should have said ‘sorry’.19 
                                                 
18 Ibid at 167. 
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By using the example of the effect of Perdita’s failure to apologise, or accept 
responsibility, for Mary’s unjust incarceration, this novel poignantly explicates how 
apology is fundamental to the possibility of a reconciled future.  After Mary’s 
death, Perdita laments, “I should have said sorry to my sister, Mary.  Sorry, my 
sister, oh my sister, sorry.”20  But it is too late, and Perdita’s failure to apologise 
renders her unable to move on from her past.  She is so burdened by her secret that 
“[w]hat remains is broken as my speech once was.”21 
 
Saying sorry allows for the past to be acknowledged.  As Daisy says in My Place, 
“You know what I think?  The government and the white man must own up to 
their mistakes.  There’s been a lot of coverin’ up.”22  It allows for the unspoken to 
be put into words.  It forces the party who has done the wrong to name that which 
they have done.  In this way, apologising is necessary in dismantling the conditions 
that give rise to the différend, and in facilitating reconciliation.  It allows for the 
parties to speak to, and to hear and understand, each other.  This is something that 
has been emphasised by Aboriginal people in their calls for an apology and in their 
responses to Kevin Rudd’s speech.  It was also highlighted in the Bringing Them 
Home report: 
the past is very much with us today, in the continuing devastation of the 
lives of Indigenous Australians.  That devastation cannot be addressed 
unless the whole community listens with an open heart and mind to the 
stories of what has happened in the past and, having listened and 
understood, commits itself to reconciliation. … The Inquiry’s 
recommendations are directed to healing and reconciliation for the benefit 
of all Australians.23 
                                                 
20 Ibid at 211. 
21 Ibid at 212. 
22 Morgan, above n.7 at 434. 
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The importance of apologising is also foregrounded in Alex Miller’s latest work, 
Landscape of Farewell.24  This novel tells the story of retired professor, Max Otto, 
Aboriginal academic, Vita McLelland, and Vita’s uncle, Aboriginal elder, Dougald 
Gnapun.25  Max and Vita first meet at a lecture given by Max on the subject of 
‘massacre’, during which Vita confronts him for “presum[ing] to speak of massacre 
… and not speak of my people”.26  The two nevertheless become friends, and Max 
reveals to Vita his father’s complicity in the murder of Jews in World War Two, 
and his own “guilt-by-association”27 and inability to speak of “the crimes of his 
father’s generation.”28  The past is not spoken of in Max’s family.  They have taken 
a vow of silence: 
Winifred and I knew we could never say anything that would change the 
way that things had been for our parents’ generation.  It was too vast to deal 
with.  Too awful.  Without ever making a pact, we nevertheless permitted 
each other to keep silent about it.  We expected each other not to speak of 
it.  We respected our fathers and mothers by taking a vow of silence.  It was 
a mistake, no doubt.  It was fear and weakness that made us do it.29 
Vita challenges Max for this failure to confront his past and question his father 
about his role in the genocide of the Jews: 
‘It’s not a sin to have regrets, Max.  It’s only a sin to deny having them so we 
don’t have to do anything about them.’ … ‘Why you didn’t ask your 
questions and why you didn’t write your book on massacre is probably a 
good deal more important and interesting than what would have been in 
such a book if you had written it.’30 
                                                 
24 It was also touched on by Miller in Journey to the Stone Country (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & 
Unwin) 2003 which is discussed in Chapter Seven.  At 344 – 345, Panya states: “‘No one never come 
here and asked me to forgive em.  I never heard nothin from none of em.  They knew where I was 
livin all these years, but not one of them Becks or Bigges ever come by and asked me to forgive em.  
All they wanna do is forget. … He just wanna explain everything his own way and forget what he 
done.  But I never gonna forget.’” 
25 Dougald was also one of the characters in Journey to the Stone Country. 
26 Miller, above n.6 at 15. 
27 Ibid at 12. 
28 Ibid at 12. 
29 Ibid at 44. 
30 Ibid at 49.   239
This paralleling of the familiar and accepted history of the German treatment of 
Jews, with an emerging history of black-white relations in Australia, is a useful tool 
by which Miller exemplifies the fundamental importance and necessity of apology.  
He effectively illustrates the way in which the failure to acknowledge, and speak 
of, past barbarities and injustices, and to apologise to those who suffered, shapes 
identity.  Max is burdened by a past of which he has not previously spoken, and so, 
unable to fully embrace his future, plans (unsuccessfully) to end his life.  Australia 
is similarly burdened by its history.  Offering an apology to Aboriginal people 
allows for this history to be acknowledged and spoken about within the public 
domain, and so for our nationa l  i d e n t i t y  t o  b e  r e - f o r m e d .   I n  t h i s  w a y ,  i t  i s  
something which equally benefits white Australians.  Non-Aboriginal people’s 
anxiety about where we belong that Hodge and Mishra write about, for example, 
begins to be addressed by an apology.31  It provides some legitimacy for non-
Aboriginal people in this country.32  It is these points of needing to belong and of 
legitimacy that are emphasised by Miller in Landscape of Farewell. 
 
In  Landscape of Farewell, Max does, in fact, apologise to Vita for his paper’s 
shortcomings and omissions: 
‘Permit me to apologise to you, Professor McLelland … for the poor quality 
of my paper.  You are right, of course, to condemn such shoddiness.  It 
saddens me greatly to have been responsible for your anger.  Let me say 
again, I am sorry.’33 
The apology is important for both Max and Vita.  For Max it is important as it 
causes him to consider the difficulties of “[p]assing the baton of truth from our own 
                                                 
31 Hodge, B. and Mishra, V. Dark Side of the Dream: Australian literature and the postcolonial mind 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin) 1990. 
32 This was also a key concern for postcolonial writers in the late 80’s and 90’s. 
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generation to the next”34 and the need for inter-generational responsibility for past 
misdeeds.  He reflects that: 
We may not ourselves have participated in massacring our fellow humans – 
and surely no sane person will hold the children responsible for the murders 
committed by their fathers – but our troubling sense that we are guilty-by-
association with their crimes is surely justified by our knowledge that we 
are ourselves members of the same murdering species as they.  I am a 
human being first and only second, and by the chance of birth, am I the son 
of my father and mother.  I know myself to by implicated in the guilt of 
both my species and my parents, for it is to these categories of being and to 
these only, that I owe a sense of membership.35 
For Vita its importance lies in its implicit sense of hope: 
‘About the whole thing.  It was impressive.  It was a good moment.  It was 
something I don’t want to forget.  The way you came up to us and 
apologised.  It was beautiful. … After something like that you just can’t go 
back to being silent, can you?  Silence is no longer an option for you after 
something like that, is it?  Silence would make a mockery of it all.  We have 
to take the next step.’36 
Miller’s message here is clear.  He weaves a compelling commentary about the 
importance of breaking silence, of accepting responsibility for past injustices and of 
apologising, as necessary first steps in reconciliation and reparation.  As Vita states: 
‘An apology is just a start.  That’s all it is.  It’s a start.  It’s not everything. … 
If we don’t pay our debts, we can’t go on believing in ourselves.  We’re just 
empty.  We’re nothing.  We’re a joke.’37 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid at 20. 
35 Ibid at 21.  Noel Pearson has commented on intergenerational responsibility in relation to 
Australia: “As to the question of guilt, I am myself equivocal.  I know very clearly that, as 
individuals, ordinary Australians cannot be expected to feel guilty about the past … However, as a 
nation, the Australian community has a collective consciousness and conscience that encompasses a 
responsibility for the present and the future, and the past.  Our collective consciousness includes the 
past.  For how can we as a contemporary community … share and celebrate in the achievements of 
the past, indeed feel responsibility for and express pride in aspects of our past, and not feel 
responsibility for and express shame in relation to other aspects of the past.”  Quoted in McRae, H., 
Nettheim, G., Beacroft, L. and McNamara, L. Indigenous Legal Issues: Commentary and Materials 3rd 
ed. (New South Wales: Lawbook Co.) 2003 at 17. 
36 Ibid at 59 – 60. 
37 Ibid at 56.   241
Reconciliation, Pluralism and the Recognition of ‘Otherness’: The Road 
to Equality 
Reconciliation is an emotive word that is difficult to define.  Tim Rowse writes: 
By the end of the decade of ‘Reconciliation’, 2000, it was clear that the term 
had taken on two competing meanings.  In one vision, the differences 
between Indigenous and other Australians were to fade away; the nation’s 
unity would be predicated on the elimination of ‘difference’.  In the 
competing view, ‘reconciliation’ would enact and enshrine the different 
ways that Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians belonged to 
‘Australia’.  Difference, in this second view, was reconciliation’s 
fundamental principle; in the first view, it was its nemesis.38 
I understand reconciliation to be about understanding, acceptance and difference.  
That is, it is about acknowledging how Indigenous people were treated by non-
indigenous people, understanding and accepting that this has caused continuing 
pain and disadvantage for many Indigenous people, and accepting and respecting 
Aboriginality.  As Kokoberra woman, and Young Australian of the Year in 2007, 
Tania Major states: 
we need to face up to reality.  Face up to the fact that there was a stolen 
generation … My mother was denied an education cos she was black.  And I 
want people to realise that so they can understand how to interact with 
indigenous people.39 
It is also about understanding non-Aboriginal privilege which gives social and 
economic advantage, and the way this is experienced by Aboriginal people.40  
Perhaps most importantly, however, reconciliation is about addressing the 
                                                 
38 Rowse, T. quoted in McRae et al., above n.35 at 67. 
39 Denton, A. Interview with Tania Major, Enough Rope, Episode 145, August 27, 2007.   
<www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s2016257.htm>  Retrieved 15 June 2008. 
40 If we think about angry young Aboriginal men, in particular, this anger may often be about being 
excluded from that privilege.  This is displayed, for example, in Keneally, T. The Chant of Jimmie 
Blacksmith (Australia: Harper Collins) 2001.   242
inequalities that exist between Indigenous and non-indigenous Australians.41  As 
Aden Ridgeway has written: 
For Indigenous people, we require the tools to climb out of ‘black poverty’ 
so that there is human recognition of the need for land, and social and 
political organisation to preserve most of all, cultural identity.  Our struggle 
to achieve ‘just reconciliation’ is our own need and desire to overcome the 
status of second class citizen and to cure ourselves of the problems 
associated with education, health and wider public services.   
Fundamentally, the Australian people must understand and respect that the 
solution must provide us with the capacity to cure our own ills.  It must 
require that you also learn from us in how the cure is found and done, and 
most importantly through reconciliation, it will require you to need us more 
than we need you.42 
 
It is this spirit of acceptance and understanding that was emphasised by Kevin 
Rudd in his apology, and that is evident in the texts discussed in this chapter.  In 
both Landscape of Farewell and Sorry, for example, it is manifest in the friendships 
that evolve between Max and Dougald, and Mary and Perdita.  In Landscape of 
Farewell, Max and Dougald are forced, by Vita, to live together in Dougald’s home 
in outback Queensland.  They happily co-exist, each respecting the other, their 
identities and their differences.43  Max, in this environment, is able to confront his 
                                                 
41 This is perhaps an overly simplistic view of reconciliation.  It was introduced in the 1990’s as a 
government policy.  In 1991 the federal government enacted the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation Act (Cth) which established the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation.  According to 
the then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Robert Tickner, this body was to advise on issues that 
would “enable the nation to move forward over the coming decade with a broadly agreed agenda for 
reform which will meet the aspirations of Aboriginal people.”  Robert Tickner, Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs, quoted in McRae et al., above n.35 at 63.  There has been much written about 
reconciliation.  See, for example, Gratten, M. ed. Essays on Australian Reconciliation (Melbourne: 
Black Inc.) 2000; (1993) 3(61) Aboriginal Law Bulletin, reconciliation issue; Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation, Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge (Canberra: AGPS) 2000. 
42 Above n.4 at 237 – 238. 
43 The novel has many scenes of Max and Dougald enjoying a quiet contentment and understanding.  
For example, Max recounts, “Scrubbing at the remains of burned food that clung to the insides of 
the pots, I found it difficult to recall with any certainty the conditions of my former life.  I turned 
from the sink and looked towards Dougald.  He caught my look and smiled.  It was a slow, gracious, 
kindly, amused smile that drew up the loose folds of his cheeks and formed deep recesses and 
wrinkles around his eyes.  There was much in his smile of understanding, and much was   243
past,44 and Dougald shares his own story with Max.  At Dougald’s request, Max 
writes the story of his great grandfather, the warrior Gnapun.  It is a story of the 
massacre of white settlers by Gnapun and the Aboriginal people whose country 
they have invaded.  More important than the story, however, is that Max writes it 
with such understanding and acceptance that Dougald, after reading it, can only 
say, “‘You could have been there Max.’”45  Equally important is Max’s response, 
“‘Your approval means a great deal to me.  I was afraid you might be offended by 
it.’”46  There is no judging, simply understanding. 
 
Mary and Perdita share a similar relationship of understanding in Sorry.  Perdita 
accepts and respects Mary’s Aboriginality and heritage.  She hates the colour of her 
own skin: 
It was freckled and pale, the mark of her foreignness in this place, the mark 
of implicit deficiency.  She wanted so much to be dark.  When she placed 
her forearm alongside Mary’s she saw the bright negative of a surer 
presence.47 
She shares Mary’s catch of a snake and together they offer it to the Aboriginal 
camp, “not mere food, but evidence of their special connection.”48  And she was 
“delighted” to be given a skin group by Mary, a symbol of her acceptance by Mary’s 
people.49  This stands in stark contrast to Perdita’s father’s acceptance of the 
theories of social Darwinism,50 and Mrs. Trevor, the station owner’s wife’s, opinion 
                                                                                                                                             
communicated to me of a sensitive response in him to our situation together in his home.  I returned 
his smile.” Above n.6 at 74. 
44 For example, he is able to write about his past one night in his journal.  Ibid at 95 – 107. 
45 Ibid at 214. 
46 Ibid at 214. 
47 Jones, above n.6 at 73. 
48 Ibid at 70. 
49 Ibid at 72. 
50 Ibid at 12.   244
that it was her duty to “civilize” the “half-caste girls”.51  I t  i s  t h e  y o u n g e r  
generation, and the friendship of Perdita, Mary and Mrs. Trevor’s son Billy, that 
represents the hope of understanding and reconciliation.  Like Landscape of 
Farewell, there is, between these three friends, only acceptance. 
 
In contrast, the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal characters in Benang do not share 
this relationship of acceptance and understanding.  Harley does not enjoy the 
respect of his grandfather, nor does he offer his respect to Ern.  Rather, he and his 
Nyoongar uncles, force Ern to accompany them on a journey through their 
Nyoongar country.  Ern has suffered a severe stroke and is unable to move or speak, 
and so is compelled to listen while Jack and Will tell Harley about their people and 
about the way that they have been treated by those, such as Ern, who pursued 
policies of assimilation and absorption.  “Old Ern, almost immobile, had closed his 
eyes.  No doubt he wished he could close his ears also.”52  This image of Ern, forced 
to listen to the stories of Harley’s uncles is an important one.  It symbolises the 
need for those who perpetrated the wrongs to listen to the voices and stories of 
those who suffered them.  As Newman states: 
It is this manifestation of Ern Scat as the unwilling witness, an obvious 
metaphor for white Australia, successfully – if ahistorically – forced to listen 
to recounts of the misdeeds of himself and others, which brings this novel 
firmly within the witnessing exchange which is such a fundamental feature 
of reconciliation narratives.53 
White Australia must listen to Aboriginal people as a precursor to understanding 
and acceptance.54 
                                                 
51 Ibid at 22. 
52 Scott, above n.6 at 386. 
53 Newman, P. “Disgrace, Benang, And The Search For Benevolence” (2005) 85 Journal of Australian 
Studies 85 at 92. 
54 This willingness to listen to and hear Aboriginal peoples’ voices is also evident in McGahan, A. 
The White Earth (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2005.  Here, Ruth wishing to atone for the   245
The telling of (and listening to) such stories is important.  Anthony Uhlmann 
writes that there must be: 
an attempt to understand, on the part of non-indigenous Australians, the 
lived experience of the other neighbours who are indigenous Australians. … 
My suggestion is that stories have a place in this process, one which is of 
relevance not only to ‘average readers’ but to the law as a system of 
interpretation.55 
This is an important point.  It is also one which was the focus of postcolonial 
writing in Australia in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  This writing foregrounded the need 
to listen to colonised peoples’ stories.  Importantly, this is not just about Aboriginal 
people writing these stories, but also the way non-Aboriginal people take up these 
issues and write about them.  The importance of this is seen in the national apology 
and call for reconciliation.  The telling of stories such as Benang, Landscape of 
Farewell and Sorry allows for alternative experiences and perspectives to be told.  
They tell of things that have been kept silent and demand that Aboriginal 
perspectives be listened to.  They are, in this way, enormously valuable in 
facilitating understanding between people, and in informing of the impact of the 
law at the level of both the legal, in the way that it denied Aboriginal people 
equality, and the social, in the way in which the knowledge and perceptions 
created by it are experienced and perpetuated in the community.  These stories 
create a space for reconciliation, and demand greater understanding and 
acceptance, and, perhaps more importantly, explicate that if reconciliation (and so 
                                                                                                                                             
misdeeds of her father, meets with and listens to the Aboriginal women at Cherbourg who were 
forced from Kuran Station, and raises with them the possibility of them re-acquiring their land.  By 
the end of the novel the possibility of the land being returned has increased.  William inherits the 
property after his uncle’s death.  At the outset of the novel, William wants to inherit the property 
for himself.  However, by the end of the novel, and after listening to the stories relayed to him by 
Ruth, and the voices that he hears in the bush, he is no longer sure.  There is an unspoken desire, in 
the spirit of reconciliation, to return the land to the Aboriginal owners.  This novel is discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
55 Uhlmann, A. “Law Translating Life and Life Translating Law Through Stories: Bringing Them 
Home and Benang by Kim Scott” (2001) 15 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 41 at 48.   246
equality) is to be realised, the law (and society) needs to be open to difference.  
That is, they highlight the need for acceptance of, and respect for, ‘otherness’.   
And, importantly, this ‘otherness’ needs to be accommodated, not absorbed or 
assimilated.  Attempts at the latter led to the injustices contained in the legislation 
detailed in Chapter Nine, and the law (and society) must ensure that such atrocities 
do not recur. 
 
In Chapter Two, I introduced the idea of pluralism.  I explained there that 
pluralism embraces diversity.  It recognises that a variety of norms and perspectives 
can exist within society, and that there is no single universal or totalizing theory 
that orders or explains everyone’s experiences or existence.  Our positivist law 
does, however, promote a singular, unified system, one which emphasises totality 
and denies alterity.  One of the consequences of this emphasis on singularity and 
totality, as evidenced by the assimilation and absorption policies pursued by 
Australian governments throughout the twentieth century, is that the law seeks to 
reduce all differences to the same, and to digest ‘otherness’ into itself.  As Uhlmann 
explains it: 
A totalising language … seeks to absorb the other within the idea of the 
same and assimilate the other to the same’s self-understanding and as such is 
unjust and violent.56 
Perhaps most importantly, however, this insistence upon uniformity silences that 
which does not conform.57  As Uhlmann continues: 
The worst possible violence, however, is silence. … Indigenous Australians 
have experienced the worst possible violence of terra nullius, a silence of 
non-recognition, and they have experienced the violence of the totalising 
                                                 
56 Ibid at 46. 
57 Positivism and the way that it denies and silences difference is discussed in Chapter Two.   247
monologic discourse of assimilation which sought to reduce their otherness 
to the same of white Australia.58 
The law has denied Aboriginal people their identity, refused to recognise their 
existence, and so has silenced Aboriginal peoples’ voices within the dominant 
domain.  This denial of identity was predominantly within the public domain, 
however it also occurred privately for those children who were taken away and 
were not given any knowledge of who they were (and are).  This often became an 
issue for them as adults, or once they discovered their identity.59 
 
The dangers of singularity and totality are manifest, for example, in Benang in Ern’s 
“eugenicist fantasy – a fantasy of a world without difference”,60 which promotes the 
absorption of the black into the white and the removal, for ever, of any traces of an 
Aboriginal ‘race’.  It seeks to reduce “a rich and variously shared place to one 
fragile, impoverished consciousness”,61 a process which makes Harley feel 
“impoverished, weakened, reduced.”62  Pluralism, however, offers an alternative to 
this denial and repression of difference.  It foregrounds that other ways of 
perceiving law and other ways of experiencing law exist, and that law is not “one 
system, imposed on one society.”63  It emphasises the local and the diverse, and is 
open to, and willing to listen to, ‘otherness’.  This is an important point.  As 
Lyotard has said of totalising theories: 
                                                 
58 Above n.55 at 46. 
59 This is an issue, for example, for Harley in Benang. 
60 S l a t e r ,  L .  “ B e n a n g ,  T h i s  “ M o s t  L o c a l  o f  H i s t o r i e s ” :  A n n e x i n g  C o l o n i a l  R e c o r d s  i n t o  a  W o r l d  
without End” (2006) 41(1) Journal of Commonwealth Literature 51 at 61. 
61 Scott, above n.6 at 33. 
62 Ibid at 33. 
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The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we 
can take.  We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia for the whole 
and the one.64 
For Lyotard, this desire for totality culminated in the Gulag and Auschwitz.65  In 
Australia, it has led to the (legally sanctioned) theft of land and the introduction of 
inhumane and discriminatory legislation.  Pluralism challenges this totality, and 
allows ‘otherness’ to exist without being reduced to the same. 
 
In  Benang, Scott illustrates the possibilities of pluralism through Harley, who 
“experiences the heterogeneity of the world and proximity with otherness without 
needing to assimilate it into his knowledge system.”66 He is educated to be white, 
and denied his own identity.  That is, he is reduced to the sameness of being white.  
Yet, he is nevertheless able to hear other (Nyoongar) voices and stories, and so: 
begins to recognize what possibilities exist outside this authoritative 
discourse that might enable him to become someone other that the “first 
white man born”.67 
He rebels against Ern’s insistent reduction of difference to sameness, and seeks to 
write a counter history which allows the diversity and multiplicity of his people to 
be heard and celebrated.68 
 
Benang is thus a text that tells many different stories, and presents many different 
experiences and perspectives.  It is “a meeting place” that allows for these plural 
stories to be told and that enables exchange and understanding between Aboriginal 
                                                 
64 Lyotard, J-F. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. Bennington, G. and 
Massumi, B. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 1984 at 81 – 82. 
65 Lyotard is discussed in Chapter Four. 
66 Slater, above n.60 at 63. 
67 Ibid at 61. 
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and non-Aboriginal Australians to begin.69  As Harley explains at the outset of the 
novel: 
it is not really me who sings, for although I touch the earth only once in my 
performance – leaving a single footprint in white sand and ash – through me 
we hear the rhythm of many feet pounding the earth, and the strong pulse 
of countless hearts beating.70 
Harley (and Scott) insists that we listen to these stories, to these “many feet”, even 
if it makes us uncomfortable: 
I offer these words, especially to those of you I embarrass, and who turn 
away from the shame of seeing me; or perhaps it is because your eyes smart 
as the wind blows the smoke a little toward you, and you hear something 
like a million million many-sized hearts beating, and the whispering of 
waves, leaves, grasses … 
We are still here, Benang.71 
For Scott, it is by listening to these stories that Australia can begin to acknowledge 
the diversity of its culture, “displace colonial logic”72 and “begin to create new ways 
of narrating Australia.”73  As Slater explains, by listening to Harley’s story and the 
multiplicity of stories which he tells: 
Australians can begin to rearticulate the country and themselves, in the 
hope of forging a new ethics of engagement, and thereby constituting a 
“new” country.  In experimenting with a dialogic style of writing, Harley 
deploys writing as a tool for transformation in which he does not capture 
otherness and reduce it to the same, but rather forges connections.74 
Perhaps most importantly, then, Benang is a text which shows how it is possible to 
recognise and respect difference, and which demands that such difference be 
accommodated and accepted as “legitimate modes of being.”75  Scott emphasises 
                                                 
69 Slater, L. “Kim Scott’s Benang: An Ethics of Uncertainty” (2005) 4 Journal of the Association for 
the Study of Australian Literature 147 at 158. 
70 Scott, above n.6 at 9. 
71 Ibid at 497. 
72 Slater, above n.69 at 148. 
73 Ibid at 158. 
74 Ibid at 148. 
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that it is no longer acceptable for difference to “be digested into a more complex 
unity.”76  The denial of diversity has led to the inequalities and discrimination 
suffered by Aboriginal people.  By informing the reader of the treatment of 
Nyoongar people, their resistance to this treatment, and of their experiences and 
stories, Scott presents the possibility of a future in which difference can be 
respected and accepted.  He shows how Australia can appreciate and listen to 
‘otherness’ without making the mistakes of assimilation once again. 
 
In My Place, Daisy asks: 
Do you think we’ll get some respect?  I like to think the black man will get 
treated same as the white man one day.  Be good, wouldn’t it?  By gee, it’d 
be good.77 
If this equality is to be realised, the acceptance of and respect for difference that is 
foregrounded in Benang is essential.  As explained in Chapter Eight, there is a 
difference between standards of formal and substantive equality.  The latter will 
not be achieved simply by removing measures, such as the 1905 Aborigines Act, or 
by stipulating that Aboriginal people are entitled to the same rights and 
opportunities as non-Aboriginal Australians.  This assumes that we are all the same, 
and, as discussed above, we are not.78  In his apology, Kevin Rudd envisages: 
A future where all Australians, whatever their origins, are truly equal 
partners, with equal opportunities and with an equal stake in shaping the 
next chapter in the history of this great country, Australia.79 
It is important, if this is to be achieved, for the law, and for society as a whole, to 
appreciate Aboriginal peoples’ differences. 
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At the time of telling his story to Sally in My Place, Arthur Corunna did not think 
that Australia had reached this point: 
You see, the trouble is that colonialism isn’t over yet.  We still have a White 
Australia policy against the Aborigines.  Aah, it’s always been the same.  
They say there’s no difference between black and white, we all Australians, 
that’s a lie.  I tell you, the black man has nothin’, the government’s been 
robbin’ him blind for years. 
There’s so much the whitefellas don’t understand.  They want us to be 
assimilated into the white, but we don’t want to be.  They complain about 
our land rights, but they don’t understand the way we want to live.  They 
say that we shouldn’t get the land, but the white man’s had land rights since 
this country was invaded, our land rights.80 
Arthur makes an important point.  Achieving equality necessitates that Aboriginal 
peoples’ voices be heard within the dominant discourse.  That is, Australia must 
configure itself as postcolonial.81  Arthur laments that colonialism “isn’t over yet”, 
and, as explained in Chapter Four, Australia is still a colonial country.  We 
continue to live by the colonisers’ law and it is the colonisers’ culture which 
predominates.  We live in a country where the colonisers are still present.   
Nevertheless, Australia can, and must, embrace its multiplicity, listen to local 
voices and perspectives, endeavour to understand their differences, and so begin to 
accord equality to all who live here. 
 
My Place and Benang both demonstrate the possibility of change.  They both 
highlight how the 1905 Act in denying Aboriginal identity resulted in a lack of 
equality for Aboriginal people and how, with the recognition and acceptance of 
difference, this can begin to change.  In My Place, in particular, Sally does not, for 
example, harbour the same fears and shame experienced by her mother and 
                                                 
80 Morgan, above n.7 at 267 – 268. 
81 There are, however, many difficulties associated with according Australia, as a settler nation, 
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grandmother.  She does not need to worry that her children will be taken away 
because they are Aboriginal.  She is able to receive a university education and 
pursue a professional career.  She is able to write the story of her family with a 
voice that can be heard within the dominant discourse.  These are but small steps.  




In Chapters Nine and Ten I have focused on stories about equality to show how 
literature can inform readers about the law.  In particular, I have argued that these 
novels show how the law has not, despite its assertions, treated everyone equally.  
The novels discussed in Chapter Nine clearly expose that the rule of law, 
introduced into Australia at the time of settlement, has not accorded Aboriginal 
people equality.  Rather, Aboriginal people have been denied equality, denied their 
identity and have been subjugated by a positivist, colonial law that defined them as 
‘inferior’ and ‘uncivilised’ in order to justify its policies of assimilation and 
discrimination.  The law as embodied in the Aborigines Act 1905 (WA), did not 
accommodate difference or pluralism.  It repressed and denied Aboriginal identities 
and differences, and silenced Aboriginal voices within the dominant discourse, 
denying Aborigines the right or the ability to object to the injustices to which they 
were subjected. 
 
Importantly, however, these texts also highlight the possibility of transition from 
the law as enshrined in the 1905 Act, to a law which recognises Aboriginal peoples’ 
diversity and ‘otherness’, and treats them with the equality promised by the rule of   253
law.  I have argued in this chapter that the law, if equality for Aboriginal people is 
to be realised, must be more pluralistic in its treatment of, and relationship with, 
Aboriginal people.82  The texts discussed here show how the law can engage with 
difference, rather than repressing it and silencing it.  And importantly, they 
demonstrate that this recognition and acceptance is an essential precursor to 
achieving equality. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the end of writing this thesis I am left with an overriding and resounding 
thought.  This is not my country.  I am, at best, a visitor.  At worst, an invader.  I 
have enjoyed the benefits of belonging to a culture which has flourished at the 
expense of the many and diverse cultures which have existed here since before 
colonisation.  I am complicit in the violent history of the oppression of Aboriginal 
people.  It is the law of the colonisers, my law, that has denied the existence of 
Aboriginal people, stolen Aboriginal land, separated Aboriginal families and failed 
to accord Aboriginal people equality.  This law has deliberately constructed 
Aboriginal people as ‘primitive’, ‘uncivilised’ and ‘inferior’, and actively used these 
constructions to justify its own right to Aboriginal land and the forced assimilation 
of Aboriginal people into white Australia.  It has legitimated Aboriginal 
dispossession under the principle of terra nullius and deprived Aboriginal people of 
its full rights and protections under the guise of equality, of making all Australians 
the same.  And it silenced them.  It did not recognise Aboriginal peoples’ voices, 
perspectives and experiences, and it denied them the right and the ability to 
challenge, within the dominant discourse, the injustices to which they were 
subjected. 
 
This is what the literary texts that I have examined here tell me.  The stories they 
tell are not always or entirely fictitious.  They recount the reality of the way that 
the law has mistreated Aboriginal people.  It is a fact that Australia was simply 
taken by the English on the basis that it was an empty land.  It is a fact that the law 
legitimated and justified the dispossession of Aboriginal people.  It is a fact that 
Aboriginal people continue to struggle today for recognition of their land rights 
and that native title rights are not accorded, within our legal system, a status equal   255
to non-native title property rights.  It is fact that the law implemented a barbaric 
and repressive regime of oppression and discrimination against Aboriginal people.  
And it is a fact that not until 2008 would Australia’s federal political leaders 
acknowledge and apologise for the way that our law treated (and treats) this 
country’s Indigenous peoples.1  It is these facts that are exposed in the novels 
discussed here. 
 
While writing this thesis I was asked by an (anonymous) friend, “why do you want 
to write about this stuff?  It’s all over now anyway.”  It is made clear by the texts 
discussed here that it is not “all over”.  Aboriginal people continue to feel the 
impact of the law’s mistreatment of them.  They continue to feel the consequences 
of being forcibly removed from their land and of being forcibly separated from 
their families.  These consequences are manifest in many areas from educational 
and employment opportunities and the over representation of Aboriginal people in 
the criminal justice system, to life expectancy and infant mortality rates, and so on.  
As Kim Scott states, in many areas of life, “Australia’s Indigenous communities 
remain at a disadvantage compared to the rest of the population.”2  It is important 
that we are made aware of these realities.  This is why the works discussed here are 
so valuable. 
 
Importantly, however, these texts inform the reader about the law in a number of 
important ways, beyond the impact that it has had on the lives of Aboriginal 
people.  They expose how the law regulates not only the legal but also the social in 
the way that it creates normative standards that shape the way that people 
perceive, and are perceived by, each other.  That is, they reveal how the law 
                                                 
1 It should be noted here that some state leaders have issued their own apologies. 
2 Scott, K. “Covered up with Sand” (2007) 66(2) Meanjin 120 at 121.   256
constructs identity and how it creates the ‘other’.  This ‘other’, which is different, 
or somehow does not conform to the law’s constructed standards and values, is 
then often marginalised and excluded from many aspects of the law, and society.  
In this thesis, I have focused on the way in which the law has constructed and 
marginalised the Aboriginal ‘other’.  There are, however, many other instances in 
which the law has constructed (and constructs) identity.  Women, refugees, asylum 
seekers, illegal immigrants, terrorists and gay and lesbian are just some of the 
identities that have been formed and reformed by the law.  It is this power of the 
discourse of law, in the way that it constructs identity, produces knowledge and 
creates ‘truth’ that is revealed in the novels discussed here.  They highlight 
Foucault’s claims that “power produces knowledge”3 and that “[d]iscourses generate 
truths.”4 
 
Perhaps most importantly, however, these texts explicate how the law, in the way 
that it produces such knowledge and constructs identity, silences.  They expose 
how the law denies those it identifies as ‘other’ a voice within the dominant 
discourse so that they are unable to question and challenge the wrongs perpetrated 
against them.  That is, the failure of the law to recognise, or listen to, Aboriginal 
peoples’ voices, perspectives and experiences has given rise to a différend.  Their 
“versions of reality are either silenced or already judged.”5 
 
I have argued in this thesis that, through their portrayal of these issues, the texts 
discussed here clearly inform about the structures and limitations of our positivist 
legal system and, in particular, its insistence on identifying that which is within 
                                                 
3 Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon) 1977 at 27. 
4 Hunt, A. and Wickham, G. Foucault and the Law (London: Pluto Press) 1994 at 11. 
5 Rodan, D. Identity and Justice: Conflicts, Contradictions and Contingencies (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter 
Land) 2004 at 86.   257
law and that which is not.  As explained in Chapter Two, it is this concern with 
excluding the non-law that has led to the law’s marginalisation of that which is not 
deemed within law or does not conform to law’s self imposed and defined 
standards.  That is, it has led to the castigation, marginalisation and exclusion of the 
‘other’ and the different.  I have critiqued the way in which this positivist (and 
colonial) law has excluded Aboriginal perspectives from its domain, refused to 
acknowledge or respect Aboriginal laws and Aboriginal legal systems and excluded 
Aboriginal people from full and equal access to its benefits, while, at the same time, 
including them within its controls and restrictions. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the law needs to be more flexible.   
Arguing from a postcolonial perspective, I have suggested that the law needs to be 
more open to, and to listen to, local voices and perspectives.  It needs to be more 
open to the possibility of different ways of doing things and different ways of 
perceiving and relating to law and society.  It needs to accommodate these 
differences, not assimilate or digest them.  It needs to listen, not silence.  And, it 
needs to embrace equality, not merely formally, but substantively.  In this way, the 
injustices and the discrimination identified in this thesis can be addressed. 
 
Importantly, the texts analysed here do show that the law can be more flexible and 
open to change.  This is seen, for example, in the transition from the pre-Mabo law, 
as represented in The Timeless Land, Doctor Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring 
the Ending of the World and The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith, to the post-Mabo 
law portrayed in The Secret River, The White Earth and Journey to the Stone 
Country.  As explained in Chapter Seven, these novels show how, as evidenced in, 
and following, the Mabo decision, the ‘other’ is beginning to be recognised by our   258
law, and how this law, when challenged, can change.  And so, for example, the 
theories of social Darwinism and constructions of Aborigines as ‘primitive’ and 
‘uncivilised’, that were supported in Eleanor Dark’s telling of Australia’s settlement, 
are questioned and critiqued in Kate Grenville’s re-writing of this story.  She 
presents a law which recognises that the application of terra nullius to Australia 
was a fiction.  Similarly, the novels discussed in Part Three demonstrate a 
transformation from a law which endorsed and promoted policies of protection, 
segregation and assimilation as enshrined in the repressive and discriminatory 
Aborigines Act 1905 (WA), to one which can potentially embrace the respect and 
equality argued for in the novels discussed in Chapter Ten. 
 
I hope in this thesis that I have shown that the law is important.  As explained in 
Chapter One, law is not just about regulating speed limits or contractual 
obligations.  It is not just about a principle of international law that stipulated that 
if land was ‘empty’ an occupying nation could claim sovereignty over it, or about 
legislation that prohibited Aboriginal people from entering a pub, or getting 
married without permission.  It is about creating perceptions and normative 
standards that shape the way we relate to the world, and that continue to lead to 
prejudice and discrimination.  And so, even though the law may have changed in 
the way that it treats Aboriginal people, the consequences of past injustices 
continue to be felt by those who suffered.  The law must be aware of the impact 
that it has on individuals beyond the purely legal, and it must be willing to change 
both to accommodate and to guide community standards. 
 
A review in the Canberra Times says of Kim Scott’s Benang that it is: 
[h]aunting and poignant, [and that it] pierces the heart even as it seeks to 
lance the savage bleeding of the wounds of white settlement in Australia.    259
At the end of the book the reader must choose a moment’s silence, the held 
breath, as in the presence of art or worship, or the sudden clamouring of the 
heart, shouting that such a thing should never be allowed to happen again.6 
If literature can herald such sentiment and determination, and inform the reader 
about the way the law operates and the impact that it can have on individuals and 
society as a whole, then it is a powerful and useful medium.  Not only can it 
educate about the law, it can also imagine the possibilities of difference; of mutual 
respect, recognition of ‘otherness’ and equality.  At the beginning of this thesis, I 
quoted Paul Keating’s Redfern Park speech where he called on all non-Aboriginal 
Australians to imagine that it was they who suffered the injustices that have been 
inflicted on Aboriginal people, because “if we can imagine the injustice then we 
can imagine the opposite.  And we can have justice.”7  Literature is a medium for 
the expression of this imagination.  Kevin Rudd’s apology to Australia’s Indigenous 
peoples shows how the imagination can be translated into reality. 
                                                 
6 Quoted on the cover of Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000. 
7 Keating, P. “The Redfern Park Speech” in Gratten, M. ed. Essays on Australian Reconciliation 
(Melbourne: Black Inc.) 2000 at 63.   260
REFERENCES 
Articles, Books, Reports 
Allen, T.R.S. “Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and 
Constitutionalism” (1985) 44(1) Cambridge Law Journal 111. 
Aristodemou, M. Law and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2000. 
Aronson, M., Dyer, B. and Groves, M. Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(Pyrmont NSW: Lawbook Co.) 2004. 
Arthur, K. “Fiction and the Rewriting of History: A Reading of Colin Johnson” 
(1985) 1 Westerly 55. 
Arthurs, H. “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1. 
Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. The Empire Writes Back (London: 
Routledge) 1989. 
Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. Post-colonial Studies Reader (London: 
Routledge) 1995. 
Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. The Empire Writes Back 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge) 2002. 
Ashcroft, B. “The Horizontal Sublime” (2005) 19(2) Antipodes 141. 
Attwood, B. “Portrait of an Aboriginal as an Artist: Sally Morgan and the 
Construction of Aboriginality” (1992) 25 Australian Historical Studies 302. 
Austin, J. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 2 nd ed. (New York: Burt 
Franklin) 1970. 
Bartlett, R. Native Title in Australia 2nd ed. (Australia: Butterworths) 2004. 
Behrendt, L. “What Lies Beneath” (2006) 65(1) Meanjin 4. 
Ben-Messahel, S. “Speaking with Sally Morgan” (2000) 14(2) Antipodes 99. 
Bennett, M. “‘“The Rule of Law” Means Literally What it Says: The Rule of Law’: 
Fuller and Raz on Formal Legality and the Concept of Law” (2007) 32 Australian 
Journal of Legal Philosophy 90. 
Benterrak, K., Muecke, S. and Roe, P. Reading the Country (Fremantle: Fremantle 
Arts Centre Press) 1996.   261
Berns, S. Concise Jurisprudence (New South Wales: Federation Press) 1993. 
Bradbrook, A., MacCallum, S. and Moore, A. Australian Real Property Law 3rd ed. 
(Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002. 
Brady, V. “Reading Aboriginal Writing” (1994) 2 Westerly 41. 
Brennan, G. “Australian Values – Some Reflections” (2007) 79(4) Australian 
Quarterly 7. 
Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Sydney: Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) 1997. 
Brown, J. “Unlearning Dominant Modes of Representation: Mudrooroo’s Doctor 
Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World and Robert 
Drewe’s The Savage Crows” (1993) 3 Westerly 71. 
Bryden, P. “Canadian Administrative Law in Transition 1963 – 1988” (1988) 
University of British Columbia Law Review 147. 
Burgess, C. “The Impact of Postmodernism, Postcolonialism and Cultural Studies 
on Japanese Studies in Australia” (2001) 21(1) Japanese Studies 61. 
Buti, A. After the Removal: A Submission by the Aboriginal Legal Service of 
Western Australia (Inc) to the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Children From Their Families (Perth: Aboriginal Legal 
Service of Western Australian (Inc)) 1995. 
Carey, P. True History of the Kelly Gang (Queensland: University of Queensland 
Press) 2002. 
Castles, A. An Australian Legal History (Sydney: Law Book Company) 1982. 
Clancy, R. The Mapping of Terra Australia (NSW: Universal Press) 1995. 
Clarke, M. For the Term of His Natural Life (Victoria: Currey O’Neil) 1984. 
Clendinnen, I. “The History Question: Who Owns the Past” (2006) 23 Quarterly 
Essay 1. 
Collins, E. “Poison in the Flour: Historical Novel or Tragic Love Story” (2006) 65(1) 
Meanjin 38. 
Cornell, D. Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the 
Law (New York: Routledge) 1991.   262
Cooper, A. “Talking About My Place / My Place, Feminism, Criticism and the 
Other’s Autobiography” (1995) 28 Southern Review 140. 
Creyke, R. and McMillan, J. Control of Government Action: Text, Cases & 
Commentary (Chatswood NSW: Butterworths) 2005. 
Curthoys, A. “Expulsion, Exodus and Exile in White Australian Historical 
Mythology” (1999) 61 Journal of Australian Studies 1. 
Dark, E. The Timeless Land (Sydney: Harper Collins) 2002. 
Davies, M. Asking the Law Question (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 1994. 
Davies, M. Delimiting the Law: ‘Postmodernism’ and the Politics of Law (London: 
Pluto Press) 1996. 
Davies, M. Asking the Law Question 2nd ed. (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 2002. 
Davies, M. “Exclusion and the Identity of Law” (2005) 5 Macquarie Law Journal 5. 
Davies, M. “The Ethos of Pluralism” (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 87. 
Denton, A. Interview with Tania Major, Enough Rope, Episode 145, August 27, 
2007.  <www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s2016257.htm>   
Detmold, M. “Law and Difference: Reflections on Mabo’s Case” in Essays on the 
Mabo Decision (Sydney: Law Book Company) 1993. 
Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10th ed. 
(London: Macmillan) 1960. 
Dodson, M. “The Wentworth Lecture: The end in the beginning: re(de)fining 
Aboriginality” (1994) 1 Australian Aboriginal Studies 2. 
Dolin, K. A Critical Introduction to Law and Literature (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press) 2007. 
Douglas, R. Douglas and Jones’s Administrative Law 4 th ed. (NSW: Federation 
Press) 2002. 
Douzinas, C. and Gearey, A. Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of 
Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing) 2005. 
Douzinas, C., Warrington, R. and McVeigh, S. Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law 
of Text in the Texts of Law (London: Routledge) 1991. 
Drewe, R. The Shark Net (Victoria: Penguin) 2001.   263
During, S. “Postmodernism or Post-colonialism Today” (1987) 1(1) Textual Practice 
32. 
Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth) 1977. 
Eagleton, T. Literary Theory: An Introduction 2 nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing) 1996. 
Elder, B. Blood on the Wattle: Massacres and Maltreatment of Australian 
Aborigines since 1788 2nd ed. (NSW: National Book Distributors) 1992. 
Fanon, F. Wretched of the Earth (Hammondsworth: Penguin) 1967. 
Finnis, J. Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1980. 
Flannagan, R. Gould’s Book of Fish (Sydney: Picador) 2001. 
Forster, E.M. A Passage to India (London: Penguin Classics) 2005. 
Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Pantheon) 1977. 
Foucault, M. Power / Knowledge trans. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press) 
1980. 
Freeman, M.D.A. Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 6th ed., (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell) 1994. 
French, R. “Administrative Law in Australia: Themes and Values” in Groves, M. 
and Lee, H.P. Australian Administrative Law (Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press) 2007. 
Gleeson, M. “Courts and the Rule of Law”  Speech delivered in the Rule of Law 
Series at Melbourne University on 7 November 2001, 
<www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm> 
Gleeson, M. “A Core Value”  Speech delivered at the Judicial Conference of 
Australia Annual Colloquium, Canberra, 6 October 2006, 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_6oct06.pdf> 
Gratten, M. ed. Essays on Australian Reconciliation (Melbourne: Black Inc.) 2000. 
Graycar, R. and Morgan, J. The Hidden Gender of Law (Sydney: Federation Press) 
1990. 
Grenville, K. The Secret River (Melbourne: Text Publishing) 2006. 
Grenville, K. “Secret River – Secret History” (2006) The Sydney Papers 149.   264
Grenville, K. “The History Question: Response” (2007) 25 Quarterly Essay 66. 
Griffiths, G. “The Myth of Authenticity” in Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. 
Post-colonial Studies Reader (London: Routledge) 1995. 
Griffiths, J. “What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 1. 
Haebich, A. For Their Own Good: Aborigines and Government in the Southwest of 
Western Australia (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press) 1988. 
Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1994. 
Hasluck, N. A Grain of Truth (Victoria: Penguin) 1994. 
Hocking, B. “Does Aboriginal Law Now Run in Australia?” (1979) 10 Federal Law 
Review 161. 
Hocking, B. “Aboriginal Law Now Does Run in Australia: Reflections on the Mabo 
case: from Cooper v Stuart through Milirrpum to Mabo” (1993) 15 Sydney Law 
Review 187. 
Hodge, B. and Mishra, V. Dark Side of the Dream: Australian literature and the 
postcolonial mind (Sydney: Allen & Unwin) 1990. 
Hookey, J. “The Gove Land Rights Case: A Judicial Dispensation for the Taking of 
Aboriginal Lands in Australia?” (1972) 5 Federal Law Review 85. 
Howard, J. “Coalition Campaign Address” Liberal Party of Australia 
<http://www.liberal.org.au/info/news/detail/20071112_CoalitionCampaignAddress.
php> 
Hunt, A. and Wickham, G. Foucault and the Law (London: Pluto Press) 1994. 
Ivison, D. Postcolonial Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2002. 
Jacobs, P. Mister Neville, a biography (Fremantle: Fremantle Art Centre Press) 
1990. 
Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody volume 1, 1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/ 
rciadic/national/vol1/> 
Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody volume 2, 1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/ 
rciadic/national/vol2/>   265
Johnston, E. National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody, volume 5, 1991 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/ 
rsjlibrary/rciadic/national/vol5/1.html> 
Jones, G. Sorry (NSW: Vintage Books) 2007. 
Keating, P. “The Redfern Park Speech” in Gratten, M. ed. Essays on Australian 
Reconciliation (Melbourne: Black Inc.) 2000. 
Kelsen, H. Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1967. 
Kelsen, H. General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell) 1961. 
Keneally, T. The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith (Australia: Harper Collins) 2001. 
Keneally, T. “The borrowers” The Age August 30, 2003 
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/29/1062050656844.html> 
Kossew, S. “Voicing the “Great Australian Silence”: Kate Grenville’s Narrative of 
Settlement in The Secret River” (2007) 42 The Journal of Commonwealth 
Literature 7. 
Koval, R. ABC Radio National, Interview with Kate Grenville, 17 July 2005 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/bwriting/stories/s1414510.htm> 
Langton, M. Well I heard it on the radio and saw it on the television … (Sydney: 
Australian Film Commission) 1993. 
Leiboff, M. and Thomas, M. Legal Theories in Principle (Sydney: Lawbook Co.) 
2004. 
Lodge, D. Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader (London: Longman) 1988. 
Lyotard, J-F. “The Différend, the Referent, and the Proper Name” (1984) 14(3) 
Diacritics 3. 
Lyotard, J-F. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. 
Bennington, G. and Massumi, B. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 
1984. 
Lyotard, J-F. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abeele 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 1988. 
Manderson, D. “Beyond the Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal 
Theory” (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 1048. 
Mansfield, J. “How Balanced are the Scales of Justice? The Rule of Law in Australia” 
(2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 1.   266
McGahan, A. Last Drinks (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2001. 
McGahan, A. The White Earth (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2005. 
McKenna, M “Writing the Past” <http://www.humanitieswritingproject.net.au/ 
mckenna.htm> 
M c N e i l ,  K .  “ A  Q u e s t i o n  o f  T i t l e :  Has the Common Law been Misapplied to 
Dispossess the Aboriginals?” (1990) 16 Monash University Law Review 91. 
McRae, H., Nettheim, G., Beacroft, L. and McNamara, L. Indigenous Legal Issues: 
Commentary and Materials 3rd ed. (New South Wales: Lawbook Co.) 2003. 
Memmi, A. The Colonizer and the Colonized (London: Earthscan Publications) 
1990. 
Miller, A. Journey to the Stone Country (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2003. 
Miller, A. Landscape of Farewell (Crow’s Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin) 2007. 
Mishra, V. and Hodge, B. “What is post(-)colonialism?” (1991) 5(3) Textual Practice 
399. 
Moore, L. “The Queen v Carlton James Winmar (Repelling the Pulyarts – cultural 
clash and criminal responsibility)” (1990) 2(46) Aboriginal Law Bulletin 17. 
Morgan, S. My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1988. 
Morison, J. and Bell, C. eds. Tall Stories? Reading Law and Literature (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth) 1996. 
Mudrooroo,  Doctor Wooreddy’s Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the 
World (Melbourne: Hyland House) 2001. 
Muecke, S. “Aboriginal Literature and the Repressive Hypothesis” (1988) 48(4) 
Southerly 405. 
Murray, R. “Hollywood on the Hawkesbury” (2007) 51(4) Quadrant 67. 
Nannup, A., Marsh, L. and Kinnane, S. When the Pelican Laughed (Fremantle: 
Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1992. 
Nettheim, G. “Judicial Revolution or Cautious Correction? Mabo v Queensland” 
(1993) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1. 
Newman, P. “Disgrace, Benang, And The Search For Benevolence” (2005) 85 
Journal of Australian Studies 85.   267
Newton, K.M. ed. Twentieth Century Literary Theory: A Reader 2nd ed. (London: 
Macmillan Press) 1997. 
Orwell, G. Animal Farm (London: Folio Society) 1984. 
Patton, P. “Post-structuralism and the Mabo Debate: Difference, Society and 
Justice” in Wilson, M. and Yeatman, A. Justice and Identity: Antipodean Practices 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin) 1995. 
Patton, P. “The translation of indigenous land into property: the mere analogy of 
English jurisprudence” (2000) 6(1) Parallax 25. 
Pierce, P. “The Solitariness of Alex Miller” (2004) 21(3) Australian Literary Studies 
299. 
Posner, R. Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press) 1988. 
Potter, E. “Andrew McGahan’s The White Earth and the Ecological Poetics of 
Memory” (2006) 20(2) Antipodes 177. 
Raz, J. “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81Yale Law Journal 823. 
Reilly, A. “Introduction” (2000) 1(1) Balayi: Culture, Law and Colonialism 1. 
Reynolds, H. Dispossession: Black Australians and White Invaders (New South 
Wales: Allen & Unwin) 1989. 
Rice, P. and Waugh, P. Modern Literary Theory: A Reader 3rd ed. (London: Arnold) 
1991. 
Ritter, D. “The “Rejection of Terra Nullius” in Mabo: A Critical Analysis” (1996) 18 
Sydney Law Review 5. 
Rodan, D. Identity and Justice: Conflicts, Contradictions and Contingencies 
(Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang) 2004. 
Rodan, D. ‘Identity’ and ‘Experience’: Theories of Representation and Justice in 
Selected Narrative Forms (Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch University) 2000. 
Said, E. Orientalism (London: Penguin) 2003. 
Scott, K. True Country (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 1993. 
Scott, K. Benang (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press) 2000. 
Scott, K. “Covered up with Sand” (2007) 66(2) Meanjin 120.   268
Shoemaker, A. Black Words White Page (Canberra: ANU E Press) 2004. 
Sidebotham, N. Jurisdictional Review: An Error of Jurisdiction or Jurisprudence? 
(Master of Laws Thesis: University of British Columbia) 1994. 
Simpson, G. “Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of Settlement: 
An Unresolved Jurisprudence” (1993) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 195. 
Slater, L. “Benang: From the Heart: ‘I Found Myself Among Paper’” (2001) 16(1) 
Southerly 220 at 220. 
Slater, L. “Kim Scott’s Benang: An Ethics of Uncertainty” (2005) 4 Journal of the 
Association for the Study of Australian Literature 147. 
Slater, L. “Kim Scott’s Benang: Monstrous (Textual) Bodies” (2005) 65(1) Southerly 
63. 
Slater, L. “Benang, This “Most Local of Histories”: Annexing Colonial Records into 
a World without End” (2006) 41(1) Journal of Commonwealth Literature 51. 
Slemon, S.  “The Scramble for Post-colonialism” in Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and 
Tiffin, H. Post-colonial Studies Reader (London: Routledge) 1995. 
Smith, S. “Re-Citing, Re-Siting, and Re-Sighting Likeness: Reading the Family 
Archive in Drucilla Modjeska’s Poppy, Donna Williams’ Nobody Nowhere, and 
Sally Morgan’s My Place” (1994) 40(3) Modern Fiction Studies 509. 
Stewart, C. “The Rule of Law and the Tinkerbell Effect: Theoretical Considerations, 
Criticisms and Justifications for the Rule of Law” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 
135. 
Stewart, I. “The Critical Legal Science of Hans Kelsen” (1990) 17 Journal of Law 
and Society 273. 
Stewart, I. “Men of Class: Aristotle, Montesquieu and Dicey on ‘Separation of 
Powers’ and ‘The Rule of Law’” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 187. 
Sullivan, J. “Making a fiction of history …” The Age October 21, 2006. 
Sullivan, J. “Skeletons are out” The Age July 2, 2005. 
Summerfield, T. Families of Meaning: Dismantling the Boundaries Between Law 
and Society (Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch University) 2004. 
Telling Our Story: A Report by the Aboriginal Legal Service of WA (Inc) on the 
Removal of Aboriginal Children from their Families in WA (Perth: Aboriginal 
Legal Service of WA (Inc)) 1995.   269
Thompson, E.P. Whigs and Hunters – The Origins of the Black Act (New York: 
Pantheon) 1975. 
Threadgold, T. “Law and Literature: Revised and Enlarged Edition by Richard 
Posner” (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 830. 
Trees, K. Narrative and Co-existence: Mediating Between Indigenous and Non-
indigenous Stories (Doctoral Thesis: Murdoch University) 1998. 
Trees, K. “My Place as Counter-Memory” (1991) 32 SPAN 66. 
Uhlmann, A. “Law Translating Life and Life Translating Law Through Stories: 
Bringing Them Home and Benang by Kim Scott” (2001) 15 The Australian Feminist 
Law Journal 41. 
Van Krieken, R. “From Milirrpum to Mabo: The High Court, Terra Nullius and 
Moral Entrepneurship” (2000) 23(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
63. 
Vogler, A. “Forging heritage for the tourist gaze: Australian history and 
contemporary representations reviewed” (2007) 91 Journal of Australian Studies 93. 
Ward, G.Wandering Girl (Broome: Magabala Books) 1987. 
Ward, I. Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 1995. 
Watson, I. “Indigenous Peoples’ Law-Ways: Survival Against the Colonial State” 
(1997) 8 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 39. 
Webber, J. “The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for Standards of Justice in 
Mabo” (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 5. 
Weisberg, R. The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern 
Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1984. 
West, R. “Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and 
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner” (1985) 99 Harvard Law 
Review 384. 
Williams, M. Empty Justice: One Hundred Years of Law, Literature and Philosophy 
(London: Cavendish Publishing) 2002. 
Williams, M. Secrets and Laws: Collected Essays in Law, Lives and Literature 
(London: Cavendish Publishing) 2005.   270
Williams, P. and Chrisman, L. Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A 
Reader (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf) 1993. 
Wright, A. Carpentaria (NSW: Giramondo) 2006. 
 
Case Law 
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
Attorney-General (NSW) v Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312. 
Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 24 ALR 118. 
Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286. 
Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141. 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203. 
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
Western Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1. 
Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
Williams v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 16 CLR 404. 




Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901. 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991. 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992. 
Family Law Act 1975. 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986. 
Marriage Act 1961.   271
Native Title Act 1993. 
Native Title Amendment Act 1998. 
Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007. 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975. 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984. 
Australian Capital Territory 
Discrimination Act 1991. 
Human Rights Act 2004. 
New South Wales 
Aborigines Protection Act 1909. 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. 
Queensland 
Aboriginal Protection and the Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897. 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991. 
South Australia 
Aborigines Act 1911. 
Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966. 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984. 
Maralinga Land Rights Act 1984. 
Northern Territory Aboriginals Act 1910. 
Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981. 
Tasmania 
Cape Barron Island Reserve Act 1912. 
Victoria 
Aborigines Act 1890. 
Aborigines Protection Act 1886.   272
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. 
Equal Opportunity Act 1985. 
Western Australia 
Aborigines Act 1897. 
Aborigines Act 1905. 
Aborigines Act Amendment Act 1911. 
Aboriginal Protection Act 1886. 
Child Welfare Act 1947. 
Native Administration Act 1936. 
Native Welfare Act 1963. 
 
Other Sources 
Commonwealth,  Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 February 
2008 at 167 (Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister). 